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Abstract
Heritage buildings are exposed to the same fire threats as others. This dissertation has the
goal to provide a risk management procedure in order to improve fire protection of Valu-
able Contents contained in Historical Heritage Buildings. None specific Italian code or law
have the building and content protection as its primary goal, but managers of historical
buildings have however responsibility for the Valuable Contents inside the building. The
core of the procedure is structured in two parts: 1.Risk Assessment; 2.Risk Treatment.
In Risk Assessment phase, by means of a risk analysis and evaluation method, we want
to point out which are the weak points in contents’ protection due both to building fea-
tures and to management strategies. The hierarchy structure is composed by 4 diﬀerent
levels: 1-Policy (target of the procedure); 2-Objectives (top parameters: Evacuation, Fire
Brigade Eﬀectiveness and Fire and Smoke Spread); 3–Characteristics (Technical Installa-
tions, Egress Paths, Structure, Height, Vertical Connections, Context); 4-Factors (total of
15 factors). To feed the Hierarchy Structure with reliable data, experts’ judgments have
been collected making use of a Delphi Method performed in Italy. The expert panel for
this research has been selected among Italian academics, fire brigades and technicians in-
volved in historical building’s management: the tool is calibrated on the Italian situation.
Results from Delphi have been used in the risk hierarchy calculation and a sensitivity anal-
ysis has been conducted to test the reliability of the structure. In Risk Treatment phase
is proposed a strategy to choose the best set of mitigation measures to reduce risk for
Valuable Contents. The procedure suggests to the user sets of coherent measures to miti-
gate specific risk indexes by means of managerial strategies and interventions on building.
The procedure has been applied to two diﬀerent historical buildings in order to compare
outputs from the procedure with the expectations.
Sommario
Gli edifici storici sono esposti a minacce di incendio paria gli altri. Questa tesi ha lo
scopo di fornire una procedura di gestione del rischio, al fine di migliorare la protezione dal
fuoco di contenuti di valore all’interno degli edifici del patrimonio storico. Nessuna legge
italiana ha la protezione dell’edificio e dei contenuti come obiettivo primario; i manager
degli edifici storici hanno comunque la responsabilita` di proteggere i contenuti di valore
presenti all’interno dell’edificio. Il nucleo della procedura proposta e` strutturato in due
parti: 1-valutazione del rischio; 2. trattamento del rischio. In fase di valutazione, per
mezzo di un metodo gerarchico di analisi del rischio, vogliamo sottolineare quali sono i
punti deboli riguardo la protezione dei contenuti dovuti sia alle caratteristiche costruttive
dell’edficio che alle strategie di gestione. La struttura gerarchica di riferimento e` composta
da 4 diversi livelli: 1-politica (target della procedura), 2-Obiettivi (parametri apicali:
Evacuazione, Eﬃcacia dei Vigili del Fuoco e Propagazione del fumo e delle fiamme), 3-
Caratteristiche (Impianti tecnici, Vie d’esodo, Struttura, Altezza, Connessioni verticali,
Contesto), 4-Fattori (15 sotto-parametri). Per alimentare la struttura gerarchica con dati
attendibili, sono stati raccolti giudizi di esperti facendo uso di un metodo Delphi condotto
in Italia. Il gruppo di esperti di questa ricerca e` stato selezionato tra gli Accademici
italiani, Vigili del Fuoco e Tecnici coinvolti nella gestione degli edifici storici: lo strumento
e` quindi calibrato sulla situazione italiana. I risultati del Delphi sono stati utilizzati nel
calcolo della struttura gerarchica e un’analisi di sensitivita` e` stata condotta per verificare
l’aﬃdabilita` della struttura. In fase di trattamento del rischio si propone una strategia
per scegliere il miglior set di misure di mitigazione per ridurre il rischio per i contenuti di
valore. La procedura propone all’utente gruppi di misure coerenti per ridurre gli indici di
rischio specifici attraverso strategie gestionali o interventi sulla costruzione. La procedura
e` stata applicata a due diversi edifici storici, al fine di confrontare i risultati ottenuti dalla
procedura con le aspettative.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit hat zum Ziel, auf ein Risikomanagementverfahren bereitzustellen, um das
Feuerschutz wertvoller Inhalte der historischen Geba¨ude zu verbessern. Kein italienisches
Recht betrachtet den Geba¨ude- und ihen Inhaltsschutz als vorrangiges Ziel. Die Managers
der historischen Geba¨ude haben die Verantwortung, die die innerhalb des Geba¨udes be-
findenden Wertsachen zu schutzen. Der Kern des vorgeschlagenen Verfahrens ist in zwei
Teilen gegliedert: 1. Risikobewertung; 2. Risikobehandlung. In der Evaluierungsphase wer-
den die Schwachstellen durch eine hierarchische Methode der Risikoanalyse des Inhalts-
schutzes betont. Diese Schwachstellen ha¨ngen sowohl von den strukturellen Merkmalen der
Geba¨ude als auch von den Managementsstrategien ab. Die hierarchische Referenzstruktur
besteht aus vier Stufen: 1. Politik; 2. Ziele; 3. Eigenschaften; 4. Faktoren. Um zuverla¨ssige
Daten in der hierarchischen Struktur einzufu¨gen, wurden Expertenurteile durch den Ein-
satz einer “Delphi-Methode”, der in Italien durchgefu¨hrt wurde. Die Gruppe von Experten
dieser Forschung wurde zwischen Akademiker, Feuerwehrma¨nner und Techniker gewa¨hlt,
die an der Verwaltung der historischen Geba¨uden eingewickelt sind. Dieses Resultat wurde
durch die Italienische Situation kalibriert. Die Ergebnisse der Delphi-Methode wurden in
der Berechnung der hierarchischen Struktur verwendet, und schließlich wurde eine Sensi-
tivita¨tsanalyse durchgefu¨hrt, um die Zuverla¨ssigkeit der Methode zu u¨berpru¨fen.
In der Risikosbehandlungsphase wird eine Strategie vorgeschlagen, um die beste Grup-
pe von Minderungsmaßnahmen zu wa¨hlen, um das Risiko fu¨r relevante Inhalte zu redu-
zieren. Die Praxis bietet Gruppen von Maßnahmen an den Anwender, um die spezifischen
Risiko-Index durch gezielte Strategien und Interventionen auf dem Geba¨ude zu reduzieren.
Das Verfahren wurde auf zwei verschiedenen historischen Geba¨udenn aufgebracht, um die
erhaltenen Ergebnisse mit den Erwartungen zu vergleichen.
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Chapter 1
Preservation of Historical Heritage
Buildings and Valuable Contents
During the recent decades and especially since the seventies, a great concern about the
Conservation and Preservation of Cultural Heritage has appeared in many countries. This
universal concern has diﬀerent reasons, among them the fact that many historic monu-
ments have been compromised by a messy urban development.
1.1 Protection of cultural heritage
The memory of a nation is based on its technical and cultural creations of the past [93, 92].
A gap in the historic continuity of the nation is created, if these monuments or works of
art disappear. As a consequence of that gap, social life is disarranged, so that sometimes
society is forced to create substitutes. That is the reason why Poland, a country that was
totally destroyed after the Second World War, decided to rebuilt its town and monuments
in the pre-war style [93]. The protection of monuments and their valuable contents is a
necessity scooping to the preservation of historic heritage and the transmission from one
generation to the next, in order to preserve the cultural identity and continuity of nations
and societies through the years.
The erection of a monument does not automatically assure its maintenance through
time. It mainly depends on the consideration given by future generations, that is to say,
in which degree a society can evaluate cultural values of the past, how far these values
can resist time. As reported in [92], Goethe expressed for the first time in 1798, in the
introduction of his work “Propyle¨n”, another concept for the cultural creation, referring
that:
“[. . . ] everything that man is thinking or is creating belongs to humanity and
every human eﬀort which could be used by humanity, brings her into human-
ity.”
In this way, the meaning of universality of arts and science is introduced. This concept sur-
vives till today and is included in international conventions and agreements for monuments
conservation.
1
1.2 International conventions and agreements
From Papaioannou [92], it is possible to identify the “Swedish law”, in 1866, as the first
legislation on conservation of national monuments. Then, in the beginning of XX century,
International Agreements referred to protection of cultural heritage from war damage were
published. In Athens Congress of 1931, the concept of an international cultural inheritance
with specific general principles was for the first time emphasized. That was imprinted in
a vote accepted by the Society of Nations Assembly, in 1932. A relevant indirect reference
was made again in the international meeting of architects (C.I.A.M.) in Athens (1933).
They specified the basic principles of urban planning in the so called “Charter of C.I.A.M.”.
A significant step for monuments protection in the period of war operations was “Hauge
Convention” signed in 1954, with initiative of UNESCO. So we reach 1964, when the
second Congress of Architects and Experts in Historic Monuments takes place in Venice.
There were 13 Resolutions in that Congress. The first of them is known as “International
Restoration Charter” or Charter of Venice [108]:
Preamble
Imbued with a message from the past, the historic monuments of generations of
people remain to the present day as living witnesses of their age-old traditions.
People are becoming more and more conscious of the unity of human values and
regard ancient monuments as a common heritage. The common responsibility
to safeguard them for future generations is recognized. It is our duty to hand
them on in the full richness of their authenticity. [. . . ]
It is defined in that text the meaning of historic monument, which does not cover only
architectural creature but the whole urban or rural area as an evidence of a historic event
or a specific civilization. That does not only refer in the famous creations but also in the
modest anonymous works that gained through the time a cultural value. Restoration and
conservation of monuments have the task to conserve them as works of art and historic
evidence. Various definitions exist in diﬀerent countries on terms concerning restora-
tion and conservation (preservation, reconstruction, sanitation, rehabilitation, anastylosis,
etc.). Charter of Venice constitutes the framework of international architectural heritage
conservation principles.
Always according to Papaioannou [92], the “Convention of Archeological Heritage Pro-
tection”, signed in London in 1969, is identified as the next general international docu-
ment after Charter of Venice. Three years later, Convention of Universal Cultural
and Natural Heritage [113] of the United Nations is signed in Paris (November 1972).
1975 was aﬃrmed by the Council of Europe to be the year of European architectural
heritage conservation. The most eminent manifestation in this year was the Congress of
Amsterdam and the homonymous declaration consisting the Charter of Architectural
Heritage [44], signed by 21 nations.
A very important step for architectural heritage conservation was the European Council
Ministers meeting held in Granada of Spain on October 1985. There were representatives
from the - at that time - 21 member states of European Community, who signed the Con-
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vention of European Architectural Heritage Protection [45]. This is still now the
frame of a common policy for the conservation and the distinction of European Architec-
tural Heritage. In that convention dilated meanings of monument, architectural complex
and historic site, which include not only archaeological and artistic masterpieces, but also
buildings, complexes or areas with a special scientific, social or technological interest were
established. Member states undertook the duty to make registration and complete docu-
mentation of their national monuments. A relevant legislation on conservation with proper
mechanisms of practical application, control and penalties should be applied. Finally, the
need of a national and international cooperation among conservationists, architects and
other experts, and of a mutual technical assistance and exchange of information and ex-
perience was emphasized.
The latest chain link in the long history of heritage conservation, is the Council
Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society [43] (signed
in Faro, October 27th 2005). The Council of Europe had the aim to emphasize the value
and potential of cultural heritage that have to be wisely used as a resource for sustainable
development and quality of life in a constantly evolving society. With the 2005 convention
is recognized the need to put people and human values at the centre of an enlarged and
cross-disciplinary concept of cultural heritage; another step towards the creation of a pan-
European framework for co-operation in cultural heritage protection. Below is an extract
from the Council Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society:
Article 1. Aims of the Convention
The Parties to this Convention agree to:
1. recognise that rights relating to cultural heritage are inherent in the right
to participate in cultural life, as defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights;
2. recognize individual and collective responsibility towards cultural heritage;
3. emphasize that the conservation of cultural heritage and its sustainable
use have human development and quality of life as their goal;
[. . . ] .
1.3 Definitions
Speaking about conservation of historical heritage we refer, as widely said, both to build-
ings and their contents. We must use a common language, which has been established
by the conservationists during many years and is written in several international texts
(Conventions, Agreements etc.).
CONSERVATION
Conservation is defined as the technical intervention to protect a historic monument or
a traditional or listed building from dilapidation. Below text extracted from the Charter
of Venice, with comments:
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ARTICLE 4. It is essential to the conservation of monuments that they be
maintained on a permanent basis.
ARTICLE 5. The conservation of monuments is always facilitated by making
use of them for some socially useful purpose. Such use is therefore desirable
but it must not change the lay-out or decoration of the building. It is within
these limits only that modifications demanded by a change of function should
be envisaged and may be permitted.
It has to be noticed the importance of the compatibility between present use and historic
destination of use. Usually giving a modern destination of use to ancient buildings can
lead to make interventions on the lay-out of the building.
ARTICLE 6. The conservation of a monument implies preserving a setting
which is not out of scale. Wherever the traditional setting exists, it must be
kept. No new construction, demolition or modification which would alter the
relations of mass and colour must be allowed.
It is important to take the less invasive actions in order to conserve the building integrity.
ARTICLE 7. A monument is inseparable from the history to which it bears
witness and from the setting in which it occurs. The moving of all or part of
a monument cannot be allowed except where the safeguarding of that monu-
ment demands it or where it is justified by national or international interest of
paramount importance.
ARTICLE 8. Items of sculpture, painting or decoration which form an integral
part of a monument may only be removed from it if this is the sole means of
ensuring their preservation.
It is important to conserve the building with all its artistic contents and architectonical
features.
RESTORATION
“We usually consider as restoration every action done with the aim to give new eﬃ-
ciency to a product of human activity”. This definition of restoration, given by Brandi
[36], is the most general definition of restoration that can be given. Such a sentence has
intrinsically a lot of unsolved issues, starting from the expression “to give new eﬃcienc”. Is
it simply possible to re-establish objects functionality or to re-establish objects usability?
Each one of the aims brings to diﬀerent behaviours in acting on cultural objects (both
works of art and heritage buildings).
MONUMENT
Monument is defined in the first article of the Charter of Venice:
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[. . . ] ARTICLE 1. The concept of an historic monument embraces not only the
single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found
the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or an historic
event. This applies not only to great works of art but also to more modest works
of the past which have acquired cultural significance with the passing of time.
[. . . ]
The following are considered as the main characteristics of a monument (conditions sine
qua non) [93]:
1. Originality. Which refers to the special value of every monument, that could not be
repeated even in the case of a precise copy, since it includes a correlation of those
components and parameters consisting an original creation.
2. Time (historicity). Which includes all time phases and interventions to the monu-
ment, giving the chronological sequence of events in the life of the creature.
3. Quality. Which is diﬃcult to be defined since the elected evaluation system is several
times subjective depending on the ideology and the aesthetic criteria of every society
and each period.
4. Symbolism (message). This criterion was added in order to declare the message from
the past contained in the monument and it is expressed with each accurate form
WORK OF ART
The concept of work of art (WoA) is strictly linked (if almost not intrinsically compre-
hended) with the previous definitions. In order to define Conservation, Restoration and
Monument we need to have clear in our mind what a Work of Art is. From Brandi [36]:
“‘[. . . ]As a product of human activity, work of art is composed by a double
essence: aesthetic essence, that corresponds to the fact of artistry, that change
a work into a work of art; historic essence that put the human product in a
certain time period and place, work of art that in a certain time and place
stands. [. . . ] Restoration is the methodological moment of the work of art
identification, in its physical consistency and in its double essence, aesthetical
and historical [. . . ]”
The diﬀerence between physical consistency of the works of art and their essence is
usually a parameter employed to estimate importance of works of art in case of fire. On
one hand, with respect to the fire event, any work of art reacts with its physical consis-
tency; on the other hand, the damage of a work of art due to smoke or fire is mainly a
damage to its essence (historical and aesthetical).
VALUABLE CONTENTS
To define Valuable Contents it is necessary to refer to the previous definition of Work
of Art. The object of this dissertations are Historical Heritage Buildings (ref. following
definition) containing Works of Art and the main objective is to mitigate fire risk to which
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they are exposed. From the above definition, Work of Art has two essences: the physi-
cal and the aesthetic one. A risk manager has to be interested in both aspects but, as
a technician, he is used (and he has competency) to manage only the physical aspect.
It is necessary to leave the definition of “aesthetic essence” to art historians, or at least
collaborate with them. This is the reason why, in the follow of this thesis, every time we
refer to contents importance (or value) we’ll adopt definitions and rankings given in Cost
C17 [86], a European research program involving art historians to estimate damages due
to fire in historical buildings (for a detailed Cost C17 description refer to section 3.1).
We’ll manage the “physical essence” of the assets because the material, the shape and the
dimension of the object are involved in fire event, and it is the “physical essence” that
take part to the Damage determination (ref. Definition 2 in chapter 2, section 2.1). Since
we have the necessity to link Damage and Losses (ref. Definition 3 in chapter 2, section
2.1), we need to involve the “aesthetic essence” referring to conventional criteria accepted
by art historians.
We refer to Valuable Contents when we have physical objects (wooden or textile pictures,
statues, jewels, and other mobile items) that can be classified with the“importance criteria”
given by art historians in Cost Action C17 “Executive Summary of Recommendations”,
[86].
HISTORICAL HERITAGE BUILDING
Historical Heritage Building (HHB) is in this dissertation defined as: an historical building
(sites and areas are not comprehended) that is considered a monument because of its fabric
and its contents and/or its destination of use. For Historical Heritage Building we consider
here a building that has:
• an intrinsic historical value linked to its life through centuries;
• an intrinsic artistic and architectonical value due to building’s fabric;
• a social value;
• a cultural value.
We are here interested in HHBs containing Valuable Contents. Valuable Contents intrinsi-
cally linked to the building (frescos, tapestries, decorations, etc.) are indirectly considered
among the building’s architectonical features.
MANAGER OF HISTORICAL HERITAGE BUILDINGS
In this dissertation we’ll refer to Italian situation in defining ‘HHB manager” in the
acceptation we’ll use all along this thesis. Since we refer to the link between Historical
Heritage Buildings and Valuable Contents protection, we can base our definition on the
“museum manager” definition given by Italian law.
From Italian law about museum’s management standards “DM 10/05/ 2001” [11] :
“[. . . ]The multiple functions of the museum (primarily conservation and col-
lection management, access and services to the public, safety, research) may
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be carried out only if the museum has qualified personnel. [. . . ] to protect the
collective interest, must be complied with certain rules covering: [. . . ]- the full
responsibility of the director in front of the organ of government and control of
the museum, especially for choices of technical-scientific nature [. . . ]”
From Garlandini [59] this definition is here related:
The Museum manager is responsible for the museum as part of the mission he
or she is entrusted by the owner and/or operator. He/she defines the strate-
gic decisions for the promotion and development of the institution. He/She
is responsible for the collection and quality of activities and services of the
museum.
He/she has a triple function of guidance and control systems [99].
• Science: he/she defines and monitors the activities related to collections and their
enrichment, and he/she supervises and contributes to the conservation, study, safety
and development of collections. He/she establishes guidelines for research institute.
• Cultural: he/she defines the overall plan of activities related to the presentation of
the permanent and temporary exhibits and promotes public access to the museum
and its services.
• Managerial: he/she coordinates the diﬀerent services of the museum and has the
responsibility for human resources management, technical and financial. He/she
ensures the relationships with local owners. He/she represents the museum at the
diﬀerent institutions and partners, both public and private. He/she ensures the
continuous assessment of the activities of the museum.
Manager in State Museums
Italian law 42/2004 does not provide the figure of the “museum manager” for state muse-
ums. State museums are managed in a “museum oﬃce”’ way by the Soprintendenza and
manager function is carried out, among his many duties, by the Soprintendente or one or
more delegates.
More in general terms, we’ll define in this dissertation a “HHB manager” as the person,
or the group of persons, that has the following responsibility:
• Administrative responsibility
implementation of administrative procedures for management. Define of objectives
and address the programmatic management of capital goods. Implementation of
programs and projects.
• Economic and financial responsibility
Economic planning and multi-annual management of economic and financial re-
sources.
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• Institutional responsibility
Oﬃcial representative of the museum (as delegated by policy).
• Responsibility in human resource management
Procedures for recruitment, human resources management and organization. Train-
ing and retraining of personnel.
• Responsibility for real property, furnishings and equipment
HHB: technical plans, fittings, equipment. Routine maintenance and repairs.
• Safety Responsibility
Safety of occupants (employees and visitors). Fire prevention.
• Responsibility on mobile contents
Management of collections. Management of in storage and on loan collections, pre-
sentation and exhibition of heritage. Relations with the Superintendents. Security
of the museum’s heritage (theft and damage). Restoration and conservation.
1.4 Historical Heritage Buildings in Italy
In each European country there are specific laws defining heritage buildings and “items”
[85], [97], [128], [94]. The first Italian Law defining either rules to identify “items” (build-
ings, goods, paintings, collections, etc.) to be considered of historic and/or artistic interest
and to protect them, was Legge n.1089 issued in 1939 [2]. According to this Law all public
property “items” older then 50 years and whose author was not any more alive, had to
be considered of historic and/or artistic interest and consequently protected. Each public
owner would have to compile a list of the “items” belonging to him and send it to the
competent Minister. These public “items” could not be sold.
For private property “items”, it was necessary that the Ministry notified to private
owners the “binding force” of historic and/or artistic interest. This “binding force” could
be consequent to a notice sent by a public or private subject or, for special kinds of “items”
(as collections of pictures or books or archaeological elements, etc.), it was consequent to
the compulsory declaration produced by the private owner. These private “items” could
be sold following particular rules. For all these “items”, of public or private property, the
Law defined the rules to be followed for their conservation and protection. In 1939 too was
issued Legge n.1497 [3] to protect “beauties of nature”. This Law defined requisites that a
natural site had to satisfy to be considered something to be protected. Even if these were
the most important Laws concerning conservation, during the years diﬀerent kinds of Acts
have been issued relating to specific aspects on the same themes: funds to be utilized for
conservation works, methods to follow for works to be approved and so on.
Things remained essentially unchanged even when in 1999 D.Lgs n.490 [10] was issued
to re-order the sector, through a single Act, replacing about all previous legislation. Few
years ago a new special Law, D.Lgs n.42 [16] titled “Codice dei beni culturali e del pae-
saggio” re-ordered again the matter replacing the previous D.Lgs n.490 issued in 1999.
Substantially, according to this new special 2004 Law, the previously defined criteria to
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identify the “items” to be considered of historic and/or artistic interest have remained
unchanged with the only main diﬀerence that not necessarily all public property “items”
older than 50 years and whose author is not any more alive has to be considered of historic
and/or artistic interest. In fact, according to this new 2004 Law, the competent Ministry
has to analyse all the description forms (that have to be compiled by the public or pri-
vate owners) concerning each “item” in order to verify the historic and/or artistic value
of them. If there are the necessary requirements, the Minister issues a “cultural interest
declaration” and the “item” is included in specific ministerial lists concerning protected
“items”. If not, the “item”, even if of public property and older than 50 years and whose
author is not any more alive, has not to be considered something to be protected and
can be too sold to private owners. In Italian heritage are comprehended at least 95.000
monuments and churches, 30.000 historical buildings, 3.500 museums, 2.000 archeological
sites and 900 theaters.
1.5 Fire in historical buildings
Fire was one of the most serious threats for the buildings and sites through the centuries.
Although most of historic buildings were built in periods when very poor, if not at all,
Fire Codes and Standards were applied, many of them exist now in their original condition
after such a long time. That happens because, on one hand, the traditional builders and
architects applied several sophisticated fire protection measures based on the state of the
art at that time as well on common sense, and on the other hand, after major fires and
conflagrations, the authorities put in force more severe and more developed fire protection
legislation. Historic buildings by their nature vary in age, use and construction. However,
they all share the common threat of damage or total loss by fire. The threat of fire is
omnipresent and consequential damage may be catastrophic: hence the need to manage
continuously the risk of fire at all levels within the existing national structures. An historic
building constitutes a complex environment with regard to the building, building’s fabric,
contents and people (where the public have access) that must be eﬀectively and sympa-
thetically integrated [109]. The dimensions of this complex environment and associated
impacts are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Although fire safety objectives have been expressed in diﬀerent ways by diﬀerent au-
thorities in diﬀerent countries, generally there are accepted two main aspects of fire protec-
tion for modern buildings: life safety and property protection. For historic buildings
the protection of cultural values must be added either for the buildings or for their
contents. It is not possible to achieve an absolute fire safety. In most cases, a proper fire
safety design assume that a limited unwanted fires will occur and proper means shall be
provided to minimize the losses from fire till an acceptable level.
Below is a list of the main fire events in Historical Buildings. The first group com-
prehends the so-called ”Monumental fires” in historic structures and cities that had an
international fame [93, 110]; the second group refers to fires involving heritage buildings
in Italy in the last years [30, 81, 101].
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Figure 1.1: Conceptualisation of the complex environment created by historical buidings [109].
MONUMENTAL FIRES
• The fire of the wooden wall and of many temples of the Athenian acropolis by the
Persians (480 B.C.-Herodotus, III 52). After this complete destruction of the first
Parthenon, Athenians built the new Periclean Parthenon which, although heavily
damaged through the centuries, survive up to now. Two large fires destroyed most
of the valuable parts of the monument. The first one was put by the Celtic tribe
of Eruls pyromaniacs on the year 267 A.D. The second fire was due to the Vene-
tian F. Morosini (1687 A.D.), who bombed the temple of Parthenon completing the
destruction of the Celts.
• Rome (Galatians 387 B.C.) - (Nero 64 A.D.)
• Library of Alexandria (Julius Cesar 47 B.C.-Aurelianus 270 A.D. - Serapeion 391
A.D. and Kalif Omar 641 A.D.)
• London Great Fire (1666) was the initiator of building regulations in England. The
easterly wind assisted the fire spread and highlighted the need of buildings separation
and the control of their walls and roofs ignitability.
• Jamestown, Virginia USA (1608)
• Plymouth, Mass. USA (1623)
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• Manhattan New York, USA (1628)
• Edinburgh Great Fire (1824)
• Chicago, USA (1871)
• Aalesund, Norway (1904)
• Risor, Norway (1716, 1861)
• Thessaloniki, Greece (1917)
• Lisbon-Chiado, Portugal (1988)
• Windsor Castle (November 1992). Fire occurred in Windsor Castle, to the west of
London, the largest inhabited castle in the world and one of the oﬃcial residences of
the British monarch, Elizabeth II.
• South Bridge/Cowgate -Edinburgh (2002)
RECENTS FIRES IN ITALIAN HERITAGE BUILDINGS
• October 27th, 1991: fire breaks out in the Petruzzelli theatre in Bari. The flames
destroy all the internal structures and bring down the roof. Only the walls remain
standing.
• December 4th, 1992: the Cathedral of Brescia is damaged by a fire that destroys
among other things, a painting of the 7th Century, attributed to Paglia brothers,
recently restored.
• January 29th, 1996: a fire almost completely destroys the Fenice Theatre in Venice.
Also many historical documents preserved in the theatre end up in ash .
• April 12th, 1997: a fire severely damages the Turin Cathedral and the adjacent Royal
Palace.
• June 27th, 1998: a fire breaks out between the scaﬀolding raised on the facade of
the Church of San Geremia in Venice, damaging it and partly damaging the wooden
roof of the tower.
• November 4th, 1998: an outbreak of fire at the Royal Palace of Caserta, in the attic
where rooms used by the Air Force airmen of the NCO School are located. On
February 20th, 1999, in the same attic of the Palace another fire started.
• March 30th, 1999: a fire spreads to the French Academy in Rome, at the top of
the Trinita` dei Monti, a housing reserved for students in transit. No damage to the
library, tapestries and works of art.
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• June 27th, 2002: a fire develops during the renovation of the theatre La Scala in
Milan. The workers were working in the attic. They were dismantling the roof of
the structure. It was a fire due to a slow-burning of seasoned wood: a lot of smoke
but no flame. For this reason, none, realized the fact and gave the alarm for several
hours. From this episode a permanent team of four Fire Department was set up, in
order to oversee the construction site 24 hours out of 24. In addition, an oﬃcial of
the Fire Department takes part in regular meetings of the Coordination Committee
of Safety.
• April 15th, 2003: fire in Mulino Stucky of Giudecca, in Venice.
• December 27th, 2010 a fire occurred in one of the major monuments in Lucca, the
Guinigi chapel within the complex of San Francesco. The smoke has completely
blackened medieval frescoes and decorations.
• August 29th 2010 a fire has started at the roof level of the building near the Venice
Salute Church. Firefighters have used large amounts of water to limit the spread of
the blaze, in order to avoid the collapse of the roofs of the rooms of the church. The
morning after the fire, the Titian (Tiziano Vecellio) painting “Davide and Goliath”
has been removed from its location (in a room directly connected to the church main
hall) in order to limit damages due to water used by firefigthers but the painting has
been damaged.
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Chapter 2
Risk Framework
2.1 Fundamentals in Risk Management
In emergency occurrence it is common to refer the need for management systems as a
tool for risk reductions [58], [82]. However, risk should be first defined in order to become
able to be reduced. According to Capone [37], the definition of risk strongly depends on
the context where the object of study is located (i.e., financial-risk, environmental-risk,
technical-risk, health-risk, social-risk). Therefore, a single definition of risk cannot always
be applied. Within the work of Pliefke et al. [96] several definitions of risk regarding dis-
asters were reviewed. Additionally, this study suggests that independent to the context of
the object of study, the definition of risk should involve the terms of hazard, loss, damage,
vulnerability, exposure and consequences. As specified in [67], a structured methodology
for risk reduction is needed. In this sense, the PEER Equation (an earthquake engineering
equation commonly used for risk reductions)is frequently referred, since it suggests a gen-
eralised methodology for decision-making regarding risk estimations and their probability
of occurrence. In general terms, the PEER Equation considers the evaluation of a deter-
mined decision regarding specific risk by considering three main factors: (i) the specific
hazard intensity, (ii) the response of the studied system (i.e., building location and design)
to that hazard intensity and (iii) the potential damages and losses that the decision under
consideration may overcome. Although the PEER Equation encloses a methodology, a
non-rigorous mathematical expression is given:
g(decision) =
￿￿￿
p(loss) · p(response) · p(damage) · p(frequency) (2.1)
In this dissertation we’ll refer to the terminology used in the standard ISO 10241
“International terminology standards - Preparation and layout” (1992 edition) [5]; indeed
ISO vocabulary provides precise indications about some terms linked with fire risk analysis.
“Fire danger” [ref. section 4.103 of ISO] is a concept containing both the potential fire
danger, defined as “Fire hazard” [ref. section 4.112 of ISO] and the “Fire risk” [ref.
section 4.124 of ISO]. Potential fire danger is defined as a “condition that can produce
consequence” and it is not only linked with the “Fire load” [ref. section 4.114 of ISO]
but also with management and organisation conditions, that can even worsen severity
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of consequences we expected after the fire. “Fire risk” is a concept that, according to
equation 2.1, comprehends probability of occurrence and expected damages and/or losses.
In particular, for the aim of this dissertation, it is possible to give the intuitive definitions
reported in the following paragraphs.
Definition 1. (Probability)
Probability of fire occurrence (P) is in inverse proportion to Prevention Measures :
P ∝ 1
PreventionMeasures
(2.2)
Probability increases with the decreasing of prevention measures’ application. In this
dissertation the following prevention measures are considered:
• maintenance of technical installations;
• presence of fire compartments;
• Fire Service Team eﬃciency.
Definition 2. (Expected Damage)
Expected Damage (D) is in inverse proportion to Protection Measures :
D ∝ 1
ProtectionMeasures
(2.3)
The more are applied protection measures, the lower is the expected damage. In this
dissertation the following protection measures are considered:
• technical installations for alarm;
• technical installations for detection;
• technical installations for suppression;
• technical installations for ventilation;
• Fire Service Team eﬃciency.
Expected Damage (D) is also proportional to the Response of the studied system, as
referred in equation 2.1:
D ∝ SystemResponse (2.4)
Worst is the system behaviour in fire event, more severe will be the damage, and the
opposite. Increasing of damage severity is linked to the features of the building we are
studying. In this dissertation the following architectonic features are considered:
• height of the building;
• vertical connections;
• presence of double heights;
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• destination of use;
• presence of chimneys and flues;
• position of the building with respect to the urban context;
• system of evacuation routes;
• structure.
Definition 3. (Expected Losses)
Expected Losses (L) are proportional to Expected Damage (D) and to Contents Vulnera-
bility (V ):
L ∝ D (2.5)
L ∝ V (2.6)
Definition 4. (Contents Vulnerability)
Contents Vulnerability (V ) is in inverse proportion to Contents Importance (I ):
V ∝ 1
I
(2.7)
The more are important the contents we want to protect, the lower is the level of Vulnera-
bility we can accept. It means that for Contents with high Importance, since we want low
Vulnerability, we need to have good Protection Measures. For the ranking of importance
of Contents refer to page 90.
Definition 5. (Risk)
Depending on the considered parameters, risk will be expressed alternatively with the
following expressions:
R = P ·D (2.8)
R = P · L (2.9)
The Risk Management Chain Methodology (RMCM) published in [96] is here intro-
duced as an alternative solution regarding the reduction of fire risk for Valuable Contents
in historical buildings.
In general terms, the RMCM (Figure 2.1) consists of three main steps: risk identifica-
tion, risk assessment and risk treatment. The first step (risk identification) corresponds to
the identification of all the possible risks that may be present in the studied system, where
the adequate system and boundaries definition is important. Once all the possible risks
have been identified, each risk is analysed and judged. This corresponds to the so-called
risk assessment. Meanwhile, risk analysis can be seen as the “operative step”. Here the
vulnerability of the system under specific hazards intensity can be quantified and potential
damages or losses can be distinguished. At this point, all the risks are graded (for example,
into low, medium, high or in any other scale) and compared with each other. With this
information it is possible to distinguish between risks and to prioritise them. According
to the relevance of the risk and its influence into the system, they can either be mitigated,
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the complete Risk Management Chain Methodology regarding disasters,
suggested in [96].
transferred, accepted or rejected (the so-called risk treatment). Only when it is decided
to mitigate the risk, a preventive response and recovery phase can be implemented.
The proposed risk management procedure is built in accordance to the RMCMmethod-
ology, as shown in Figure 2.2. Risk identification is logically linked with fire. The first
step of the procedure is the risk Assessment phase: it is based on a risk analysis process
(identification of the element involved in fire risk) and on a evaluation process that let us
estimate and judge all the identified risks. Between Assessment and Treatment there is a
middle step, useful to evaluate risk acceptability respect to the stakeholders expectative.
If risk is not acceptable, it is necessary to pass to the risk Treatment phase. In this phase
Mitigation Measures are presented and estimated respect to their eﬀectiveness on risk re-
duction.
The specific explanation about the structure of procedure is reported in chapter 4.
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Figure 2.2: Connection between Risk Management Chain and Fire Risk Management Chain
adopted in this dissertation, an elaboration from [96].
2.2 Fire Risk Assessment Methods
In this section some of the diﬀerent existing fire risk assessment methods are reported.
Over the years a great number of methods have been produced for almost all the kind of
activities or buildings [53]. The most widely accepted and used risk assessment methods
will be described in this section.
According to Larsson [74], methods for fire risk analysis may be classified into three cate-
gories:
• Regulations and checklists
• Ranking methods
• Quantitative methods
Fire risk assessment methods fitting historical buildings
Because of the diﬀerent types of risk methods, there are some reasons for preferring a
method to another as far as cultural heritages are concerned [15].
Acceptable features for a method are:
• people safety can be integrated in the same approach as property protection;
• the possibility to give an indication on arson;
• the possibility to have a cost estimate to risk assessment.
Reasons to disregard a method are:
• property protection is not one of the main goals. Methods used for people protection
are less suitable as the principle that the building can be sacrificed for the safety of
the people is often inherent to this approach;
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• the eﬀects to obtain an assessment should be balanced with the importance of the
heritage to be protected. A method requiring a multidisciplinary team approach
or a computer running during hours is not suitable for assessing risks for smaller
buildings;
• cultural heritage is out of scope (i.e. a method deals with explosion risks in chemical
industry);
• only one organisation as owner has the right to use a method and is not accessible
on a broad basis.
Risk Management Methods’ Criteria From FiRE TECHWG6 report [15], the main
contents that a fire risk management method has to comprehend are here listed:
1. Identify fire hazards
2. Quantify consequence and probability of fire hazard,
3. Identify hazard control options
4. Quantify impact of options on risks of hazards
5. Select appropriate protection
2.2.1 Regulations and Checklists
A simple and safe way of achieving a satisfactory level of fire safety in a building is following
carefully the existing building codes. This has very little in common with regular risk
assessment methods, but it has to be mentioned here to illustrate the easiest way of solving
the fire safety problems. An engineer (or in this case even a layman) just has to follow a
number of detailed regulations and no “real” risk analysis is therefore necessary. Diﬀerent
types of checklists are often used as tools to make sure the building fulfils the building
code. Checklists are (if they are adapted to a specific process, activity or building) often the
fastest (and therefore often the best) way of identifying risk features. The main problem
is that it is not possible to quantify the importance of such a feature. Another problem is
that a checklist usually has to be very specific to be useful. Therefore diﬀerent lists have
to be developed and used for almost similar types of buildings. Since building codes have
a long tradition, they were often introduced not based on traditional engineering estimates
but on observations and experiences. The greatest disadvantage of just slavishly following
detailed recommendations is the fact that every hazard situation shows a great variety
in detail. In this approach it is desirable to choose a much more flexible method. Both
regulations and checklists are non-quantitative approaches and may address the steps 1, 3
and 5 from paragraph Risk Management Methods’ Criteria of Section 2.2, while bypassing
steps 2 and 4.
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2.2.1.1 NFPA 914 Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures
The NFPA 914 Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures [12] is to be seen as a regula-
tion based on questions like narratives [15]. NFPA 914 contains fire protection guidelines,
including the need to develop an overall fire protection plan and to emphasize the man-
agement responsibility to address fire protection and to preserve the historic integrity of
the irreplaceable artefacts of history and culture. This document gives guidance on how
to fullfil the regulations. Both a prescriptive approach as well as a performance-based
approach are included, finding solutions to the life safety and fire safety problems in his-
toric structures. In both cases, NFPA 914 has maintained the importance of preventing
or minimizing the intrusion of the fire protection systems or solutions so as not to destroy
the significance of the structure.
2.2.2 Ranking Methods
Ranking methods or semi-quantitative methods are today used in a wide variety of appli-
cations. Fire risk ranking is usually defined as a process of modelling and scoring hazard
and exposure parameters to produce a rapid and simple estimate of relative risk. In short,
fire risk ranking methods are, according to Watts [119], heuristic models which use pro-
fessional knowledge and past experience to assign values to selected variables. Fire risk
ranking methods have more often been developed with the purpose of simplifying the risk
assessment process for a specific type of building, process etc. Quantitative methods often
have been found to be too expensive and too time-consuming, which has led to a need of
finding, or developing, a new risk ranking method which may be applied to the specific
type of building, process etc. Ranking methods remove most of the responsibility from
the user to the producer of the method. Usually a group of experts first has to identify
every single factor that aﬀects the level of safety/risk. The factors represent both positive
features (increase the level of safety) and negative features (decrease the level of safety).
The experts then usually decide the importance of each attribute, i.e. a value is assigned
to each one. The values are usually based on the knowledge and the experience of a panel
of numerous experts. The diﬀerent knowledge and experience of the members of the panel
is, in some way, a step towards reliable results. The assigned values are then operated by
some combinations of arithmetic functions to get to a single value. The value, often called
“risk index”, is a measure of the level of safety/risk in the object and it is possible to
compare this to other similar objects and/or to a stipulated minimum value. To simplify
the ranking procedure for the user, who is often unfamiliar with ranking methods, some
sort of rating schedules, grading schemes etc. are usually incorporated into the method.
The greatest advantage of fire risk ranking methods is probably their simplicity. Thanks to
the rapid risk assessment, fire risk ranking methods are considered to be very cost-eﬀective
tools. However, a demand on a ranking method should always be that the received results
should not suﬀer too much from the simplicity of the method. Another positive side of fire
risk ranking is the structured way in which the decision making is treated. This facilitates
the understanding of the system for persons not involved in the development process and
makes it easier to implement new knowledge and technology into the system. In Table 2.1,
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elaborated from [15], there is an overview on the diﬀerent existing ranking methods and
their ability to meet the acceptance criteria, reasons to disregard the method or positive
features of the method and references.
Name of the Method Meets criteria
on page 18
Negative fea-
tures
Positive fea-
tures
Reference
Risk Value Method Not the 5th crite-
rion
[13]
FSES: Fire Safety Evalua-
tion System
yes It is not aimed at
property, but at
life safety
[119]
Specific Commercial Prop-
erty Evaluation Schedule
yes Cost of insurance [119]
Dow Fire and Explosion
Index (FEI)
yes Cultural heritage
is out of the scope
[119]
XPS FIRE yes Owned by Munich
Re
[7]
Hierarchical Approach yes Workforce re-
quired: Delphi
panel
SIA 81 yes Insurance pre-
mium related
[55],[114]
FRAME yes Life safety and
business risk in-
cluded, insurance
premium related,
arson clue
[51, 53]
FRIM yes Easy to handle Ref. para-
graph
2.2.2.1 of
this dis-
sertation
Table 2.1: Overview on the diﬀerent existing ranking methods, elaboration from [15].
2.2.2.1 FRIM MAB
FRIM MAB (Fire Risk Index Method for Multi-storey Apartment Buildings) was devel-
oped by Department of Fire Safety Engineering in Lund University, [77, 74, 64, 68, 40, 35,
79, 69]. The method was created within the project called “Risk Assessment of Timber-
frame Multi-storey Apartment Buildings Using a Risk Index method”. The project is
a part of the Nordic Wood bigger project named “Fire-safe Wood Frame Multi-storey
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Apartment Building”. The main fire safety objectives of FRIM MAB, as reported in [64],
are deemed to be:
• Provide life safety
• Provide property protection
The Index method is based on a hierarchy structure for the fire safety in a building
with wooden structure. The Index method was developed together with a Nordic project
group, using a so-called Delphi panel for fine-tuning the method and defining the weights.
The Delphi panel was made up of 20 Nordic experts who work with fire safety in various
areas (consultancy, fire brigade, fire testing, fire research and insurance), [69]. The grades
and weights are multiplied giving a relative value for each parameter. The sum of these
weighted grades results in a single index value for the whole building which can be used
to compare with index values for other buildings or diﬀerent fire safety measures. Basic
requirements in the building law must be definitely fulfilled.
To evaluate the FRIM MAB, a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) was carried out on
four multi-storey timber-frame buildings, at that time constructed in four Nordic countries.
Both the index method and the quantitative risk analysis were used to rank the buildings
with respect to fire risk. The comparison showed a reasonably good agreement, keeping
in mind that the two methods are very diﬀerent in nature.
The index method can be used directly on all multi-storey apartment buildings and to
derive a fire risk index demands that the user is an engineer or has some background in
fire safety, [74].
As previously said, the hierarchical approach was found to be the most appropriate
risk assessment methodology for application to multi-storey buildings. In the pilot study
Magnusson and Rantatalo [79] suggested a generalized five-step process for ranking the
attributes.
The procedure that Magnusson and Rantatalo used in the pilot study had the following
steps:
• Step 1: Identify hierarchical levels of fire safety specification
Magnusson and Rantatalo preliminary formulated the Policy as: “Fire safety per-
formance for a wood-frame building should be at least equivalent to that of corre-
sponding building with a non-combustible frame.” The Policy could be expressed in
terms of the following Objectives:
1. Provide life safety
2. Prevent fire spread from room of origin
3. Prevent fire spread to adjacent building
• Step 2: Specify attributes comprising each level
This is the most important and diﬃcult part of the development process. The list
has to be complete; it means that no major features are allowed to be left out, but
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at the same time the list has to be easy to grasp and, if possible, to mathematically
quantify. Usually some sort of matrix operation is used and therefore the wish is to
restrict the number of attributes if possible. It may include statements about life
safety, property protection, continuity of operations, environmental protection, and
heritage preservation.
The NFPA Fire Concepts Tree was used when defining the list of Strategies. The
Objectives above were found to depend on the following Strategies:
“Provide life safety”:
– Control fire growth (S3)
– Establish safe egress (S1)
– Establish safe/eﬀective rescue operation (S2)
“Prevent fire spread through compartment boundaries”:
– Control fire growth (S3)
– Prevent fire spread through room boundaries (S4)
– Prevent fire spread through joints and intersections (S5)
“Prevent spread through building structure”:
– Prevent fire spread through/in concealed spaces (S6)
– Prevent ignition of structure (S9)
– Prevent fire spread through window openings, facades (S7)
– Prevent fire spread to/through attic (S8)
“Prevent fire spread to adjacent building”:
– Limit size of exposing fire (burning building) (S10)
The next level, referred to as the Parameter-level, consists of individual features that
are measurable, directly or indirectly. The Parameters contribute to the achievement
of the Strategies and thereby also to the achievements of the Objectives and the
Policy. In pilot study 13 main Parameters that significantly influence the fire risk in
a multi-storey timber-frame apartment building were identified.
• Step 3: Assign weights to the attributes listed above
These weights are always the same for a specific group of buildings, i.e. in FRIM
MAB approach multi-storey apartment buildings. Once the structure of the index
method has been determined to the objectives, strategies and parameters are given
Weights. The Weights are determined by a Delphi method. As a result of Delphi,
each of the Parameters have Weights that are linked to each one of the Strategies
and the Strategies will have Weights linked to each one of the Objectives, etc. Thus,
the relative importance of each parameter can be calculated through matrix multi-
plication, resulting in the index method.
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• Step 4: Develop a numerical scale on which the attributes can be assigned
values or measures
The values are individual for each building.
• Step 5: Select an evaluation model
Select a mathematical model that combines weights and values for each attribute
and combines the diﬀerent attributes to receive a single value. In FRIM MAB an
Analytical Hierarchy Process was chosen.
Advantages and disadvantages
In agreement with [64], it is possible to aﬃrm that FRIM MAB is only applicable to
multi-storey apartment buildings with timber structure. Parameters, weights and indexes
are strictly linked to the reality of such building typology.
Any engineering method, in any engineering discipline, can be misused and so the Index
method presented here can. It is quite possible to achieve a good index rating by giving
some parameters a very bad rating and other parameters a extremely good rating. For
example, an engineer may give full marks for detection but zero marks for a signal system,
indicating a design where fires are detected but no warning signal is given. In spite of the
good index rating, the resulting building design may be totally unacceptable or absurd
from a fire safety point of view. But this is only possible if the engineer really wishes to
misuse the method. The building design and the use of the method must therefore be
based on common sense, as it is true for most methods in all the engineering disciplines.
It is also important to note that the FRIM MAB is not an engineering design method.
For example, if a designer wishes to reduce the minimum separation distance from other
buildings, as prescribed in the building regulation, radiation calculations and a special
window glass may be used in order to “prove” that the separation distance can be reduced.
The designer cannot use the index method as a design method, but must use proper design
methods.
2.2.3 Quantitative Methods
In an increasing number of countries the situation for building engineers and fire protection
engineers has gone through a rather radical change. By the introduction of performance-
based criteria for fire safety, it is now up to the engineer to verify that the level of fire
safety in the building is equivalent to a building built according to current building codes.
The engineer has to rely more on his own knowledge, which means that considerable
responsibility has moved over to him/her personally. At the same time the freedom has
increased, the engineer is free to use the tools he/she thinks are necessary. In many
cases the engineer chooses to only evaluate a small number of the most likely scenarios.
Computer models have then become a valuable tool for simulation of fire and smoke spread,
evacuation etc. When calculating the total risk or the risk for a single scenario in more
complex situations, an event-tree analysis is often the best tool. (Event-trees and other
risk assessment methods are described in [15], [35], [63]). Fault-tree analysis is another
example of a similar risk assessment method [112]. The term “deterministic methods” is
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often used when referring to this type of methods. Perhaps the most time-consuming and
complex way of evaluating the level of fire risk is to use a probabilistic method. One of the
disadvantages is that the methods require a large base of input data. The engineer also has
to be familiar with diﬀerent mathematical techniques as for example stochastic modelling
and linear regression. The advantage is the precision in the results. It is important to
remember that no method or technique is the perfect choice in every situation, the most
appropriate method has to be chosen from case to case. A probabilistic or deterministic
method is very often the choice when the risk has to be known as accurately as possible.
On the other hand, in many cases these methods are too complex, time-consuming and
costly.
In this specific approach the objective has been to find an assessment method which is
rapid and easy to use, i.e. one should not have to be a fire safety expert to be able to use
it in a satisfactory way.
Probabilistic methods are the most informative approaches to fire risk assessment in
which they produce quantitative values, typically produced by methods that can be traced
back through explicit assumptions, data and mathematical relationships to the underlying
risk distribution [60]. The following table Table 2.2, elaborated from [15], gives an overview
on the diﬀerent existing quantitative methods and their ability to meet the acceptance
criteria, reasons to disregard the method or positive features of the method and references.
Name of the Method Meets criteria
on page 18
Negative fea-
tures
Positive fea-
tures
Reference
CRISP: Computation of
Risk Indices by Simulation
Procedures
yes Aimed at life
safety
[66]
FiRECAM: Fire Risk
Evaluation and Cost
Assessment Model
yes For oﬃce build-
ings
Cost estimate
(based on Cana-
dian Market)
[129]
BFSEM: Building Fire
Safety Evaluation Method
Not the 5th crite-
rion
Cost of insurance
FIERAsystem: Fire Eval-
uation and Risk Assess-
ment
yes Use for light in-
dustrial buildings
[74]
Event Tree Analysis yes Life safety, dam-
age area, cost
benefit analysis
included
[15]
Fire Risk Assessment with
Reliability Index β
yes Complex and
time consuming
[15]
Table 2.2: Overview on the diﬀerent existing quantitative methods, elaboration from [15].
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Chapter 3
State of the Art
“Conservation of Cultural Heritage” is a stated goal of the ISO Technical Committee on
Fire Safety Engineering [120]. Heritage buildings are exposed to the same fire threats
as other buildings, including arson, lightning, construction operations, faulty equipment,
and inadequate maintenance [118]. Many specific aspects of the fire problem are unknown
because statistically, heritage buildings are almost invisible. Fire loss data is typically
collected only on factors that relate to fire cause and origin, building occupancy or building
use. There is usually no fire loss data by historic significance or even building age.
The way we know about fire losses of heritage buildings is by observing those that oc-
cur around us or from media attention to those that are of such importance that they are
newsworthy. Preserving our heritage from fire is a topic that is currently being addressed
around the world, but in Europe in particular. In early Nineties the CIB W014 Working
Commission identified seven projects as those of highest priority, including a “guidance
document on rational fire safety engineering approach to fire safety in historic buildings”.
This represented ongoing work that was initiated some ten years earlier [80]. Other Eu-
ropean activities included a Conference on Fire Protection and the Built Heritage held in
Edinburgh, Scotland in 1998 and the Third International Symposium on Fire Protection of
Heritage held in Warsaw, Poland in 1999. In 2000 the CIB co-sponsored the International
Conference on Fire Protection of Cultural Heritage in Thessaloniki, Greece [93].
In addition to loss by fire, historic buildings are also vulnerable to another type of
destruction, that is caused by a lack of understanding of how design professionals should
respond to the unique configurations and performance characteristics of significant her-
itage properties. Standard fire protection approaches, based on ideal (new construction)
conditions that drastically diﬀer from the conditions presented in historic buildings, can
have adverse impacts on historic materials and spaces and destroy the very qualities that
give a space its historic characteristics. These damaging approaches include removal of
significant architectural features, and changes made for the installation of fire protection
equipment. The problem is not in the introduction of these changes, but in their imple-
mentation without sensitivity and understanding of how each change aﬀects the important
aspects of the building. While building codes have progressed to keep up with developing
techniques of modern construction, the issues of fire safety for heritage premises are rel-
egated to guidance documents, e.g. [8, 6] , with no legal authority. A few rehabilitation
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codes have evolved that recognize the inherent diﬀerences between new construction and
existing buildings, but they retain the inflexibility and additional problems of specification-
based codes, and are inadequate in their approach to historic buildings, the subcategory
of existing buildings with the highest requirement for property protection. None of the
recent generation of codes has definitively resolved the conflict between the prescriptive
language of fire safety and the philosophical language of agreements like the Venice Char-
ters, documents used to identify appropriate preservation approaches and techniques.
In the early years of the twenty-first Century two important European research projects
started on the issue “Fire and Historical Buildings”. These two international research
projects, FiRE TECH and Cost Action C17, represent the most recent and notable scien-
tific works on the topic. This dissertation is based on the main concepts and procedures
contained in those works. In the follow a resume of FiRE TECH and Action Cost C17 is
given. Some previous important studies about fire risk were developed in Sweden, espe-
cially in Department of Fire Safety Engineering in Lund University, ref. paragraph 2.2.2.1.
As widely explained, these studies produced risk analysis methods and techniques (FRIM-
MAB) for fire managing in buildings (note: not fire management in historical buildings).
Some fire safety engineering concepts from these studies are comprised in FiRE TECH
report and are developed in this dissertation.
3.1 COST ACTION C17
The Action started in January 2001 and ended in December 2006; the work of COST Action
C17 has been published as a series of Conference Proceedings [14, 18, 19, 20, 27] in support
of a Final Report [86, 87, 88, 22]. The intention of the Action was to address the physical
and significant cultural loss of Europe’s built heritage to the damaging eﬀects of fire.
It was achieved in a multi-disciplinary, multi-national manner through the collaboration
and integration of a variety of related projects. It was also based on research initiatives
and published material resulting from a number of relevant international conferences. The
outcomes were the promotion of data, methodologies, and management systems. The final
aim was to assist a wide range of end-users balance fire engineering needs with conservation
requirements in the future preservation of the European patrimony.
COST ACTION was conducted because, in addition to associated levels of life loss, the
number, authenticity and quality of European historic buildings is being steadily eroded
through the eﬀects of fire. In 1983 this was recognized by the Council of Europe Commit-
tee of Ministers, who recommended “That the governments of the member states adopt
all legislative, administrative, financial, educational and other appropriate measures to
protect the built heritage from fire and other natural disasters”. Therefore there was a
need to find a balance between technological and management solutions to counter this
disastrous eﬀect of fire. The real scale of loss of historic buildings to fire was, and still
partially is, unknown. Superficial data suggested that the annual and aggregated eﬀect
is considerable, perhaps as high as one important historic building each day. There was
a general lack of statistical information, and a common lack of understanding and appre-
ciation of what measures are available and required, to counter the eﬀects of fire. Good
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guidance was urgently called for, on how to sensitively retrofit modern day equipment into
historic fabric. There was also a need to develop related management expertise in the
dealing with this problem in historic premises.
To assess the specific risks to a historic building requires the need to define possible,
or expected, damage due to a particular hazard or phenomenon. There is a considerable
number of historic buildings requiring protection. It is important to recognize that these
historic buildings are a major contributor to the “sense of place” and they are of great
importance to both inhabitants and tourists.
To be eﬀective in historic building protection from fire, the need was to develop a
high level of international co-ordination and strengthen the levels of trans-national multi-
disciplinary co-operation. The need was to exchange and enhance experiences to increase
awareness and understanding, and to focus future action. Networking partnerships were
identified, their specialist input recognized and roles they perform classified. The associ-
ated skill and knowledge needed to be pooled, assessed and best practice developed. As
said in the previous paragraph, several international conferences considered the topic of
fire loss to the built heritage. But these did not provide the mechanism for encouraging
and co-ordinating research projects. However, published proceedings oﬀered an established
understanding of the issues, although many of them remain unresolved in practical terms.
3.1.1 Objectives of the Action and Scientific Content
Across Europe the full extent of the physical loss of the built heritage to the eﬀects of fire
was unknown. Some suspect it was to be as high as one important historic building each
day, but there were no reliable statistics upon which the real degree of destruction and
cultural loss can easily be established. In integrating new technologies with traditional
disciplines, there was a need to develop synergies within related organizations so that
loss levels can be reduced and, ideally, halted. There was, therefore, an urgent need to
integrate, co-ordinate, and assess the associated factors on a pan-European level so that
a common state of the art understanding emerges to help combat such levels of loss. To
address the problem a pan-European integrated approach was required. The operational
framework considered the vulnerability of historic buildings to fire.
The final aim was to compile appropriate statistical information, including an analysis
of expert opinion on the rate of loss of historic buildings to fire. The Action was based on
the following concepts:
• To understand a common state-of-the-art and to appreciate appropriate countermea-
sures including concerted action to influence future developments in technology;
• To understand the financial protection of historic properties guidance on the sensitive
integration and retrofitting of countermeasures;
• To promote statistical research into the consequences and causes of fires – both major
fires and more minor incidences, (e.g. small fires to which the fire brigade are not
called or false alarms) – and their impact;
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• To use risk mapping data gathered as a basis for discussion, establishing a dialogue
with insurance bodies to seek the development of insurance products more closely
tailored to historic buildings;
• To establish a well-documented survey of technical expertise state of the art to assist
in influencing future developments in fire protection technology for use in historic
buildings;
• To define an appropriate range of passive and active technical equipment counter-
measures;
• To consider alternative approaches to reduce current loss levels;
• To promote findings and benefits of relevant risk assessment methodologies and prop-
erty management support.
• Results of the COST Action have to be targeted to building owners, property man-
agers and conservation professionals to increase awareness and understanding.
3.1.2 Operational framework of the Action
To reach the Action objectives four working groups (WG) were created:
Working Group 1: Data, loss statistics and evaluating risks
Working Group 2: Available and developing technology
Working Group 3: Cultural and financial value
Working Group 4: Property management strategies
The operational framework of the Action was developed to consider the special nature of
the value of historic buildings, the economic aspects of cultural historic value, and the need
for measures to minimize damage if a fire occurs. Specifically this required consideration
of the:
• vulnerability of historic buildings to fire
• risk assessment methodologies
• protection of fabric and content
• prevention of fire and fire spread
• detection and suppression requirements
• training and management of staﬀ
• insurance considerations
In pursuing these intentions, there was a need to integrate and coordinate the asso-
ciated factors so that a common understanding of the issues might emerge. To achieve
meaningful results during the intended life-span of the programme, a strategic approach
was adopted. Each WG produced a final report [18, 19, 20, 27].
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3.1.3 Relevant results
The most relevant results from ACTION COST C17, interesting for this dissertation,
are from Working Group 3 and Working Group 4. Working Group 1 in [98, 18, 71] and
Working Group 2 in [19, 72] produced material that is in partial superposition with Fire
Tech (ref. section 3.2) without having FiRE TECH’s level of detail.
WG3 results: WG3 studied the “Cultural and financial value” issue employing judg-
ments coming from experts and insurance companies [23, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 24,
25, 26, 50].
Value for historical building is mainly linked to:
• costs for reconstruction (partial as well as total reconstructions will be carried
through with the same material and the same construction as the original to the
greatest possible extent, with regards also to economy);
• economic value;
• cultural value.
The definitions from the diﬀerent countries in Europe seem to correspond very well.
Still diﬀerent traditions give diﬀerent emphasis on diﬀerent aspects and slightly diﬀerent
expressions in their definitions. From [23, 123] the following are the main criteria of
cultural historic value:
• historic interest, that includes buildings which illustrate important aspects of so-
cial, economic, scientific, cultural (literature, theatre, film, art, architecture etc) or
military history -architectural interest, which means buildings of interest for their
architectural design, decoration and craftmanship;
• technical interest, which means buildings of interest because of technical innovations.
This issue is in many countries included in architectural interest;
• group value, where buildings are important as part of an interesting or beautiful
unity.
Enhancing factors or added value can be:
1. authenticity or genuineness
2. representativity or rareness, if the building is very typical or very special
3. clarity and educational potential, if the building is suitable for presenting or display-
ing its history and other values as education or for tourists
4. the degree of importance; is it important for a village, for a town, for a region, for a
country or for mankind
Aspects also to take into account are:
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1. quality or state of maintenance
2. usefulness/functionality
From report [127]:
“Cultural historic value is invaluable and priceless. Cultural historic valuable
buildings are not replaceable and sometimes they have not got a market. That
does not mean that they have not got an economic value. Usually they have
an important economic value for society also if they don’t have an economic
value for the owner. It is important to understand that especially in discussions
about the costs for fire prevention measures to take and for insurance. Today
in most countries it is impossible to get grants for fire prevention also in listed
buildings of great importance. That has to be changed.”
From one point of view it is impossible to calculate and set an economic price on the
cultural historical value of a building. On the other hand it is too dangerous not to set
a price on the cultural historic value of a building of great cultural historic value. It is
easy to forget that something priceless costs a lot to protect and is extremely diﬃcult and
expensive to recreate even the fabric of such a building. In summary it is established in
[127] that the economic value of a cultural historic building consist of the value for the:
• owner in terms of market value;
• tourist industry;
• enterprise who can use the value in diﬀerent ways;
• society.
WG4 results: WG4 studied the “Property management strategies” issue and it is the
most eﬀective result of ACTION COST C17 [73, 42, 17]. In WG4 final report there is
the real core of Action’s recommendations. The report is in fact directly addressed to the
building managers and states the best practice to manage protection and prevention in
historical heritage buildings.
The WG4 final report [27] dealing with property management strategies, contains doc-
umentation encompassing the whole range of management regimes for risk preparedness as
well as staﬀ training, audit and controls. The WG4 considers that the management of fire
risks is as important as technical improvements to historic buildings and the on-going need
risk assessment. Using the risk management approach, all three facets - risk assessment,
management and technical solutions - form an integral part of the property management
process.
The perspective of a performance-based approach in planning risk assessment and upgrad-
ing buildings and strategies is the answer to the possible conflict between life safety and
historic object fire improvement.
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3.2 FiRE TECH: Fire Risk Evaluation To European Cul-
tural Heritage
FiRE TECH started from the consideration that fire protection of cultural heritage has had
no high priority in the fire safety business. The resources available for protection of cultural
heritage against destruction by fire were, and still often are, limited and insuﬃcient for the
perceived needs. Authorities - European, national and local - had to select the projects on
an intuitive basis, as there is no technical guidance available. Furthermore, authorities in
charge of the protection of cultural heritage found no support in prescriptive national fire
safety regulations: there is a lack of well-found methods allowing a correct evaluation of
the fire risk incurred by cultural heritage and the tools needed to estimate the eﬃciency
of diﬀerent fire protection measures for building and contents are still missing.
3.2.1 Scientific objectives and approach
FiRE TECH first scientific objective is the development of an evaluation tool taking into
account all the parameters expected to influence decisions when prioritising fire protection
projects in cultural heritage. This goal includes the elaboration of quantitative methods
or the adaptation of existing ones for the evaluation of the diﬀerent parameters/criteria
intervening in the decision process. These parameters are the fire-risk, the eﬃciency of
the measures and their cost.
In parallel with the first scientific objective, the second objective is to give an overview
and examine the relative benefits and drawbacks of the various components of fire safety
techniques. This means a comparison between the diﬀerent possible strategies of pro-
tection, identification of the weaknesses of the existing techniques and the proposal of
alternative solutions. Usual fire protection techniques are often not applicable and/or not
acceptable for the protection of cultural heritage. There is an important lack of specific
information on fire safety technology for cultural heritage.
Under this project, an evaluation tool is to assist authorities in prioritising fire pro-
tection projects and selecting projects on the basis of objective criteria. These take into
account all the selected criteria/aspects in order to optimise the use of the available fi-
nancial resources by the selection of those projects providing the highest gain for the
investment made.
The innovative aspect of the project is that the problem of “fire protection of a cultural
heritage” is in FiRE TECH approached from the viewpoint of ’Fire Safety Engineering’.
3.2.2 Operational framework of FiRE TECH
To reach the objectives of the research, eight working groups (WG) were created:
Working group 1: Identification of the existing practices and regulations and the motiva-
tion behind them
Working group 2: Analysis of fires involving cultural heritage
Working group 3: Fire performance of ancient materials
Working group 4: Existing fire safety technologies and products
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Working group 6: Risk Analysis
Working group 7: Development of a quantitative decision model/method
Working group 8: Case Studies
Working group 9: Database
Each group was composed of academics coming from diﬀerent European Universities
and, at the end of the research, some technical reports and a final report for each group was
published [62, 115, 54, 21, 84, 91, 41, 15, 49, 116, 1]. Additionally a guide was developed
describing the use of fire safety engineering approaches to protect cultural heritage. The
information is made available to all interested parties by the publication of a guidance
document under book format [117].
3.2.3 FiRE TECH methodology
FiRE TECH methodology in analysing Historical Heritage Buildings under fire is struc-
tured in five main parts described in this paragraph. In Figure 3.1 a diagram representing
the method is shown .
3.2.3.1 Agree the objectives – STEP 1
At first, we need to establish the main goals of the analysis. Usually the objectives are:
• OB1 - to protect the occupants
• OB2 - to protect the firemen
• OB3 - to protect the building
• OB4 - to protect the contents
• OB5 - to safeguard the continuity of activity
• OB6 - to protect the environment
For cultural heritage buildings the particular intention of protecting the building
and/or the content may be as important as - or even more important than - the protection
of people or firemen. For cultural heritage buildings in old urban areas, the protection of
neighbour buildings (OB6) may become equally important or even more important than
the protection of people. It is requested to evaluate these objectives, ranking them in
order to decide the most urgent priority. At this step there is the definition of acceptance
criteria: they are an expression of the opinion of the stakeholders on the expected/required
level of satisfaction for each of the objectives. An acceptance criterion for the protection of
cultural heritage buildings and content may be a limit for loss (in percentage or in money
unit). An acceptance criterion for the protection of people may be, for examples, “total
evacuation in 5 minutes” after detection of the fire.
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FiRE TECH Decision Supporting Procedure
STEP 1
AGREE THE OBJECTIVES
STEP 2
ANALYSE THE PRESENT SITUATION
2.1 DATA 
COLLECTION OF 
INFORMATION
2.1.1
Regulations
2.1.2
Casuistry
2.1.3
Description of 
the building
2.2 
ASSESSMENT 
TOOLS
2.2.1
Check the 
compliance to 
the regulation
2.2.2
Risk Analysis
2.2.3
Fire predictive 
modelling 
2.3
ASSESSMENT
STEP 3
LIST AND REVIEW THE FIRE SAFETY MEASURES
STEP 4
OPTIMIZE THE CHOICE OF FIRE SAFETY MEASURES
STEP 5
ANALYSE THE RESULTS CRITICALLY
STEP 6
FORMULATE CONCLUSIONS
Do 
the results meet 
the objectives?
NO
YES
Do 
the results meet 
the objectives?
YES
NO
OK
Figure 3.1: Diagram of FiRE TECH procedure, an elaboration from [117].
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3.2.3.2 Analyse the present situation - STEP 2
This step is divided into two main parts: data collection of information and assessment
tools review.
Data collection of information - STEP 2.1 It consists of three main parts described
in the follow.
Collection of fire safety regulatory elements - STEP 2.1.1 Collect all the regu-
lations applicable to the cultural heritage building studied. In addition to general national
regulations it is necessary to pay attention to local regulations, to particular regulations
for cultural heritage buildings and to particular regulations for the intended use of the
building.
Information out of previous fires occurred in cultural heritage buildings - STEP
2.1.2 Information from previous fires allows the identification of:
• the most common causes of fire in cultural heritage buildings,
• typical fire development in cultural heritage buildings
• potential fire safety measures
In general most common causes appear to be arson, deficient electric circuits and renova-
tion works.
Description of the building - STEP 2.1.3 A complete description of the building,
including all elements that may have any influence on fire safety/fire prevention has to be
produced. This includes the following elements:
• Concept and fabric of the building
It’s a description of the configuration of the building, of the layout, of the geometrical
characteristics of the building. We have then to individuate all the diﬀerent zones
in the building: circulation paths, exits and potential evacuation routes, rooms for
particular activities, fire compartment if they exists. It’s also a description of the
materials constituting the fabric of the building (with special attention to those
elements which are important for the evaluation of the resistance to fire of structural
and separating elements) and the reaction to fire of wall, ceiling and floor coverings.
• Content/fire load of the building
Consists of an estimation of the immobile fire load and an estimation of the expected
mobile fire load. This information allows an estimation of the potential fire duration.
• Technical installation
These technical installations need to be described in terms of their condition, the
number, the type, the maintenance, the control of the installations and fire safety
provisions.
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• Function/use of the building
Here a detailed description is required: the function/use needs to be defined for the
diﬀerent areas (or compartment if they exist).
• Type of the occupants of the building
Report whether the building has day time or night occupancy. Define the typology
of occupants (familiar/not familiar with the building, mobile independent/mobile
dependent persons, age of persons).
• Description of the history and value of the building and its contents
The architectural and structural changes during the diﬀerent renovations are of in-
terest for the fire safety of the building. It may be necessary to split the building
into specific sections (facades, specific rooms or wings...) and content (special objects
who might need extra protection).
Assessment of the present level of safety - STEP 2.2 For the present level of
safety assessment three approaches are available:
• Regulations and check lists - STEP 2.2.1
It may be assumed that a satisfactory level of safety will be achieved by applying
the existing building codes, where this is possible. They have very little to do with
risk assessment methods but give a straight forward way of providing fire safety. A
number of detailed rules have to be followed and no “real” risk analysis is carried
out. Regulations and check lists do not quantify the risk.
• Evaluation of fire risk with risk assessment tools - STEP 2.2.2
A fire risk analysis for the existing situation has to be carried out. In FiRE TECH
a quantitative method has been chosen.
• Assessment of fire risk via fire predictive modelling - STEP 2.2.3
This kind of assessment implies the use of computer simulation models. Many fire
development models are available for the calculation of temperature evolution, smoke
spread etc... (zone models, Computational Fluid Dynamics Models), for the calcula-
tion of structural behaviour, evacuation models for the modelling of human behaviour
during escape.
Risk assessment method used in FiRE TECH - STEP 2.3 FiRE TECH method
for risk assessment is based on the risk definition
R = P ·D (3.1)
with P the happening probability of an event and D the damage associated with that
event (ref. 2.1). Event Tree Analysis is used to define probabilities for each risk scenario
while fire spread models are used to define damages.
ETA is a binary system with a logical graphic presentation. The event tree procedure
consists of the following steps:
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1. selection of the events;
2. event tree design;
3. quantification of fire development;
4. assessment of damage;
5. calculation of risk measures;
6. risk evaluation.
The risk analysis itself is carried out by quantitatively evaluating a number of fire
scenarios. The evaluation calculates the fire development and the evacuation process for
all scenarios in the event tree. Event trees are logic diagrams, which can be used to
illustrate the sequence of events involved in ignition, fire development and control, as
well as the course of escape. The risk for each scenario is calculated by multiplying the
probabilities for the specific scenario. The total probability for a given outcome to occur
is the sum of all specific probabilities for a given scenario. The total risk associated with
a building is the sum of the risks for all scenarios in the event tree.
Selection of the events - STEP 2.3.1 Events included in a life safety analysis are
related to the fire development itself and to the possibility of a successful escape. The first
event of the event sequence is called the starting event. Depending on the occurrence of
one or more intermediate events, diﬀerent outcomes can occur. The initiating event in fire
risk analysis is most commonly “initial fire”. In the following some events related to the
fire event are listed:
• fire location
• source of ignition and first item ignited
• possibility of early suppression by staﬀ
• presence of an automatic suppression system
• smoke ventilation.
Events related to successful escape:
• number of people in the building
• operability of fire detection
• operability of notification system
• number of escape exits available
Events related to the spread of fire and fire gases:
• spread through heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems
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• open doors
• unsealed openings between fire compartments.
In order to find proper reliability data for the included events, the engineer could
rely upon data banks, engineering judgment and sometimes other frequency modelling
techniques as fault trees. In FiRE TECH the probability of having a fire in either of the
locations is related only to the floor surface dimension.
Event tree design - STEP 2.3.2 The objective of an event tree is to provide insight
into the possible consequences of one initiating event (e.g. a fire). The selected events are
brought together in the event tree. The events must come in the order they physically
take after a fire. In each branch, the conditional probability of the included events is
calculated. The probability data for each event derive both from statistical researches and
from engineer judgment about the analysed situation.
Quantification of fire development - STEP 2.3.3 The fire development is quantified
by the use of suitable methods. These could either be more simple calculation methods or
more advanced computer simulations. The aim of quantifying the fire development is to
derive information on how certain fire-related parameters vary with time (such parameters
could be smoke layer height, temperature, visibility level, radiation, concentration of soot
and toxic species, etc...). This information could be made available by the use of hand
calculation equations for more simple structures and by the use of CFD (Computational
Fluid Dynamic) models for more complex buildings. Hand calculation equations are used
to evaluate the flame spread rate and to assess radiation levels to walls and ceilings as the
fire develops. Graphics about the fire development are drawn regarding the fire growth
(measured in squared meters) over time.
Assessment of damage - STEP 2.3.4 The damage to the building is assessed for all
scenarios in the event tree. The state function, to assess if damage will occur or not, is
the following:
tunt ≥ tesc, tsup (3.2)
where:
tunt = time to reach untenable conditions (3.3)
tesc = time to complete escape (3.4)
tsup = time to suppression (3.5)
Considering the safety of people, the negative diﬀerence in the state function could be
used to asses the number of people who will not have the possibility to conduct successful
escape. When addressing property protection, the state function could be used to assess
the fire damage area. For each scenario we have to be able to assign a time of realization.
With such a data we can quantify the damage entering in fire development graphs (pt.
2.3.3 above) and deriving the damaged surface D.
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Calculation of risk - STEP 2.3.5 When the fire development and the fire damage
have been assessed for all scenarios in the event tree, it is possible to derive certain risk
measures.
Given the happening probability for each one of the ETA branch, with some calculation
we obtain the happening probability for each scenario.
Then “outcome” is defined as the set of scenarios with the same time of realization
and consequences. It is possible to calculate the happening probability for each outcome.
After calculating damage with the method expressed above in 2.3.4 and having the
happening probability for each outcome, it is possible to assign a Risk Average to each
outcome.
3.2.3.3 Review the possible fire safety measures - STEP 3
The aim of this step is to list the possible fire safety measures for the case studied, to con-
sider their individual acceptability and reliability, and to provide the information required
for the application of the optimisation methods as applied under step 4. This includes an
estimation of the cost of each possible measure. The evaluation of the criteria acceptabil-
ity, system reliability and cost has to be carried out for the specific case study and will
diﬀer from case to case.
POSSIBLE MEASURES
Possible measures are listed in FiRE TECH:
1. Reaction to fire
2. Fire resistance of structure
3. Fire resistance of partitions
4. Size of fire compartments
5. Characteristic and location of openings on the facade
6. Distance between buildings
7. Geometry of egress paths
8. Access for the firemen
9. Means for fire detection
10. Means for fire suppression
11. Smoke control
12. Emergency and alarm signs
13. On-site firemen
14. Fire brigades
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15. Maintenance of fire safety systems
16. Education for fire safety
17. Emergency planning and training
18. Salvage operation management
19. Periodic inspection of the building
EVALUATION CRITERIA
The evaluation criteria are mainly three:
1. Acceptability
The acceptability of systems means whether the system/product is suitable for the
use in cultural heritage buildings. Acceptability will depend on criteria which have
to be established by the stakeholders and usually depends on architectural or urban
criteria and on conservation criteria.
2. System reliability
The reliability of a system can be defined as the likelihood that the system will
exhibit the desired response in the event of a fire occurring, and can be expressed
either quantitatively or qualitatively, provided that suﬃcient statistical data are
available.
3. Cost
The costs to be considered include:
• capital cost
• manpower/installation cost
• annual running cost
• maintenance cost
• replacement cost
3.2.3.4 Optimize the choice of fire safety measures - STEP 4
In this step a mathematical technique is applied in order to select the most eﬃcient and
cost-eﬀective fire protection measures, using the information collected in the previous steps.
The method proposed in FiRE TECH is the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP). AHP
is a practical technique for modelling and solving multi-criteria decision problems. The
AHP-approach facilitates the development of logical hierarchical structures for complex
decisions. A logical framework is set up, which allows improving the performance of
complex decisions by decomposing the problem in a particular hierarchical structure. The
incorporation of all the decision criteria allows the decision-maker to determine trade-oﬀs
among objectives. The application of the method exploits two kinds of knowledge in the
process of priority, setting when to conceive the “boxes” of the network as well as when
to decide weights relative importance:
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• information gained from the expertise/knowledge of the participants;
• measured or calculated information.
3.2.3.5 Analyse the results critically - STEP 5
In this step the results are reviewed critically with all stakeholders and it is checked
whether the results correspond to everyone’s expectations or not. It is verified whether
the proposed measures after all:
1. satisfy the predefined boundary conditions;
2. meet the safety level required in the existing regulation;
3. correspond to the existing/common practice;
4. are logical.
This check is to be done with the same assessment methods as used in step 2 (checklists,
risk analysis methods, fire predictive methods). If the results are not satisfactory the
steps 3 and 4 need to be reviewed. The optimisation process has to be checked on errors,
inconsistencies, contradictions. If nothing of abnormal is found, the process from step 3
needs to be repeated with extra measures.
3.2.3.6 Formulate conclusions - STEP 6
Finally it is necessary to formulate the conclusion for the stakeholders, to propose measures
to be taken, to give advise on the order of cost/eﬀectiveness on the proposed measures,
to give advise on their estimated costs and reliability, to include the demonstration of the
improvement of fire risk.
3.3 COST ACTION C17 and FiRE TECH: relationships
Both FiRE TECH and COST C17 start from the consciousness raising about the need to
establish common European strategies in fire fighting for historical buildings and contents.
Despite the common basis and organization in Working Groups, the two researches have
diﬀerent scientific objectives and diﬀerent addresses.
FiRE TECH panel of members was primarily composed by academics working in Fire
Safety Engineering and produced results (in primis the “decision supporting procedure”
ref. 3.2.3) mainly useful for academic people.
ActionCOST C17 panel of members was composed by people involved from various angles
in heritage preservation and protection (heritage cultural oﬃcials, museum managers and
owners, fire brigades, heritage building’s safety managers) and produced recommendations
useful both for building’s managers and owners.
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Figure 3.2: Relationships between FiRE TECH and COST C17.
Arrows link COST Working Group dealing with similar topics of FiRE TECH WGs.
On the arrows report’s references are depicted.
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From paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 it is possible to understand how much superposition and
mismatches there are between the two researches, see fig. 3.2.
With the attempt to overcome such mismatches and superpositions, in this dissertation
a procedure to improve standard level of fire safety for contents is proposed.
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Chapter 4
Risk Management Procedure
4.1 Objective of the Procedure
This dissertation has the goal to provide a risk management procedure in order to improve
fire protection of Valuable Contents contained in Historical Heritage Buildings. It is here
proposed the Risk Management Procedure for Valuable Contents in Historical Heritage
Buildings.
The procedure has been built using some of the concepts from FiRE TECH’s decision
supporting procedure, with the aim to respect COST C17 recommendations in managing
contents and preventing losses due to fire events.
According to Action COST C17 scientific mission [87], guidance should be provided to
owners of properties and managers on developing management plans for their properties to
include areas such as Damage Limitation and Liasons with the fire service. The managers
of historical buildings have to be surrounded by specialists who can advise them and
provide the information from which to gain a full understanding of the risks associated
with the historic building.
This should address:
• appropriate risk management principles;
• the need of protection;
• realistic valuation of reconstruction costs for heritage buildings (comprised in losses
estimation).
As stated in [86], all those engaged in protection of valuable cultural heritage should pay
attention to:
• the protection (or lack of protection) of valuable cultural historic buildings and
contents;
• appropriate insurance cover, that is linked to building and contents risk assessment.
COST C17 recommends, in addition, that special circumstances regarding historic
buildings must be described and analysed in the risk analysis:
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• the special vulnerability of the building;
• the activities in the building;
• its fabric and its structural features;
• its surroundings or activities in the surroundings;
• the probability of ignition;
• the distance to the fire brigade.
As shown in section 4.3, most of this features are comprised in the proposed procedure,
which has the aim to be an “easy-to-use” screening tool helping in Valuable Contents
fire risk management. Risk Management Procedure for Valuable Contents in Historical
Heritage Buildings is a decision procedure built according to COST C17 recommendations.
4.2 Starting Hypothesis and Addressees of the Procedure
Each Historical Heritage Building in Italy, open to the public and containing precious
Works of Art (ref. chapter 1, section 1.3 for definitions), is supposed to be “safe” with
respect to fire protection, according to national codes. The main objective of the Italian
fire protection codes is safety of the occupants.
Ways technicians can use to reach the objective of safety for occupants and the chosen
one are building dependent. To this day, Performance Based Design in fire protection is
allowed in Italy thanks to D.M. 09/05/07 [28]. Fire Safety Engineering concepts can be
used as well as standard codes application to demonstrate building’s safety; this usually
happens when prescriptive codes alone cannot be applied. Historical Heritage Buildings
are a pertinent example of such situations and FiRE TECH is the only example of “decision
procedure” in fire prevention that involves, together with safety of the occupants, safety
of the building and of the contents.
In this dissertation we want to illustrate a diﬀerent and more specific procedure that
is able to improve standard level of fire safety in Historical Heritage Buildings, addressing
the interest mainly to contents protection.
It is made therefore the assumption that the building we are going to study reaches the
basic level of fire protection for occupants, according to Italian law and codes. Obviously
there is a link between the building and its contents; in particular, dealing with valuable
contents and works of art, in a lot of situations such items are integral part of the fabric
itself. We are mainly interested in “mobile contents” (wooden and textile pictures, stat-
ues, jewels, some kind of furniture, porcelains, etc.) because of the possibility to intervene
with contents evacuation actions. On the other side we can not neglect the “not mobile
contents” (frescos, heavy statues, heavy furniture, tapestries, etc.) but such items are
usually intrinsically protected by the standard fire protection intervention that we con-
sider to be eﬀective. In spite of all, all the possible link between building and contents
protection are considered in the procedure, so that risk mitigation for “mobile contents”
imply necessarily an improvement of protection also for “not mobile contents”.
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More in detail, Historical Heritage Building’s Managers (ref. chapter 1, section 1.3 for
definitions) have by law the duty to protect from fire:
• building;
• people inside building;
• contents.
As widely said, nowadays protecting the occupants is the primary duty requested from
Italian laws on safety. Usually fire protection interventions on historical building are made
respecting the building characteristics and trying to protect also the building, as far as the
intervention is compatible with the architectonic configuration.We assume, this way, that
the first two duties are usually discharged adopting a fire safety design according to codes.
Anyway, none specific italian code or law have the building and content protection as its
primary goal. Managers have however responsibility for the Valuable Contents inside the
building but in Italy (and in other countries as well), there is no specific law addressing to
the contents preservation from fire in terms nor prescriptive or performance based. The
only instrument now available to manage content protection from fire is the COST C17
set of recommendations.
We want here to define a screening instruments suitable for Historical Heritage Build-
ings’ Manager. As the addressee of the COST recommendations is the Manager of His-
torical Heritage Building, he is also the addressee of the Risk Management Procedure for
Valuable Contents in Historical Heritage Buildings.
4.3 Structure of the Procedure
The core of the procedure is structured in two main parts:
1. Risk Assessment;
2. Risk Treatment.
The fundamental relationships among the two parts are shown in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Conceptualisation of the relationships among Risk Assessment and Risk Treatment.
45
At the top of the procedure there is a phase dedicated to the building’s analysis and data
collection (not represented in figure 4.1), refer to section 4.3.1. This preliminary step has
the duty to provide to users all the necessary information to run the procedure correctly.
This first screening can be done using check lists, as suggested in Annex A.
All the collected data are the inputs for the Risk Assessment phase that produces,
as output, risk indexes concerning control parameters; refer to section 5.1.4 in chapter
5. Risk Treatment phase has now to be performed in order accept or not accept and
mitigate the results from the first phase. If it is necessary to intervene with some actions
of mitigation, the Risk Assessment phase has to be conducted again to evaluate the eﬃcacy
of the actions.
In Figure 4.2 the full structure of Risk Management Procedure for Valuable Contents
in Historical Heritage Buildings is depicted.
4.3.1 Building analysis and data collection
This preliminary phase is introduced to make Risk Management Procedure for Valuable
Contents in Historical Heritage Buildings work in terms of slenderness. First aim is to
approach historical building’s analysis without the necessity to collect the big amount of
complex data required e.s. from FiRE TECH. The preliminary phase should be able to
direct the decision maker to focus and analyse in depth only the most critical building’s
features. Sometimes high complexity due to architectonical features and miscellaneous use
of the building is quite diﬃcult to be fitted. By means of the preliminary phase, we want
to become confident with the building and to exclude from full analysis procedure the less
interesting areas.
Since there is the necessity to have the maximum reduction of input data, we refer to
the most easily detectable information. In gathering information, we refer to two groups
of data: the external and the internal ones. Each elementary information to be gathered
is related to “Sub-Factors” [ref. chapter 5 section 5.1.6] and all the required information
can be deducted from:
• study of the building’s plans and sections;
• study of historical and architectonical development of the fabric;
• simple survey of technical installations;
• collection of data linked to the occupants and the use of the building;
• urban analysis of the building’s context;
• at least one physical inspection to the building.
Information useful for the procedure are divided into two diﬀerent sets: external data
and internal data. External data set is just one for each building while internal data sets
are usually more than one for each building, depending on the complexity of the fabric.
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Figure 4.2: Representation of the Risk Management Procedure for Valuable Contents in Historical
Heritage Buildings structure.
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External Data
The external data consist in the collection of all the architectonical features that can be
attributed to the building itself from a macroscopic view; all the external data are not
variant inside the same building. Such analysis is also introduced to relate the city con-
text of the building to its behaviour in fire event. Especially in Italy, urban context could
be the first weak point in historical building’s fire protection.
Internal Data
Each internal data set comprehends all the building’s technical and architectonical features
that are variant in the building. So, in gathering data from an internal point of view, we
need at first to individuate which are the building’s sectors that have to be catalogued.
This choice could be done according to the definition of Sector based upon one (or some)
of the following criteria. A Sector could be individuate as:
• part of the building with the same destination of use;
• part of the building that is a single architectonical unit (a building’s level, a single
special room - a theatre, an hall, a double-height salon, a series of rooms with
common features);
• part of the building that is a fire compartment (with respect to the regulation defi-
nition).
4.3.2 Risk Assessment
In Risk Assessment phase, a risk analysis and evaluation method developed on the base of
FiRE TECH and FRIM MAB is used. The proposed procedure is based on FiRE TECH
way of applying concepts belonging to Fire Safety Engineering to historical buildings.
Getting ideas from FiRE TECH’s STEP 4 [ref. paragraph 3.2.3.4 in chapter 3]; according
to [74], a Analytical Hierarchy Process technique has been identified among the existing
semi-quantitative risk methods, ref. chapter 5 section 5.1. This choice has been done also
according to Cost Action C17, that in [23] recommends that:
“Analytic methods based on logical systems instead of using statistics (i.e. fault
tree and event tree analysis) to be used for separate buildings or small and big
establishment.”
In Risk Assessment phase we want to point out which are the weak points in contents’
protection due both to building features and to management strategies. To feed the Hi-
erarchy Structure with reliable data, experts’ judgments have been collected making use
of a Delphi Method performed in Italy, ref. section 5.2 in chapter 5. The expert panel for
this research has been selected among Italian academics, fire brigades and technicians in-
volved in historical building’s management. The tool is therefore calibrated on the Italian
situation, especially the Tuscany one.
Risk Assessment phase is described in chapter 5.
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4.3.3 Risk Treatment
After a detailed risk analysis performed with the method described above, it is then
proposed a strategy to chose the best set of mitigation measures in order to reduce the
risk for Valuable Contents. In this phase it could be possible for the manager (with the
support of the building technicians) to accomplish a set of measures able to mitigate fire
risk for contents.
Risk Treatment phase is described in chapter 6.
49
Chapter 5
Risk Assessment Method
5.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi-criteria decision-making approach and
was introduced by Thomas Saaty for the first time in 1977 and then re-elaborated [103,
104, 102, 105]. Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) plays a critical role in many real
life problems and several methods have been proposed for solving multi-attribute decision
making problems [130, 39]. Very often these criteria conflict with each other. Even more
often the pertinent data are very expensive to collect, nevertheless AHP is a method that
is widely used in a lot of engineering applications [111, 57, 39].
We need to organize problems in complex structures which allow us to think about
them one or two at a time. As stated by Saaty [104], we need simplicity and complexity.
We need an approach that is conceptually simple so that we can use it easily. And at the
same time, we need an approach that is robust enough to handle real world decisions and
complexities.
The Analytic Hierarchy Process is such a problem-solving framework. It is a systematic
procedure for representing the elements of any problem. It organizes the basic rationality
by breaking a problem down into its smaller constituent parts and then calls for only
simple pairwise comparison judgments to develop priorities in each hierarchy.
The AHP concept stems from the following three principles for explicit logical analysis:
• Hierarchy representation and decomposition: breaking down the problem into sepa-
rate elements;
• Priority discrimination and synthesis: ranking the elements by relative importance;
• Logical consistency: ensuring that elements are grouped logically and ranked con-
sistently according to a logical criterion.
The first principle of AHP concept involves construction of a functional hierarchy to
decompose complex systems into their constituent parts according to their essential rela-
tionships. The elements in the hierarchy compose a cluster of system objectives, decision
criteria and the attributes of criteria. Each set of elements in a functional hierarchy occu-
pies a level of the hierarchy [46].
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From an operative point of view, according to Saaty [105], in order to make a decision
in an organised way to generate priorities, we need to decompose the decision into the
following steps:
1. Define the problem and determine the kind of knowledge sought;
2. Structure the decision hierarchy from the top with the goal of the decision, then
the objectives from a broad perspective, through the intermediate levels (criteria on
which subsequent elements depend) to the lowest level (which usually is a set of the
alternatives).
3. Construct a set of pairwise comparison matrices. Each element in an upper level is
used to compare the elements in the level immediately below with respect to it.
4. Use the priorities obtained from the comparisons to weigh the priorities in the level
immediately below. Do this for every element. Then for each element in the level
below add its weighed values and obtain its overall or global priority. Continue this
process of weighing and adding until the final priorities of the alternatives in the
lower level are obtained.
To make comparisons, we need a scale of numbers that indicates how many times more
important or dominant one element is over another element with respect to the criterion
or property with respect to which they are compared. In this dissertation we will refer to
the scale proposed by Saaty, Tab. 5.1.
Intensity of importance Definition Explanation
1 Equal importance Two elements contribute equally to the objec-
tive
2 Weak or slight
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly favour one el-
ement over another
4 Moderate plus
5 Strong Importance Experience and judgment strongly favour one
element over another
6 Strong plus
7 Very strong or demon-
strated importance
One element is favored very strongly over an-
other, its dominance is demonstrated in prac-
tice
8 Very, very strong
9 Extreme importance The evidence favoring one element over another
is of the highest possible order of aﬃrmation
1.1-1.9 If the activities are very
close
It may be diﬃcult to assign the best value but
when compared with other contrasting activi-
ties, the size of the small numbers would not
be too noticeable, yet they can still indicate the
relative importance of the activities
Table 5.1: Scale of importance proposed by Saaty, [103, 104, 102, 105].
AHP is a useful technique for discriminating between competing options in the light
of a range of objectives to be met. The calculations are not complex and based on simple
mathematical techniques.
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5.1.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process theory
The mathematical basis of the AHP can be explained in fairly simple outline. For a
full treatment of the AHP the mathematically undaunted should refer to Saaty’s articles
[103, 104].
The AHP has four axioms, (i) reciprocal judgments, (ii) homogeneous elements, (iii)
hierarchic or feedback dependent structure, and (iv) rank order expectations.
Assume that one is given n stones, A1, ..., An, with known weights w1, ..., wn, respec-
tively, and suppose that a matrix of pairwise ratios is formed whose rows give the ratios
of the weights of each stone with respect to all others. Thus one has the equation:
Aw =

A1 . . . An
A1
w1
w1
. . . w1wn
...
...
...
An
wn
w1
. . . wnwn
 ·

w1
...
wn
 = n ·

w1
...
wn
 = nw (5.1)
where A has been multiplied on the right by the vector of weights w. The result of
this multiplication is nw.
Thus, to recover the scale from the matrix of ratios, one must solve the problem
Aw = nw or (A − nI)w = 0. This is a system of homogeneous linear equations. It has
a nontrivial solution if and only if the determinant of A − nI vanishes, that is, n is an
eigenvalue of A. Now A has unit rank since every row is a constant multiple of the first
row. Thus all its eigenvalues except one are zero. The sum of the eigenvalues of a matrix
is equal to its trace, the sum of its diagonal elements, and in this case the trace of A is
equal to n. Thus n is an eigenvalue of A, and one has a nontrivial solution. The solution
consists of positive entries and is unique to within a multiplicative constant.
To make w unique, one can normalize its entries by dividing by their sum. Thus, given
the comparison matrix, one can recover the scale.
In this case, the solution is any column ofA normalized. Notice that inA the reciprocal
property aij = 1/aji holds; thus, also aii = 1. Another property ofA is that it is consistent :
its entries satisfy the condition aik = aijajk. Thus the entire matrix can be constructed
from a set of elements which form a chain across the rows and columns.
In the general case, the precise value of wiwj cannot be given, but instead only an estimate
of it as a judgment. For example, consider an estimate of these values by an expert who is
assumed to make small perturbations of the coeﬃcients. This implies small perturbations
of the eigenvalues. The problem now becomes A￿w‘ = λmaxw￿ where λmax is the largest
eigenvalue of A￿. To simplify the notation, we shall continue to write Aw = λmaxw, where
A is the matrix of pairwise comparisons.
The problem now is how good is the estimate of w. Notice that if w is obtained by
solving this problem, the matrix whose entries are Wi/Wj is a consistent matrix. It is a
consistent estimate of the matrix A. A itself needs not be consistent. In fact, the entries
of A need not even to be transitive; that is, A1 may be preferred to A2 and A2 to A3
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but A3 may be preferred to A1. What we would like is a measure of the error due to
inconsistency. It turns out that A is consistent if and only if λmax = n and that we always
have λmax ≥ n
Since small changes in aij imply a small change in λmax, the deviation of the latter
from n is a deviation from consistency and can be represented by (λmax − n)/(n − 1),
which is called the consistency index (C.I.). When the consistency has been calculated,
the result is compared with those of the same index of a randomly generated reciprocal
matrix from the scale 1 to 9, with reciprocals forced. This index is called the random
index (R.I.). The following Table 5.2 gives the order of the matrix (first row) and the
average R.I. (second row):
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
R.I. 0,00 0,00 0,52 0,89 1,11 1,25 1,35 1,40 1,45 1,49
Table 5.2: Random index estimation according to Saaty, [103].
The ratio of C.I. to the average R.I. for the same order matrix is called the consistency
ratio (C.R.). A consistency ratio of 0,10 or less is positive evidence for informed judgment.
We will accept C.R. ≤ 10%.
The relations aij = 1/aji and aii = 1 are preserved in these matrices to improve
consistency. The reason for this is that if stone ￿1 is estimated to be k times heavier than
stone ￿2, one should require that stone ￿2 is estimated to be 1/k times the weight of the
first. If the consistency ratio is significantly small, the estimates are accepted; otherwise,
an attempt is made to improve consistency by obtaining additional information. What
contributes to the consistency of a judgment are (i) the homogeneity of the elements in
a group, not comparing a grain of sand with a mountain; (ii) the sparseness of elements
in the group, because an individual cannot hold in mind simultaneously the relations of
many more than a few objects; and (iii) the knowledge and care of the decision maker
about the problem under study.
5.1.2 Analytical Hierarchy Process structure
The top level of the hierarchy is the focus, it consists of only one element; subsequent
levels may each have several elements and because the elements in one level are to be
compared with one another against a criterion in the next higher level, the elements in
each level must be of the same order of magnitude. According to literature, [102, 32, 74]
the proposed hierarchy structure is composed by 5 diﬀerent levels:
• Level 1: POLICY Policy is the target of the procedure, it represent the final aim
we want to reach using AHP and it is not involved in the calculation for the lower
levels of the structure. In the proposed procedure policy is:
Fire Risk Assessment for Valuable Contents in Historical Heritage Buildings.
• Level 2: OBJECTIVES
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Objectives are the top parameters that are involved in the AHP calculation. In the
proposed procedure three objectives have been identified:
– OB1: Evacuation
– OB2: Fire Brigade Eﬀectiveness
– OB3: Fire and Smoke Spread
The following Figure 5.1 shows the relationships among Objectives and Policy. The
Objectives are the three control parameters that have been chosen in this method to
assess if risk for Valuable Contents is acceptable with respect to the Policy.
Figure 5.1: Structure of the Analytical Hierarchy: relationships between Objectives (Level 2)
and External and Internal Characteristics (Level 3).
Detailed explanations about the three Objectives are reported in paragraph 5.1.4.
Coherently with par. 4.3.1 of chapter 4, from level 3 to level 6, each level is composed by
elements belonging to two diﬀerent sets: the External Characteristics and the Internal
Characteristics.
• Level 3: CHARACTERISTICS
Three External Characteristics and three Internal Characteristics have been chosen .
Internal Characteristics are defined for each sector into which the building is divided,
External Characteristics are defined once for each building:
External Characteristics
– EC1: Height
– EC2: Vertical Connections
– EC3: Context
Internal Characteristics
– IC1: Technical Installations
– IC2: Egress Paths
– IC3: Structure
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Figure 5.2: Structure of the Analytical Hierarchy: relationships between Objectives (Level 2)
and External and Internal Characteristics (Level 3).
The following Figure 5.2 shows the relationships among Objectives and Character-
istics; both External and Internal Characteristics are represented.
Detailed explanations about the six Characteristics are reported in paragraph 5.1.5.
• Level 4: FACTORS
Coherently with the paragraph above, each Characteristic is composed by elements
belonging to the same set. This way we have the External Factors, lower level
of the External Characteristics and the Internal Factors, lower level of the
Internal Characteristics. External factors are six and they are defined once for
the whole building. Internal factors are nine and they are defined for each sector
into which the building is divided. We have a total of 15 factors, as reported in the
follow:
External Factors
– EF1.1: Number of Levels
– EF1.2: Medium Height
– EF2.1: Stairs
– EF2.2: Double Heights
– EF3.1: Fire Brigade response time
– EF3.2: Surroundings
Internal Factors
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– IF1.1: Smoke control system
– IF1.2: Detection system
– IF1.3: Suppression system
– IF1.4: Alarm system
– IF2.1: Type of Evacuation Route
– IF2.2: Dimension and Layout
– IF2.3: Linings and Floorings
– IF3.1: Vertical Structure
– IF3.2: Horizontal Structure
The following figures show the relationships among Characteristics and Factors. Fig-
ure 5.3 refers to the External Characteristics and Factors while Figure 5.4 refers to
the Internal Characteristics and Factors.
Figure 5.3: Structure of the Analytical Hierarchy: relationships between External Characteristics
(Level 3) and External Factors (Level 4).
Detailed explanations about the fifteen Factors are reported in paragraph 5.1.6.
• Level 5: SUB-FACTORS
Sub-Factors are the elementary unit of the Analytical Hierarchy Structure. Sub-
Factors are referred to each one of the Factors listed above and they are divided
into subsets comprehending a variable number of Sub-Factors. The number of Sub-
Factors for each subset depends on the specific Factor to be defined. Total number
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Figure 5.4: Structure of the Analytical Hierarchy: relationships between External Characteristics
(Level 2) and External Factors (Level 3).
of Sub-Factors is 37, they are 16 External and 21 Internal. Detailed explanations
about the relationships between Sub-Factors and Factors are reported in paragraph
5.1.6.
In the Risk Assessment Method, great attention is given to the level of formation of the
Fire Service Team. People in the Fire Service have to be well trained, in a suﬃcient number
respect to the building’s dimension and they have to be retrained periodically. To focus on
these aspects, an Extra Factor (Fire Service Index - FSI ) has been defined. Such Factor
is called “Extra Factor” because it is not a component of the Hierarchic Structure. It is a
factor that has an influence on some of the Factors inside the structure but it is out of the
hierarchy. Detailed explanations for the Fire Service Index - FSI are given in paragraph
5.1.7. In Figure 5.5 the total structure of the Analytical Hierarchy Process is represented.
AHP calculation in Risk Assessment Method
In Risk Assessment Method it is necessary to start giving indexes to the lower level of
the structure (Level 5), then a set of matrix calculation gives back as output three risk
indexes, one for each Objective. In this paragraph how AHP fits to the proposed Risk
Assessment Method is analysed in depth.
As widely explained, we have three Objectives (OB1, OB2, OB3) and each one of
them is evaluated on the base of 2 sets, each one constituted by three Characteristics
(EC1, EC2, EC3 and IC1, IC2, IC3). We suppose now to have a generic “Cm” Charac-
teristic composed by n Factors and each Factor to be composed by p Sub-Factors. Input
data are p risk indexes for each Factor, indexes that have to be assigned following the
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Figure 5.5: Structure of the Analytical Hierarchy for the proposed procedure - Level 5 is not
represented.
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rules in section 5.1.6. This way it is possible to have a vector vCm with “1×n” dimension
containing risk indexes for each n-Factor constituting the “Cm” Characteristic:
vCm =
￿
F1 . . . Fn
￿
(5.2)
In the above notation, vector vCm is the vector composed by the risk indexes (F1, . . . , Fn)
of the n Factors constituting the “Cm” Characteristic. This is the only step in which it
is necessary to insert data into the method; all the others involved matrixes and vectors
have pre-assigned components.
This is the case of weights for Factors composing the “Cm” Characteristic: a closed
cluster of technicians, involved in Method’s development, assigned the weights performing
the first AHP step. For each set of n Factor composing the generic “Cm” Characteristic,
an AHP matrix has been built by means of in-pairs comparisons with respect to each one
of the three Objectives. AHP gave as output for each Characteristic 3 vectors wCm (one
for each Objective) having “n× 1” dimension:
wOB1Cm =

wOB1F1
...
wOB1Fn
 (5.3)
wOB2Cm =

wOB2F1
...
wOB2Fn
 (5.4)
wOB3Cm =

wOB3F1
...
wOB3Fn
 (5.5)
In the above notation we indicate as wOB1Cm the vector containing weights of Factors
constituting the “Cm” Characteristic with respect to the Objective OB1. Each component
of the vectors wOB1F1 is the weight of the Factor F1 with respect to the Objective OB1.
The vectors can be aggregated into the matrix:
WCm =

OB1 OB2 OB3
wOB1F1 w
OB2
F1 w
OB3
F1
...
...
...
wOB1Fn w
OB2
Fn w
OB3
Fn
 (5.6)
Risk indexes for “Cm” Characteristic can then be calculated multiplying vector vCm
by the matrix WCm:
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vCm ·WCm =
￿
F1 . . . Fn
￿
·

wOB1F1 w
OB2
F1 w
OB3
F1
...
...
...
wOB1Fn w
OB2
Fn w
OB3
Fn
 =
=
￿￿n
i=1 Fi · wOB1Fi
￿n
i=1 Fi · wOB2Fi
￿n
i=1 Fi · wOB3Fi
￿
=
=
￿
CmOB1 CmOB2 CmOB3
￿
= Cm
(5.7)
The Cm vector with dimensions “1 × 3” represents the risk indexes of the “Cm”
Characteristic with respect to the three Objectives. Once transposed we obtain:
CmT =
CmOB1CmOB2
CmOB3
 (5.8)
Since we have 3 Characteristics we calculate the three vectors C1T , C2T and C3T that
can be aggregated in the matrix:
COB =

C1 C2 C3
OB1 C1OB1 C2OB1 C3OB1
OB2 C1OB2 C2OB2 C3OB2
OB3 C1OB3 C2OB3 C3OB3
 (5.9)
COB matrix has in each row the risk indexes of the Characteristics to be combined with
the corresponding weights to obtain risk indexes for the Objectives. From COB matrix it
is possible to extract three COB vectors having “1× 3” dimensions:
COB1 =
￿
C1OB1 C2OB1 C3OB1
￿
(5.10)
COB2 =
￿
C1OB2 C2OB2 C3OB2
￿
(5.11)
COB3 =
￿
C1OB3 C2OB3 C3OB3
￿
. (5.12)
For the calculation of weights of the Characteristics with respect to the Objectives, a
second AHP step has been performed. A Saaty’s matrix was built up for each Character-
istic putting inside it the expert judgments coming from Delphi Method [refer to section
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5.2]. AHP gave as output for each Objective 3 vectors WOB having “3× 1” dimension:
WOB1 =

wOB1C1
wOB1C2
wOB1C3
 (5.13)
WOB2 =

wOB2C1
wOB2C2
wOB2C3
 (5.14)
WOB3 =

wOB3C1
wOB3C2
wOB3C3
 . (5.15)
To calculate the risk index for each Objective it is necessary to multiply each COB
vector by the corresponding WOB vector:
OB1 = COB1 ·WOB1 =
￿
C1OB1 C2OB1 C3OB1
￿
·

wOB1C1
wOB1C2
wOB1C3
 =
3￿
i=1
CiOB1 ·wOB1Ci (5.16)
OB2 = COB2 ·WOB2 =
￿
C1OB2 C2OB2 C3OB2
￿
·

wOB2C1
wOB2C2
wOB2C3
 =
3￿
i=1
CiOB2 ·wOB2Ci (5.17)
OB3 = COB3 ·WOB3 =
￿
C1OB3 C2OB3 C3OB3
￿
·

wOB3C1
wOB3C2
wOB3C3
 =
3￿
i=1
CiOB3 ·wOB3Ci (5.18)
The architecture of such calculation is represented in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Architexture of the AHP calculation in Risk Assessment Method.
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5.1.3 Risk scale
To each one of the element of the structure a risk index and a weight are given.
Since we use AHP procedure, for the weights Saaty’s scale has been used, as referred
in paragraph 5.1.
For risk index we chose a qualitative scale from 0 to 9. Risk indexes are attributed
according to the following Table 5.3, that has been developed by the author of the proposed
procedure.
Intensity of importance Definition
0 No danger at all
1 Very weak risk
2 Light Risk condition
3 Very moderate risk
4 Moderate risk
5 Risk condition
6 High risk condition
7 Very high risk condition
8 Critical risk condition
9 Absolutely not acceptable risk condition
1.1-1.9 If the elements are very close
Table 5.3: Scale of Risk used in the proposed procedure.
Weights to the elements of the structure have been assigned with two diﬀerent methods.
Weights regarding Level 5 (Sub-Factor) and Level 4 (Factors) were assigned by a close
cluster of technicians directly involved in the procedure’s development. This because of
two main reasons: (i) the huge number of parameters that were to be considered and (ii)
because of the fact that relationships among Factors and Sub-Factors and among Factors
and Characteristics, are totally dependent only on technical aspects. On the contrary,
weights to the Characteristics (at Level 3) were assigned performing the Delphi method
described in paragraph 5.2. This because the relationships among Characteristics and
Objectives are in a small number, and on such relationships the reliability of the procedure
depends.
5.1.4 Objectives
To reach the Policy at Level 1 of the structure, fire risk for Valuable Contents is evaluated
with respect to three control parameter. Such parameters (Objectives) occupies Level 2 of
the structure and they are defined as in the follow of the paragraph. All the Objectives
are evaluated employing both External Characteristics and Internal Characteristics. At
the end of the Risk Assessment Method we will have (i) 3 risk indexes on the base of the
External Characteristics and (ii) 3n risk indexes on the base of the Internal Characteristics
(with n number of Sectors into which building is divided).
Each Objective is calculated with the Analytical Hierarchy Process: risk indexes come
from the lower level of the structure (Level 2: Characteristics) and weights are assigned
with Delphi Method described in section 5.2.
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Objective 1: Evacuation - (OB1)
By means of this Objective we want to control how much, in fire event, the building (or
sector) is intrinsically dangerous with respect to the Evacuation. As “Evacuation” we
mainly consider the evacuation for Valuable Contents due to Damage Limitation Team in-
tervention. Evacuation for occupants, according to the staring hypothesis [refer to section
4.2 in chapter 4], is assured according to fire code’s application. An intrinsic link stands
between the evacuation of people and of contents since if the first is simple to be executed,
also the second takes advantages.
Usually, when the building is open to the public, in case of emergency at first occu-
pants evacuation starts and only at second evacuation for Valuable Contents can start.
Evacuation time for people is this way linked to the time in Valuable Contents rescue.
In case of fire occurring when building is not open to the public, a good system of
evacuation route for occupants can be used as a good system of paths to get in the
building and rescue Valuable Contents.
Objective 1 is defined as follow:
OB1 = wOB1C1 C1 + w
OB1
C2 C2 + w
OB1
C2 C2 (5.19)
where C1, C2, C3 are fore the whole building the External Characteristics (EC1, EC2,
EC3) and for each sector the Internal Characteristics (IC1, IC2, IC3).
Objective 2: Fire and smoke develop - (OB2)
By means of this Objective we want to control how much, in fire event, the building (or
sector) is intrinsically dangerous with respect to the fire and smokes development. Fire and
smoke development is a sensible parameter in order to protect both people and contents.
The most you are able not to let fire and smoke spread, the more easy and fast will be the
evacuation (both for people and for contents) and lower will be the expected damage.
The most serious damage corresponds with the total loss of the Valuable Contents; it is
the limit case we want to avoid. We want also to limit, as far as possible, possible damages
to Valuable Contents due to fire. Such damages have been widely studied especially from
restorers [87, 88, 33, 34, 52, 56], and from literature it is evident how both high temper-
ature and smoke’s sediments are the worst enemies for restorers of all kinds of works of art.
Objective 2 is defined as follow:
OB2 = wOB2C1 C1 + w
OB2
C2 C2 + w
OB2
C2 C2 (5.20)
where C1, C2, C3 are for the whole building the External Characteristics (EC1, EC2,
EC3) and for each sector the Internal Characteristics (IC1, IC2, IC3).
Objective 3: Fire brigade eﬀectiveness - (OB3)
By means of this Objective we want to control how much, in fire event, the building (or
sector) is intrinsically dangerous with respect to fire brigade eﬀectiveness. The main duty
of fire brigades is to intervene saving people and extinguishing fire; in this dissertation
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fire brigade eﬀectiveness has to be considered not only with respect to the capability in
fire extinguishing, but also with respect to the loss reduction both for building and for
Valuable Contents.
Reducing damages means to be eﬀective in extinguishing fire using suitable substances
that don’t create secondary damages to the Valuable Contents (water is one of the worst
extinguisher in relation with the damages that it can create on works of art). Reducing
damages means also to be able to limit the fire extension and to be able to intervene with
a rescue team for Valuable Contents evacuation.
Objective 3 is defined as follow:
OB3 = wOB3C1 C1 + w
OB3
C2 C2 + w
OB3
C2 C2 (5.21)
where C1, C2, C3 are for the whole building the External Characteristics (EC1, EC2,
EC3) and for each sector the Internal Characteristics (IC1, IC2, IC3).
5.1.5 Characteristics
Each group of homogeneous Factors can be aggregated to define the corresponding Charac-
teristic. Indexes for Factors are calculated as shown in Section 5.1.6; weights for each Fac-
tor and mathematical relationships in defining the Characteristic are given in the present
Section. It is necessary to underline again that weights for Factors with respect to the
Characteristics for a certain Objective have been assigned by the developer of the pro-
posed procedure (ref. paragraph 5.1.3). When the Factors are only two, weights have
been assigned without the necessity of using the AHP procedure.
5.1.5.1 External Characteristics
EC1 Height
Characteristic EC1 is defined basing on the following Factors:
• EF1.1: Number of Levels
[definition on page 71]
• EF1.2: Medium Height
[definition on page 73]
In particular:
EC1 = wEF1.1EF1.1 + wEF1.2EF1.2 (5.22)
In the previous equation, terms wEF1.1 and wEF1.2 are established for each one of
the Objectives we have in the procedure. In Table 5.4 weights for Factors composing
Characteristic EC1 are given.
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OB1 OB2 OB3
wEF1.1 60% 70% 20%
wEF1.2 40% 30% 80%
Table 5.4: Weights for EF1.1 and EF1.2 respect to the three Objectives (OB).
EC2 Vertical connections
Characteristic EC2 is defined basing on the following Factors:
• EF2.1: Stairs
[definition on page 75]
• EF2.2: Double Heights
[definition on page 76]
In particular:
EC2 = wEF2.1EF2.1 + wEF2.2EF2.2 (5.23)
In the previous equation, the terms wEF2.1 and wEF2.2 are established for each one
of the Objectives we have in the procedure. In Table 5.5 weights for Factors composing
Characteristic EC2 are given.
OB1 OB2 OB3
wEF2.1 85% 65% 20%
wEF2.2 15% 35% 80%
Table 5.5: Weights for EF2.1 and EF2.2 respect to the three Objectives (OB).
It is important to notice that in the EC2 calculation with respect to the Objective
3: fire and smoke spread, as explained on pag.77, EC2 can be amplified by Sub-Factor
EF2.2.2 that takes into account the possible presence of spread flues and chimneys. In
such a situation, and only for OB3 evaluation, EC2 becomes :
ECOB32 = IF2.2.2× EC2 (5.24)
EC3 Context
Characteristic EC3 is defined basing on the following Factors:
• EF3.1: Fire Brigade response time
[definition on page 77]
• EF3.2: Surroundings
[definition on page 78]
In particular:
EC3 = wEF3.1EF3.1 + wEF3.2EF3.2 (5.25)
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In the previous equation the terms wEF3.1 and wEF3.2 are established for each one
of the Objectives we have in the procedure. In Table 5.6 weights for Factors composing
Characteristic EC3 are given.
OB1 OB2 OB3
wEF3.1 65% 65% 60%
wEF3.2 35% 35% 40%
Table 5.6: Weights for EF3.1 and EF3.2 with respect to the three Objectives (OB).
5.1.5.2 Internal Characteristics
IC1 Technical installations
Characteristic IC1 is defined basing on the following Factors:
• IF1.1: Smoke control system
[definition on page 80]
• IF1.2: Detection system
[definition on page 82]
• IF1.3: Suppression system
[definition on page 84]
• IF1.4: Alarm system
[definition on page 87]
In particular:
IC1 = wIF1.1IF1.1 + wIF1.2IF1.2 + wIF1.3IF1.3 + wIF1.4IF1.4 (5.26)
In the previous equation the terms wIF1.1, wIF1.2, wIF1.3 and wIF1.4 are established
for each one of the Objectives we have in the procedure. The weights are determined
by Saaty’s matrixes built up making in pairs comparisons among the four Factors with
respect to each one of the Objectives. This way we have three matrixes of judgments from
which, with AHP , the weights are calculated. For each one of the matrix, C.R. is checked.
Output of the method for each one of the matrix is a 4× 1 autovector containing weights
for each Factor with respect to the considered Objective. Since we have 3 Objectives, we
are able to aggregate such vectors as quoted in Table 5.7.
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Matrix 5.27 has been built with respect to Objective 1: Evacuation; C.R. = 7, 2%.

IF1.1 IF1.2 IF1.3 IF1.4
IF1.1 1 1 2 1/2
IF1.2 1 1 2 1
IF1.3 1/2 1/2 1 1
IF1.4 2 1 1 1
 (5.27)
Matrix 5.28 has been built with respect to Objective 2: Fire brigade eﬀectiveness; C.R. =
0, 0%.

IF1.1 IF1.2 IF1.3 IF1.4
IF1.1 1 1 1 1
IF1.2 1 1 1 1
IF1.3 1 1 1 1
IF1.4 1 1 1 1
 (5.28)
Matrix 5.29 has been built with respect to Objective 3: Fire and smoke spread ; C.R. =
0, 4%.

IF1.1 IF1.2 IF1.3 IF1.4
IF1.1 1 2 1 3
IF1.2 1/2 1 1/2 2
IF1.3 1 2 1 3
IF1.4 1/3 1/2 1/3 1
 (5.29)
In Table 5.7 the weights calculated for Factors composing Characteristic IC1 are re-
sumed.
OB1 OB2 OB3
wIF1.1 24% 25% 35%
wIF1.2 28% 25% 18%
wIF1.3 18% 25% 35%
wIF1.4 30% 25% 12%
Table 5.7: Weights for IF1.1, IF1.2, IF1.3 and IF1.4 with respect to the three Objectives (OB).
IC2 Egress paths
Simple evaluation methods for the quality of egress paths are described in literature [117,
77]. They take into account the type of escape routes, the distance from the nearest exit,
the number of floors, the egress paths width against the number of occupants etc. Here
are only considered: Type, Dimensions and Layout, Linings and Floorings. Characteristic
IC2 is defined basing on the following Factors:
• IF2.1: Type of Evacuation Route
[definition on page 89]
• IF2.2: Dimension and Layout
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[definition on page 92]
• IF2.3: Linings and Floorings
[definition on page 93]
In particular:
IC2 = wIF2.1IF2.1 + wIF2.2IF2.2 + wIF2.3IF2.3 (5.30)
In the previous equation the terms wIF2.1, wIF2.2 and wIF2.3 are established for each
one of the Objectives we have in the procedure. The weights are, like for IC1, determined
by Saaty’s matrixes of judgments using AHP . For each one of the matrix, C.R. is checked.
Matrix 5.31 has been built with respect to Objective 1: Evacuation; C.R. = 6, 1%.

IF2.1 IF2.2 IF2.3
IF2.1 1 2 3
IF2.2 1/2 1 3
IF2.3 1/3 1/3 1
 (5.31)
Matrix 5.32 has been built with respect to Objective 2: Fire brigade eﬀectiveness; C.R. =
5, 4%.

IF2.1 IF2.2 IF2.3
IF2.1 1 2 2
IF2.2 1/2 1 2
IF2.3 1/2 1/2 1
 (5.32)
Matrix 5.33 has been built with respect to Objective 3: Fire and smoke spread ; C.R. =
0, 0%.

IF2.1 IF2.2 IF2.3
IF2.1 1 1/2 1/2
IF2.2 2 1 2
IF2.3 2 1 1
 (5.33)
In Table 5.8 the weights calculated for Characteristic IC2 are resumed.
OB1 OB2 OB3
wIF2.1 54% 50% 20%
wIF2.2 30% 29% 40%
wIF2.3 16% 21% 40%
Table 5.8: Weights for IF2.1, IF2.2 and IF2.3 respect to the three Objectives (OB).
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IC3 Structure
With this Characteristic the type of structure present in the sector is considered. Char-
acteristic EC3 is defined basing on the following Factors:
• IF3.1: Vertical Structure
[definition on page 94]
• IF3.2: Horizontal Structure
[definition on page 94]
In particular:
IC3 = wIF3.1IF3.1 + wIF3.2IF3.2 (5.34)
In the previous equation the terms wIF3.1 and wIF3.2 are established for each one of
the Objectives we have in the procedure. In Table 5.9 weights for Characteristic IC3 are
given.
OB1 OB2 OB3
wIF3.1 40% 30% 20%
wIF3.2 60% 70% 80%
Table 5.9: Weights for IF3.1 and IF3.2 respect to the three Objectives (OB).
5.1.6 Factors and Sub-Factors
In this paragraph all the logic and mathematical relationships among Factors and Sub-
Factors are described in details. All the elements are catalogued, as explained in the
previous section, in two sets: External and Internal. For each Sub-Factor its poten-
tial dependance on management strategies, directly related to the manager’s decisions, is
highlighted.
In our intentions, each one of the Sub-Factors has to resume in itself all the significant
configurations that the specific element can assume in reality. For every listed configura-
tion, a corresponding risk index is attributed to the Sub-Factor. Each one of the Factors
and Sub-Factors is marked with a code composed by two letters and two or three numbers.
Generic code for Factor XY γ.σ:
• XY can assume letters “EF ￿￿ for External Factors and “IF ￿￿ for Internal Factors;
• γ assumes a number referred to the Characteristic that is composed by that Factor;
• σ is the progressive number of the Factor.
Generic code for Sub-Factors XY γ.σ.δ:
• XY can assume letters “EF ￿￿ for External Sub-Factors and “IF ￿￿ for Internal Sub-
Factors ;
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• γ assumes a number referred to the Characteristic that is composed by that Factor
and Sub-Factor;
• σ assumes a number referred to the Factor that is composed by that Sub-Factor;
• δ is the progressive number of the Sub-Factor.
5.1.6.1 External Factors and Sub-Factors
The Factors here described are related to the features of the building that can be detected
with a macro-scale analysis.
EF1.1 Number of levels
The Factor that considers the number of building’s levels is defined as follow:
EF1.1 = EF1.1.1× EF1.1.2× EF1.1.3 (5.35)
where:
• EF1.1.1 is the Sub-Factor dealing with the number of levels out of ground;
• EF1.1.2 is the Sub-Factor considering the number of underground levels;
• EF1.1.3 is the Sub-Factor considering the presence of an attic and its destination of
use.
In Figure 5.7 the relationships between Factor EF1.1 and Sub- Factors EF1.1.1, EF1.1.2,
EF1.1.3 are shown.
Figure 5.7: Relationships between Factor EF1.1 and Sub- Factors EF1.1.1, EF1.1.2, EF1.1.3.
EF1.1.1
Three levels historical buildings are the most common in Europe. If the building has
staggered floors, the number of levels is calculated looking at the facade with the higher
number of levels. High-rise buildings (height≥ 22m) are not relevant for Italian historical
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buildings. Table 5.10 shows the diﬀerent building configurations (in the first column) and
the corresponding risk indexes attributed to EF1.1.1.
Number of levels EF1.1.1
1 1
2 3
3 6
≥ 3 8
Table 5.10: Risk indexes for EF1.1.1.
Usually in Italy historical buildings can be composed by:
• first “service” level with low height (this level can be partially underground):
• second level that is “piano nobile”; the most important level that can have an higher
height than other levels (6-8 meters);
• third and fourth levels with a lower height than second floor.
In terms of fire brigade intervention, accessing from the extern to a 3 levels building is
quite common with the use of 10m height ladders. Accessing to an higher building can
create some problems: trucks equipped with a ladder of 30m maximum height need huge
spaces in front of the building to be used (refer to pag. 79). This is the reason why in the
previous Table 5.10, passing from first to second floor is less dangerous than passing from
second to third.
EF1.1.2
It is here checked the presence of underground levels. Underground levels are often critical
because of the fact that such spaces are used as storage rooms or deposits (often deposits
of Valuable Contents). Table 5.11 shows the diﬀerent building configurations (in the first
column) and the corresponding risk indexes attributed to EF1.1.2.
Number of underground levels EF1.1.2
0 1,0
1 1,1
2 1,2
Table 5.11: Risk indexes for EF1.1.2.
EF1.1.3
It is here checked the presence of attics. Attics are often critical for two reasons: (i) such
spaces are used as storage rooms or deposits (often deposits of Valuable Contents) and
(ii) attics are the weakest point for fire protection. Usually, roofs of historical buildings
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are made of wood and in fire event, in an attic, fire is often able to spread all over the
building. Choosing the destination of use of the attic is a proper management strategy.
If there is an attic, a “Sector” has to be identified with the attic itself (refer to the
“Sector” definition in paragraph 4.3.1, chapter 4).
Table 5.12 shows the diﬀerent building configurations (in the first column) and the
corresponding risk indexes attributed to EF1.1.3.
Presence of the attic Destination of use EF1.1.3
no 1
yes empty 1,1
yes with technical installation inside 1,2
yes used as storage area 1,3
Table 5.12: Risk indexes for EF1.1.3.
EF1.2 Medium Height
The Factor that considers the building’s height is defined on the basis of the following
parameter:
HM =
￿n
i=1 αpiAiHi￿n
i=1Ai
(5.36)
where:
• Ai = EF1.2.1 is the Sub-Factor dealing with the partial surface of the building’s
area with Hi height;
• Hi = EF1.2.2 is the Sub-Factor considering the partial height of the building’s area
with Ai surface;
• αpi = EF1.2.3 is the Sub-Factor considering if the i area with Hi height and Ai
surface is opened to the public;
• n is the number of areas with Hi height and Ai surface individuated in the building.
Height Hi is always calculated under the eaves. By means of the intermediate parameter
HM , height of the diﬀerent parts of the building is weighted with the surface of that area.
Figure 5.8 shows the relationships between Factor EF1.2, parameter HM and Sub-
Factors EF1.2.1, EF1.2.2, EF1.2.3.
EF1.2.3
The Sub-Factor EF1.2.3 can assume values in Table 5.13 for each i area into which build-
ing is divided.
Choosing to let some sensible parts of the building open to the public or not, is a proper
management strategy.
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Figure 5.8: Relationships between Factor EF1.2, parameter HM and Sub- Factors EF1.2.1,
EF1.2.2, EF1.2.3.
Opening to the public EF1.2.3
not open to the public 1
partially open to the public 1,1
open to the public 1,3
Table 5.13: Values for EF1.2.3
Once calculated the HM parameter, EF1.2 index is attributed on the base of the fol-
lowing Table 5.14. Height of 22 m is the upper limit because, over that height, we have
to consider the buildings as high rise buildings.
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HM EF1.2
HM ≤ 3 0
3 < HM ≤ 5 3
5 < HM ≤ 10 4
10 < HM ≤ 15 6
15 < HM ≤ 22 7
22 ≤ HM 9
Table 5.14: Risk indexes for EF1.2.
EF2.1 Stairs
Stairs have to be considered as important escape routes not only for people but also for
Valuable Contents evacuation and it is necessary to take into account the definition of
“safe stair” given by the fire-code. Stairs that can be technically defined as “safe” egress
stairs (Ess according to the following definitions), are automatically considered as stairs
able to be used to evacuate Valuable Contents. It is then necessary to count also other
stairs present in the building because in Historical Heritage Buildings it is possible to have
some stairs that can be considered equivalent to the “safe” ones in terms of occupants
exodus and Valuable Contents evacuation (such stairs are here defined Ees).
The Factor that consider the presence and the number of stairs in the building is
defined as follow:
EF2.1 = 3 + λ∆S + (1− λ)SR (5.37)
where:
SR =
Ds
Ets
(5.38)
∆S = Ds − Ets (5.39)
and
λ = 0, 6 is the importance of the parameter ∆S with respect to the parameter SR.
We further define:
• Ds = EF2.1.1 is the Sub-Factor dealing with the desired number of stairs according
to the codes. It represents the code’s prescription, it is the number of stairs that the
building needs if the fire code is applied with no law dispensation.;
• Ets = Ess + Ees is the Sub-Factor considering the total number of egress stairs
present in the building;
• Ess = EF2.1.2 is the parameter considering the total number of “safe” egress stairs
present in the building. A stair is considered “safe” when has the characteristics
that the fire code requests;
• Ees = EF2.1.3 is the Sub-Factor considering the total number of “equivalent safe”
egress stairs present in the building. A stair is considered “equivalent safe” when it
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has not the characteristics that the fire code requests but it can be used as egress
stairs because of the special situation in the historical building;
• Etot = Ets + Eus is the parameter considering the total number of stairs present in
the building, both unsafe, safe and used as egress stairs;
• Eus is the number of unsafe stairs present in the building. A stair is considered
“unsafe” when it is not possible at all to use it as an egress stair.
Building’s manager, deciding the tour path, can establish which ones the safe egress
stairs (determining the Ess number) are. Building’s manager has the duty of establishing,
with technicians, which the stairs to be used to evacuate Valuable Contents are.
Figure 5.9 shows the relationships between Factor EF2.1 and Sub-Factors EF2.1.1,
EF2.1.2, EF2.1.3.
Figure 5.9: Relationships between Factor EF2.1 and Sub-Factors EF2.1.1, EF2.1.2, EF2.1.3.
EF2.2 Vertical Connections
This Factor considers the presence of vertical connections among the floors, due to archi-
tectonical features. The presence of salons, theatres, halls can create obstacles in evacu-
ation both of people and Valuable Contents and it is a critical point in fire spread. This
Factor is composed by two Sub-Factors:
• EF2.2.1 is a Sub-Factor that considers the possible presence of double heights in the
building;
• EF2.2.2 is a Sub-Factor that considers the possible presence of spread flues and
chimneys in the building.
EF2.2.1 acts in all the Objectives (ref. paragraph 5.1.4) while EF2.2.2 has to be consid-
ered only with respect to the Objective 3: Fire and smoke spread.
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Presence of double heights EF2.2.1
no 0
1 double height: 2 levels height 5
1 double height: 3 levels height 7
more than one double height 9
Table 5.15: Risk indexes for EF2.2.1
EF2.2.1
Sub-Factor EF2.2.1 can assume the values in Table 5.15:
In Table 5.15, in the second row, it is considered that in the building there is just one
double height that has the height of two floors. In the third row it is considered that in
the building there is one double height that has the height of three floors. The fourth row
means that in the building there is more than one double height with the above charac-
teristics.
EF2.2.2
Sub-Factor EF2.2.2 can assume the values in Table 5.16. This Sub-Factor acts only as
Presence of flues and chimneys EF2.2.2
no 1,0
spread flues and chimneys directly detected 1,2
possible presence of ancient flues and chimneys 1,3
Table 5.16: Values for EF2.2.2
an amplification parameter with respect to the evaluation of EC2 respect to Objective 3:
Fire and smoke spread, ref. to pag 66.
EF3.1 Fire brigade response time
In this Factor the fire brigade response time is considered. In some special case, we have
on site firemen inside Historical Heritage Buildings (these cases have to be discussed on
the base of the regulations; i.e. public shows inside historical building). The time required
for a suitably equipped fire brigade team to reach the site of the fire is essential in terms of
limiting the extent of fire and the damage. Response time is strictly linked to the distance
between fire station and building and the probability of traﬃc jam has to be included in
the evaluation. It is assumed that fire brigade equipment is adapted to the task they may
have to fulfill. The Sub-Factor EF3.1.1 is totally coincident with the Factor EF3.1.
Factor EF3.1 can assume the values in Table 5.17:
The permanent presence of trained staﬀ facilitates and accelerates the first intervention
on a starting fire and this way can limit the extent of damage. If a FireServiceIndex ≤ 2
[refer to paragraph 5.1.7] comes from the calculation, it is possible to take a step up with
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Fire brigade response time EF3.1
0-5 min (on site fireman) 2
5-10 min 4
10-15 min 6
>15 min 8
Table 5.17: Risk indexes for EF3.1
respect to the real situation in the upper table. Building’s manager can take special agree-
ments with the fire brigades to reduce their intervention time.
EF3.2 Surroundings
Surroundings of the analysed building are here checked. EF3.2 factor is defined as follow:
EF3.2 = EF3.2.3× ID (5.40)
where:
• EF3.2.3 is a Sub-Factor considering the position of the building with respect to the
urban configuration of the city;
• ID is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor EF3.2.1 and EF3.2.2.
ID is defined as follow:
ID =
￿n
i=1(λGi + (1− λ)Ai)
n
(5.41)
where:
• n is the number of building’s sides;
• λ=0,5 is the importance of the parameter Gi with respect to the parameter Ai;
• Gi = EF3.2.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the distance between the
analysed side and opposite buildings;
• Ai = EF3.2.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the accessibility of the
analysed side.
EF3.2.1 and EF3.2.2 are attributed for each side of the building.
Figure 5.10 shows the relationships between Factor EF3.2 and Sub-Factors EF3.2.1,
EF3.2.2, EF3.2.3.
EF3.2.1
Distance between buildings is an indication for risk: (i) of fire propagation between facing
building and (ii) accessibility by fire brigade and consequent evacuation both for occupants
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Figure 5.10: Relationships between Factor EF3.2 and Sub-Factors EF3.2.1, EF3.2.2, EF3.2.3.
and Valuable Contents. The degree of implementation is proportional to the number of
sides and takes into account the risk of fire propagation for every facade (side) of the
building. The opposite building can sometimes be another part of the same building we
are analysing.
EF3.2.1 can represent the width of the streets around the building. If the street is
narrower than 3,5 m, fire brigades can use only ladders able to reach 10 m of height. If
streets are wider than 3,5 m fire brigades can use ladders able to reach 30 m of height.
Sub-Factor EF3.2.1 can assume the values in Table 5.18.
D=Distance between facade and opposite buildings EF3.2.1
3,5 m> D (not accessible for the fire brigades’ truck) 9
3,5 m≤ D ≤6 m 7
6 m< D ≤9 m 5
9 m< D ≤20 m 3
D >20 m 1
Table 5.18: Risk indexes for EF3.2.1
EF3.2.2
The accessibility of the cultural heritage for the fire brigade and their fire fighting equip-
ment is important for a fast and eﬃcient fire fighting intervention, limitation of the fire
losses and salvation of contents. The accessibility has to be evaluated in function of the
longest time firemen have to overcome to reach the least accessible potential fire location
with suitable fire fighting means. Access time is part of the total time, including arrival
time for the fire brigade to start fire fighting. Parameters influencing these times are:
• the number of facades accessible for fire engines (it is here considered accessible a
facade facing a street);
• the geometry i.e. depth, width, number of floors of a building;
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Sub-Factor EF3.2.2 can assume the values in Table 5.19.
Accessibility of each side EF3.2.2
not accessible 9
less than 1 window accessible for each level 7
1 window accessible for each level 6
more than 1 window accessible for each level 5
all windows for each level accessible 4
Table 5.19: Risk indexes for EF3.2.2
In Table 5.19 we take into account the number of windows accessible from the outside
for each level of the building. In the second row we consider the fact that is possible to
have at least 1 window accessible but not for each level of the building. In the second row
we consider to have at least 1 window accessible for each level of the building.
EF3.2.3
This Sub-Factor is dependent on the urban location of the analysed building. Sub-Factor
EF3.2.3 can assume the values in Table 5.20.
Urban location EF3.2.3
inside historical center and traﬃc restricted area 1,4
inside historical center 1,2
outside historical center 1,0
Table 5.20: Values for EF3.2.3
5.1.6.2 Internal Factors and Sub-Factors
The Factors here described are related to the features of each one of the “Sectors” into
which the building is divided.
IF1.1 Smoke control system
In cultural heritage buildings, smoke control:
• contributes to the safe evacuation of people between substantial times;
• limits the smoke damage to cultural heritage content.
The grade of implementation has to be evaluated regarding the eﬃciency of prohibiting
smoke to spread beyond the room of origin of the fire during its expected duration. The
eﬃciency of smoke control systems depends upon the activation of the smoke control
system (manual versus automatic) and the type of system:
• natural ventilation through openings;
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• mechanical ventilation;
• pressurisation and ventilation (natural, mechanical or mixed) for smoke.
IF1.1 factor is defined as follow:
IF1.1 = IF1.1.1× IF1.1.2 (5.42)
where:
• IF1.1.1 is a Sub-Factor considering the characteristics of the smoke control system;
• IF1.1.2 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the smoke control system.
Figure 5.11 shows the relationships between Factor IF1.1 and Sub-Factors IF1.1.1
and IF1.1.2.
Figure 5.11: Relationships between Factor IF1.1 and Sub-Factors IF1.1.1 and IF1.1.2.
IF1.1.1
Sub-Factor IF1.1.1 can assume values in Table 5.21.
Activation of smoke control system
Type of smoke control system automatic manual no smoke control system
natural ventilation through open-
ings near ceiling
2 6 7
mechanical ventilation 2 6 7
pressurization and natural or me-
chanical or mixed ventilation for ex-
iting smoke
1 4 7
Table 5.21: Risk indexes for IF1.1.1
IF1.1.2
Maintenance of fire safety systems is essential for their reliability/eﬃciency. Building’s
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manager has the duty to organize the periodical maintenance of the systems. Also peri-
odic testing of the fire safety systems is necessary to keep their reliability and eﬃciency.
According to Italian law DM 10/03/98 [9], periodical maintenance to fire systems has
semestral periodicity. Sub-Factor IF1.1.2 can assume the values in Table 5.22.
Periodicity of maintenance IF1.1.2
once a year 1,5
twice a year 1,0
Table 5.22: Values for IF1.1.2
IF1.2 Detection system
This Factor is evaluated on the basis of the distribution and the type of detectors. IF1.2
factor is defined as follow:
IF1.2 = IF1.2.3× IDET (5.43)
where:
• IF1.2.3 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the detection system;
• IDET is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF1.2.1 and IF1.2.2.
IDET is defined as follow:
IDET = λDDs + (1− λ)TDs (5.44)
where:
• λ=0,5 is the importance of the parameter DDs with respect to the parameter TDs;
• DDs = IF1.2.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the distribution of the
system in the sector;
• TDs = IF1.2.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of system.
If in the sector there are Laser Detection System or Air Sampling Detection System, risk
index for IF1.2 is 1.
If there is no detection system nor in the rooms or in the escape routes, risk index for
IF1.2 is 9.
Figure 5.12 shows the relationships between Factor IF1.2 and Sub-Factors IF1.2.1,
IF1.2.2 and IF1.2.3.
IF1.2.1
Sub-Factor IF1.2.1 measures the quantity of detectors in the sector and comprehends if
there are detectors in escape routes. It is to underline that some detection systems are
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Figure 5.12: Relationships between Factor IF1.2 and Sub-Factors IF1.2.1, IF1.2.2 and IF1.2.3.
not bonded to the number of detectors (i.e. Laser Detection System and Air Sampling
Detection System). Sub-Factor IF1.2.1 can assume the values in Table 5.23.
Distribution of detectors IF1.2.1
Detectors in rooms Detectors in escape route
none in the rooms
no 9
yes 6
at least one in every room
no 6
yes 4
more than one in every room
no 2
yes 1
Table 5.23: Risk indexes for IF1.2.1
IF1.2.2
Sub-Factor IF1.2.2 checks the type of system and depends also on the detector’s power
supply and data transmission system (WI-FI or wired). Sub-Factor IF1.2.2 can assume
the values in Table 5.24.
Type of detection system
Heat detectors Smoke detectors Heat and smoke
det. with CPU
Laser det. or
Air Sampling
det. system
Wireless Wired Wireless Wired Wireless Wired
6 5 5 4 3 2 1
Table 5.24: Risk indexes for IF1.2.2
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IF1.2.3
Sub-Factor IF1.2.3 can assume values in Table 5.25.
Periodicity of maintenance IF1.2.3
once a year 1,5
twice a year 1,0
Table 5.25: Values for IF1.2.3
IF1.3 Suppression system
Both automatic and portable fire suppression means are covered by this Factor. Ultimately
the eﬃciency of both aspects has to be evaluated on the basis of their capacity to extinguish
a starting fire. For automatic fire suppression systems the type and the location of heads
are important.
The eﬃciency of portable extinguishers depends entirely on the presence of trained
people; one of the duties of the building’s manager is to make the staﬀ trained. Refer to
paragraph 5.1.7 to establish the eﬀectiveness of the fire service.
IF1.3 factor is defined as follow:
IF1.3 = IF1.3.4× ISUPP (5.45)
where:
• IF1.3.4 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the suppression system;
• ISUPP is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF1.3.1, IF1.3.2 and IF1.3.3.
ISUPP is defined as follow:
ISUPP = λAs + αT (1− λ)Peq (5.46)
where:
• λ is the importance of the parameter As respect to the parameter Peq and it depends
on the type and the location of the system;
• As = IF1.3.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type and the location of
the automatic system in the sector;
• Peq = IF1.3.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the portable equipment for
fire suppression present in the sector.
• αT = IF1.3.3 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the reliability of Fire Service
Team.
Figure 5.13 shows the relationships between Factor IF1.3 and Sub-Factors IF1.3.1,
IF1.3.2, IF1.3.3 and IF1.3.4.
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Figure 5.13: Relationships between Factor IF1.3 and Sub-Factors IF1.3.1, IF1.3.2, IF1.3.3 and
IF1.3.4.
IF1.3.1
Cultural heritage objects (and oﬀ course Valuable Contents) are sensitive to damage by
suppression systems. It is important to balance the system’s quality in fire suppression
with the preservation of the Valuable Contents that can be damaged by a wrong extin-
guishing substance. Sub-Factor IF1.3.1 can assume the values in Table 5.26.
IF1.3.2
This Sub-Factor check the presence and the distribution of portable suppression equip-
ment. It is assumed that the portable equipment, where present, is suitable to extinguish
fire in that room, according to the codes classification of extinguisher. Sub-Factor IF1.3.2
can assume the values in Table 5.27.
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Automatic System IF1.3.1
Location Type λ
in rooms with highest fire load
no automatic system 0,00 7
sprinkler 0,50 5
gas system 0,35 4
special system (i.e. watermist) 0,50 4
in rooms with valuable contents
no automatic system 0,00 7
sprinkler 0,40 8
gas system 0,65 3
special system (i.e. watermist) 0,65 5
in the remaining parts of the sector
no automatic system 0,00 7
sprinkler 0,50 8
gas system 0,50 4
special system (i.e. watermist) 0,50 3
Table 5.26: Risk indexes for IF1.3.1
Portable equipment IF1.3.2
None 7
Extinguishing eq. NOT in every room 5
Extinguishing eq. in every room 3
Table 5.27: Risk indexes for IF1.3.2
IF1.3.3
Sub-Factor IF1.3.3 deals with the real reliability of the Fire Service Team. This because
eﬃcacy in extinguishing fire with portable equipments is strongly linked with the level of
formation and training of the Fire Service Team. IF1.3.3 assumes values on the base of
FSI (ref. paragraph 5.1.7) estimation. IF1.3.3 can assume the values in Table 5.28.
Reliability of Fire Protection Team IF1.3.3
FSI ≤ 2: Excellent 0,8
2 < FSI ≤ 3: Very good 1,2
3 < FSI ≤ 4: Law minimun compliance 1,5
FSI > 4: Not acceptable 2,0
Table 5.28: Values for IF1.3.3
IF1.3.4
Sub-Factor IF1.3.4 deals with the maintenance of portable and automatic suppression sys-
tems. Especially for portable equipment, a virtuous maintenance can be done by means
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of the Fire Service Team components. Duty of the historical building’s manager is to
organize internal audit for fire suppression system maintenance. IF1.3.4 can assume the
values in Table 5.29.
Periodicity of maintenance IF1.3.4
once a year 1,2
twice a year 1,0
Fire Service Team audit 0,8
Table 5.29: Values for IF1.3.4
IF1.4 Alarm system
Emergency and alarm signs start the evacuation of occupants and in this way intervene
mainly for the safety of people. They also contribute to more immediate salvage inter-
vention of contents. Their eﬃciency is a function of the type, number and location of the
signals. If the detection signal is directly (automatically) sent to a central dispatching
centre (e.g. fire brigade or other) the rescue process can start earlier. Duty of the build-
ing’s manager is to organize the rescue team taking agreement with fire brigade or private
surveillance company. IF1.4 factor is defined as follow:
IF1.4 = IF1.4.3× IAL (5.47)
where:
• IF1.4.3 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the alarm system;
• IAL is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF1.4.1 and IF1.4.2.
IAL is defined as follow:
IAL = λTal + (1− λ)Lal (5.48)
where:
• λ =0,4 is the importance of the parameter Tal with respect to the parameter Lal;
• Tal = IF1.4.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of the alarm system
in the sector;
• Lal = IF1.4.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the location of the alarm
system.
Figure 5.14 shows the relationships between Factor IF1.4 and Sub-Factors IF1.4.1,
IF1.4.2, IF1.4.3.
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Figure 5.14: Relationships between Factor IF1.4 and Sub-Factors IF1.4.1, IF1.4.2, IF1.4.3.
IF1.4.1
Sub-Factor IF1.4.1 can assume the values in Table 5.30.
Type of Alarm System IF1.4.1
Sound signal Light signal
no
no 9
yes 8
alarm bell
no 4
yes 4
spoken signal
no 1
yes 1
Table 5.30: Risk indexes for IF1.4.1
IF1.4.2
Sub-Factor IF1.4.2 can assume the values in Table 5.31.
Location of the signal IF1.4.2
signal only in the room/compartment 4
signal sent manually at the whole building 3
Table 5.31: Risk indexes for IF1.4.2
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IF1.4.3
Sub-Factor IF1.4.3 can assume the values in Table 5.32.
Periodicity of maintenance IF1.4.3
once a year 1,5
twice a year 1,0
Table 5.32: Values for IF1.4.3
IF2.1 Type of evacuation routes
Stairs, windows and balconies can be considered as evacuation routes. Since stairs lead
people through internal evacuation routes and windows and balconies lead mainly contents
to fire brigade rescue, two diﬀerent categories are created: (i) internal connections and
(ii) external evacuation routes. IF2.1 factor is defined as follow:
IF2.1 = IF2.1.3× ITY (5.49)
where:
• IF2.1.3 is a Sub-Factor considering if the escape route functions as an escape route
for Valuable Contents;
• ITY is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF2.1.1 and IF2.1.2.
ITY is defined as follow:
ITY = λEext + (1− λ)Eint (5.50)
where:
• λ =0,3 is the importance of the parameter Tal respect to the parameter Lal;
• Eext = IF2.1.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of external evac-
uation routes in the sector;
• Eint = IF2.1.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of internal evacu-
ation routes in the sector.
If more than a combination of the Sub-Factors is suitable to the sector, the worst grade is
assigned.
Figure 5.15 shows the relationships between Factor IF2.1 and Sub-Factors IF2.1.1,
IF2.1.2, IF2.1.3.
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Figure 5.15: Relationships between IF2.1 and Sub-Factors IF2.1.1, IF2.1.2, IF2.1.3.
IF2.1.1
For evacuation of the Valuable Contents it is very important to put them in a safe place:
if there are windows at the ground floor, even not trained people can intervene in damage
limitation actions. If there is a “safe” balcony (according to Italian law DM 30/11/1983
[4] “safe” is more than 3,5x3,5m) into which evacuate, it is important to know how it
is possible to reach that place (with a permanent external stair or with a Fire Brigade’s
ladder). Sub-Factor IF2.1.1 can assume the values in Table 5.33.
IF2.1.2
For evacuation of Valuable Contents is very important to have the possibility to put them
in a safe fire compartment at the same floor. To make the Valuable Contents pass through
stairs, even if protected, can represent a factor influencing the evacuation time; the best
possible situation is putting contents in the nearest safe compartment at the same floor.
Sub-Factor IF2.1.2 can assume the values in Table 5.34.
IF2.1.3
Sub-Factor IF2.1.3 considers if the escape route functions as an escape route for Valuable
Contents. In case the route needs to function as evacuation routes for cultural heritage
contents (e.g. in a salvage or damage limitation plan), the route needs to be evaluated in
this respect. It is here proposed to increase the risk index substantially in function of the
importance of the artworks that need to be evacuated. We refer in this dissertation to the
ranking proposed in COST ACTION C17 [86]. According to COST C17, in developing a
Damage Limitation Plan, a system of categorisation should be established to ensure that
clear priorities exist for object removal. This should identify:
• First priority: items of international heritage value which are intimately connected
with the building or its previous occupants;
• Second priority: items of national value or which are important to explain the
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External evacuation routes: windows and balconies IF2.1.1
Type Number Dimensions and charac-
teristics
Windows
and balcony
cannot be
used as
evacuation
route
- - 9
windows
1 not at ground floor 7
1 at ground floor 5
> 1 not at ground floor 5
> 1 at ground floor 2
balconies
1 surface ≥ 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a permanent
stair
3
1 surface ≥ 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a Fire
Brigade ladder
4
1 surface < 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a permanent
stair
5
1 surface < 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a Fire
Brigade ladder
6
> 1 surface ≥ 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a permanent
stair
2
> 1 surface ≥ 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a Fire
Brigade ladder
3
> 1 surface < 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a permanent
stair
4
> 1 surface < 3, 5m× 3, 5m reachable with a Fire
Brigade ladder
5
Table 5.33: Risk indexes for IF2.1.1
Staircases and internal connections IF2.1.2
One staircase may be used as an evacuation route 7
Escape route leading to two independent staircases 5
Direct escape to two independent staircases 4
Direct communication with at least one safe fire compartment at the same floor 3
Table 5.34: Risk indexes for IF2.1.2
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history of the building or its occupants. This should also include items that have a
high monetary value;
• Third Priority: items that would be diﬃcult or expensive to replace and which
contribute to the history of the building;
• Unclassified: items that will be left in place.
Duty of the building’s manager is to establish damage limitation plan for the Valuable
Contents. This implies to understand which routes have to be used for contents evacuation.
Sub-Factor IF2.1.3 can assume the values in Table 5.35.
Importance of the work of art to be evacuated IF2.1.3
Unclassified: items that will be left in place 1,0
Third Priority: items that would be diﬃcult or expensive to replace and which
contribute to the history of the building
1,1
Second priority: items of national value or which are important in order to explain
the history of the building or its occupants. This should also include items that have
a high monetary value
1,3
First priority: items of international heritage value which are intimately connected
with the building or its previous occupants
1,5
Table 5.35: Values for IF2.1.3
IF2.2 Dimensions and layout
In this Factor the following parameters are considered:
• D = IF2.2.1 that is the maximum travel distance to reach a safe place according to
italian law DM 10/03/1998;
• NF = IF2.2.2 that is the number of floors to walk;
• NS = IF2.2.3 that is the number of sectors connected to the escape route.
Limits for walking distance are chosen according to italian law DM 10/03/1998 [9]; max-
imum number of floors to walk (up or down) is chosen according to Table 5.10. If the
vertical connection is protected, it could be an advantage to have a big number of sector
connected. On the contrary, if the vertical connection is not protected the more are the
connected sector the worst is the situation.
Figure 5.16 shows the relationships between Factor IF2.2 and Sub-Factors IF2.2.1,
IF2.2.2, and IF2.2.3.
Factor IF2.2 can assume the values in Table 5.36.
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Figure 5.16: Relationships between Factor IF2.2 and Sub-Factors IF2.2.1, IF2.2.2, and IF2.2.3.
IF2.2.1 IF2.2.2 IF2.2.3
Maximum travel
distance
Number of floors to walk Number of sectors connected
Not protected stair Protected stair
NS > 4 NS ≤ 4 NS > 4 NS ≤ 4
30m ≤ D NF > 3 9,0 7,0 3,0 3,0
NF ≤ 3 5,5 5,5 1,0 2,0
15m ≤ D < 30m NF > 3 3,6 3,6 3,0 3,0
NF ≤ 3 2,0 2,0 1,0 2,0
15m > D
NF > 3 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0
NF ≤ 3 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
Table 5.36: Risk indexes for IF2.2
IF2.3 Linings and floorings
Reaction to fire is evaluated against the probability that flash-over may occur in critical
spaces as escape routes. The grade for this Sub-Factor can be attributed on basis of
the reaction to fire class of large surfaces, i.e. walls and ceiling linings. The worst class
product occupying over 20% of the walls, or 20% of the ceiling is considered dominant
for the attribution of the grade. The grade is linked with the potential contribution
of the product to flash-over in an escape route and it is linked to product’s Euroclass
classification.
Sub-Factor IF2.3.1 is completely coincident with Factor IF2.3, that can assume the
values in Table 5.37.
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Euroclass classification IF2.3
No flash-over Stone, concrete, gypsum boards
(A1-A2)
2,0
No or limited contribution to flash-over Best FR woods impregnated, thick
gypsum boards (B)
4,0
No flash-over within 10min Textile wall cover on gypsum board
(C)
5,5
Flash-over within 10min Wood untreated (D) 7,0
Flash over with two minutes Some plastics (E/F) 9,0
Table 5.37: Risk indexes for IF2.3
IF3.1 Vertical Structure
Vertical Structure is the structure composing the walls or columns of the analysed sector.
The grade is linked with the resistance capacity that materials can assure. The worst type
of structure occupying over 20% of the total is considered dominant for the attribution of
the grade.
Sub-Factor IF3.1.1 is completely coincident with Factor IF3.1, that can assume values
in Table 5.38.
Type of structure IF3.1
Stone, concrete 3
Wood 8
Steel 7
Protected wood 3
Protected steel 3
Table 5.38: Risk indexes for IF3.1
IF3.2 Horizontal Structure
Horizontal Structure is the structure composing the floors you walk on in the sector.
The grade, as for Factor IF3.1, is linked with the resistance capacity that materials can
assure. The worst type of structure occupying over 20% of the total surface is considered
dominant for the attribution of the grade.
Sub-Factor IF3.2.1 is completely coincident with Factor IF3.2, that can assume values
in Table 5.39.
5.1.7 Extra Factor: Fire Service Index
This Extra Factor (FSI) is defined for the whole building. An eﬃcient and reliable internal
fire service is fundamental for the prevention and protection of the building and Valuable
Contents. All buildings containing a working activity, according to the Italian fire code
DM 10/03/1998 [9], must have an internal fire service. Setting a fire service is often just
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Type of structure IF3.1
Stone, concrete 3
Wood 7
Steel 7
Protected wood 3
Protected steel 3
Table 5.39: Risk indexes for IF3.2
a duty of the building’s manager and the eﬃciency of the service is not guaranteed.
We want here to check the eﬀectiveness of the fire service taking into account:
• FSI1 number of members with respect to the total number of the sectors.
It is important to organise the working turns to have always almost one person
trained for each sector.
• FSI2 level of formation.
Specific theoretical and practical formation in fire prevention. According to Italian
DM 10/03/1998 3 levels of fire prevention formation are defined.
• FSI3 frequency of retraining activities.
No fixed periodicity in retraining is established by the code; the more frequent is the
training, the more reliable will be the activity of the fire service.
FSI is defined as follow:
FSI =
FSI1 + FSI2 + FSI3
3
(5.51)
FSI1
Number of Fire Service members is checked for each sector.
FSI1 is defined as follow:
FSI =
￿n
i=1 ISi
n
(5.52)
where:
• ISi is the index assigned to each sector i;
• n is the total number of sectors.
For each sector ISi indexes are assigned as in Table 5.40.
Number of members in the sector ISi
> 1 0
1 3
0 8
Table 5.40: Values for ISi
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FSI2
Level of formation is defined as is the Italian DM 10/03/1998. According to such law, the
minimum content of training courses for components of fire prevention, fire fighting and
emergency management in case of fire, must be related to the type of activity and the level
of risk of fire of them and to the specific tasks assigned to workers. Taking into account
the above criteria, in the code is reported a list of activities being viewed in the levels of
high risk, medium and low as well as content and minimum durations of training courses
related to them. The three levels are classified as follow:
• A: course for fire fighting staﬀ for low risk of fire activities (4 hours duration);
• B: course for fire fighting staﬀ for medium risk of fire activities (8 hours duration);
• C: course for fire fighting staﬀ for high risk of fire activities (16 hours duration).
For the whole fire team FSI2 index is assigned as in Table 5.41.
Level of formation FSI2
A: low fire risk 6
B: medium fire risk 3
C: high fire risk 1
Table 5.41: Values for FSI2
FSI3
Retraining is defined basing the judgment on the type of the retraining (theoretical and/or
practical) and on the periodicity (every year, every two years, etc.). In Italy there is no
compulsory periodicity in retraining for Fire Service Team. For the whole fire team FSI3
index is assigned as in Table 5.42.
Periodicity Type of retrainig
Theoretical and practical Only practical Only theoretical
every year 1 2 3
every two years 4 5 6
every three years 7 8 9
Table 5.42: Values for FSI3
Once calculated FSI, it is possible to enter in Table 5.28 to estimate Fire Service Team
reliability.
96
5.2 Delphi Method
The Delphi method belongs to the subjective-intuitive methods of foresight.
Delphi was developed in the 1950’s by the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California,
in operations research [48, 61, 76]. The name can be traced back to the Delphic oracle; the
name “Delphi” was intentionally coined by Kaplan, an associate professor of philosophy at
the UCLA working for the RAND corporation, in a research eﬀort directed at improving
the use of expert predictions in policy-making. In Delphi’s literature [83] it is underlined
how in any scientific technique, theory, or hypothesis there are always some philosophical
basis or theories about the nature of the world upon which that technique, theory, or
hypothesis fundamentally rests or depends. Furthermore, in Delphi method, what that is
the reality we construct as a product of Delphi interaction, assumes great importance. In
[107] it is said that reality is a name we give our collections of tacit assumptions about
what it is. We bring along these realities to give meaning to our interactions. Each of us
maintains several of these realities but, since we need to construct the reality by Delphi
design, the important thing is not how many diﬀerent realities each of us has, but that one
important product of each Delphi panel is the reality that is defined through its interaction.
5.2.1 Delphi Method theory
Delphi is therefore widely accepted as a tool in information systems research for identifying
and prioritizing issues for managerial decision-making [89]. The Delphi method is based on
structural surveys and makes use of the intuitive available information of the participants,
who are mainly experts. Therefore, it delivers qualitative as well as quantitative results
and has beneath its explorative, predictive even normative elements. There is not one
Delphi methodology but there are several applications. There is an agreement that Delphi
is an expert survey in two or more “rounds” in which in the second and later rounds
of the survey the results of the previous round are given as feedback. Therefore, the
experts answer from the second round on under the influence of their colleagues’ opinions.
Thus, the Delphi method is a “relatively strongly structured group communication process,
in which matters, on which naturally unsure and incomplete knowledge is available, are
judged upon by experts”, so the definition in [48].
In this dissertation Okoli and Pawlowski approach [89] in constructing a Delphi Method
has been followed; Okoli and Pawlowski provide rigorous guidelines for the process of
selecting appropriate experts for the study and give detailed principles for making design
choices during the process that ensures a valid study. In Table 5.43 there is a resume of
the Delphi criteria according to Okoli and Pawlowski.
Why Delphi Method in this research?
In light of Table 5.43, the Delphi method was selected for the following reasons:
1. This study is an investigation of factors that would influence Valuable Contents
risk in Historical Heritage Buildings in fire event. No statistical data are available
on this topic; both each building we deal with and its contents are unique and
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Criteria of Delphi Method
Summary of procedure All the questionnaire design issues of a survey also apply to a Delphi
study. After the researchers design the questionnaire, they select an
appropriate group of experts who are qualified to answer the ques-
tions. The researchers then administer the survey and analyze the
responses. Next, they design another survey based on the responses
to the first one and re-administers it, asking respondents to revise
their original responses and/or answer other questions based on group
feedback from the first survey. The researchers reiterate this process
until the respondents reach a satisfactory degree of consensus. The
respondents are kept anonymous to each other (though not to the
researcher) throughout the process.
Representativeness of
sample
The questions that a Delphi study investigates are those of high un-
certainty and speculation. Thus, a general population, or even a nar-
row subset of a general population, might not be suﬃciently knowl-
edgeable to answer the questions accurately. A Delphi study is a
virtual panel of experts gathered to arrive at an answer from
a diﬃcult question. Thus, a Delphi study could be considered a
type of virtual meeting or as a group decision technique, though it
appears to be a complicated survey.
Sample size for statistical
power and significant find-
ings
The Delphi group size does not depend on statistical power, but
rather on group dynamics for arriving at consensus among experts.
Thus, the literature recommends 10 - 18 experts on a Delphi panel.
Individual vs. group re-
sponse
Studies have consistently shown that for questions requiring expert
judgment, the average of individual responses is inferior to the av-
erages produced by group decision processes; research has explicitly
shown that the Delphi method bears this out.
Reliability and response
revision
Pretesting is also an important reliability assurance for the Delphi
method. However, test-retest reliability is not relevant, since re-
searchers expect respondents to revise their responses.
Construct validity In addition to what is required of a survey, the Delphi method can
employ further construct validation by asking experts to validate the
researcher’s interpretation and categorization of the variables. The
fact that Delphi is not anonymous (to the researcher) permits this
validation step, unlike many surveys.
Anonymity Respondents are always anonymous to each other, but never anony-
mous to the researcher. This gives the researchers much opportunity
to follow up for clarifications and further qualitative data.
Non-response issues Non-response is typically very low in Delphi surveys, since most re-
searchers have personally obtained assurances of participation.
Attrition eﬀects Similar to non-response, attrition tends to be low in Delphi studies,
and the researchers usually can easily ascertain the cause by talking
with the dropouts.
Richness of data In addition to the richness issues of traditional surveys, Delphi stud-
ies inherently provide richer data because of their multiple iterations
and their response revision due to feedback. Moreover, Delphi par-
ticipants tend to be open to follow-up interviews.
Table 5.43: Criteria of Delphi Method, elaboration from [89].
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statistical data have no sense. This complex issue requires knowledge from people
who understand and manage the specific topic form diﬀerent viewpoints. Thus, a
Delphi study answers the study questions more appropriately.
2. A panel study most appropriately answers the research questions, rather than any
individual expert’s responses. Delphi is an appropriate group method. Among other
high-performing group decision analysis methods, Delphi is desirable in that it does
not require the experts to meet physically.
3. Although there may be a relatively limited number of experts with knowledge about
the research questions, the Delphi panel size requirements are modest, and it would
be practical to solicit up to three panels from 10 members in size.
4. The Delphi study is flexible in its design, and amenable to follow-up interviews.
This permits the collection of richer data to lead to a deeper understanding of the
fundamental research questions.
5. We select the procedure for conducting Delphi studies outlined by Okoli and Pawlowski
(based on Schmidt outline) for the study because it would serve the dual purpose of
soliciting opinions from experts and having them ranked according to their impor-
tance.
Delphi Organization
One of the most critical requirements is the selection of qualified experts. We divided ex-
perts into panels; three relevant categories of experts have important and valuable knowl-
edge about fire risk management in historical buildings:
1. academics (identified with the AC abbreviation);
2. technicians and practitioner working in management of historical buildings (identi-
fied with the EC abbreviation);
3. fire brigades (identified with the VF abbreviation).
These groups probably would have somewhat diﬀerent perspectives. Since it is a goal to
obtain a reasonable degree of consensus, it would be best to have panels that separate
these groups. This design also permits comparisons of the perspectives of the diﬀerent
stakeholder groups. Following recommendations from Delphi literature, there will be 10
people in each panel. This structure will obtain a suﬃcient number of perspectives from
the “inside”, and we could perform analyses to see if there are diﬀerences in perspectives
between respondents inside and outside.
The choice is to populate the panels with experts having a common background with
respect to the research topic; such common background was identified in the regional origin
of the members. Since we deal with unique heritage buildings and works of art, managing
them in a country like Italy is quite diﬀerent from managing them in the remanent part
of the world (Europe included) due to a of diﬀerent factors, first of which is the typology
of historical buildings that is strictly linked with the history and culture of the place
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they stand. To make the answers from experts the most reliable as possible, only Italian
experts (and in particular experts with experience in Tuscan buildings heritage) have been
chosen. The experts’ judgments have this way an high degree of reliability in the Tuscan
context and they can be easily extended to Italy, while it is almost impossible to expand
the judgments to the remaining parts of Europe and completely impossible to fit them to
the rest of the world.
The Web, e-mail and phone were the means of contacting the experts. The objective
was to contact people in diﬀerent organizations who are experts themselves, and who can
provide additional contacts within and outside their own organizations. Each category of
experts required a diﬀerent approach for identifying experts:
1. Academics: this list was populated almost entirely via an experts’ survey in “Univer-
sita´ degli Studi di Firenze”; mainly contacting professors and researchers belonging
to the DICEA department (Dipartimento di Ingegneria Civile e Ambientale) of the
Faculty of Engineering;
2. Technicians and practitioners working in historical building management : this list
was populated contacting a technician working in Opificio delle Pietre Dure in Flo-
rence, one of the most important conservation laboratories in Europe. Thanks to his
helpfulness it was possible to write down a list of practitioners and technicians that
operate daily on Tuscan heritage buildings containing Art History Masterpieces;
3. Fire brigades: this list was populated contacting the executive oﬃcer of the fire
brigade command in Siena. The executive oﬃcer is one of the most important experts
in fire prevention in historical heritage buildings; thanks to him it was possible to
contact experts belonging to the fire brigade command in Florence that took part
to the Delphi.
Furthermore, to insert people in the panels, we needed to obtain basic biographical
information for every expert on the list in order to determine what qualifications they
possess to make them experts (for example, the number of papers published and presen-
tations made, the length of years of practice, professional positions - mainly for academics
and fire brigades).
We contacted each panelist and explained the subject of the study and the procedures
required for it, including the commitment required. For this study, we asked panelists
to commit to complete up to six 8-10 min questionnaires and returning them within the
shortest time possible of receipt, for a total of two hours over a period of 2-3 months. We
imposed a limit of six short questionnaires so as not to tax the participants, and yet give
them an honest appraisal of their time commitment.
To make the survey more slender, a preliminary explanation of the research and a“user
guide” to give judgments were sent to each expert. Data collection was then conducted
personally by the researcher in a specific meeting arranged with each one of the experts.
To meet personally, each expert made them more confident with the method and with the
aim of the research, increasing this way the reliability of judgments.
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The administration of the questionnaires followed the procedure for “ranking-type”
Delphi studies outlined in [89]. This involved three general steps: (i) discussion about
important factors; (ii) narrowing down the original list to the most important ones; and
(iii) ranking the list of important factors.
In the first step Experts expressed their judgment about the Factors composing the
Characteristics, stating if, in their opinion, Factors were influent and/or coherent with
the aim of the research. From this first step the majority of experts considered to neglect
some Factors; it is important to underline that factors neglected by the experts have been
then comprehended in the sensitivity analysis performed on the Analytical Structure (ref.
paragraph 5.2.4). Basing on the sensitivity analysis results performed after Delphi’s first
round, exactly the Factors neglected by the experts have been cut oﬀ from the structure.
Then judgments regarding weights of the six Characteristics with respect to the three
Objectives were collected. To each one of the experts was asked to give judgments in pairs
comparison according to the scale of importance in Table 5.1.
Each expert had to rank the Characteristics (both External and Internal) with respect
to each Objectives composing a Saaty Matrix; control of Consistency Index has been
performed for each one of the matrix in order to have always C.R. < 10%.
The goal of this phase is to reach a consensus in the ranking of the relevant factors
within each panel. Studies have consistently found that it is more diﬃcult to reach consen-
sus with Delphi groups than with ones that involve direct interaction between participants.
However, with a panel design it is less diﬃcult to obtain consensus because the researchers
deliberately select panel members for their homogeneity.
This phase of the procedure involved each panel separately ranking the characteristics;
each ranked list will reflect the priority order for the specific panel. In this phase, each
expert individually submitted a rank ordering of the items.
When it comes to quantitatively determine the ranks of the items in the lists, literature
provides an excellent and detailed guideline of the principles to follow. There is a number
of diﬀerent metrics for measuring non-parametric rankings, but Kendall’s W coeﬃcient of
concordance is widely recognized as the best one [89].
According to Kendall definition [70], suppose that object i is given the rank ri,j by
judge number j, where there are in total n objects and m judges. Then the total rank
given to object i is
Ri =
m￿
j=1
ri,j , (5.53)
and the mean value of these total ranks is
R =
1
2
m(n+ 1). (5.54)
The sum of squared deviations, S, is defined as
S =
n￿
i=1
(Ri −R)2, (5.55)
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and then Kendall’s W is defined as
W =
12S
m2(n3 − n) . (5.56)
If the test statistic W is 1, then all the judges or survey respondents have been unani-
mous, and each judge or respondent has assigned the same order to the list of objects or
concerns. If W is 0, then there is no overall trend of agreement among the respondents, and
their responses may be regarded as essentially random. Intermediate values of W indicate
a greater or lesser degree of unanimity among the various judges or respondents. Legendre
[75] discusses a variant of the W statistic which accommodates ties in the rankings, if a
lot of ties are present.
The value of W ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no consensus, and 1 indicating
perfect consensus between lists. Literature provides interpretations of the diﬀerent values
of W, with 0,7 indicating strong agreement. After calculating the concordance within each
panel, the W value suggests how to proceed in the ranking.
A W value of 0,7 or greater would indicate satisfactory agreement, and we would
consider the ranking phase completed. However, if W is less than 0,7, the ranking ques-
tionnaire must be resent to the members of that panel. Each reiteration would return the
items for the panel, listed in order of mean ranks.
For each item, we gave the panelists the following information to help them to revise
their rankings:
• the mean rank of the item for the panel;
• the panelist’s ranking of the item in the former round;
• an indication of the current level of consensus, based on the value of W.
Based on this, we asked the panelists to revise their rankings for each item, again
asking them to explain their rankings and revisions.
Mean rank for each panel has been calculated according to Saaty [104]; when a group
uses the AHP, their judgments can be combined after discussion by applying the geometric
mean to the judgments which derives from the requirement. For each panel we built a
six “3× 3” Saaty matrix (three matrix with weights of the External Characteristics with
respect to the Objectives and three matrix with weights of the Internal Characteristics
with respect to the Objectives):
B =
b11 b12 b13b21 b22 b23
b31 b32 b33
 (5.57)
were each bij element is
bij = (a1,ij · a2,ij · . . . · ak,ij) 1k (5.58)
with k number of participants giving aij judgments. In our Delphi k = 10 for each panel.
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The ranking process has to be reiterated until one of two stopping criteria is reached:
1. W reaches a value of 0,7, indicating a satisfactory level of concordance;
2. the mean ranking for two successive rounds is not significantly diﬀerent.
At the end of this ranking phase, we will have eighteen ranked lists - six from each of
the panels - representing the priorities that each panels placed on the Characteristics with
respect to the Objectives. This rigorous process assures that the Characteristics rankings
are a valid indicator of the relative importance of the various element.
Since we have three panels, at the end of the Delphi process we built six matrixes (three
for the External Characteristics and three for the Internal Characteristics) containing the
mean judgments from the three panels. The components of such matrixes are the final
values that we put inside the risk assessment method as weights of the Characteristics
with respect to the Objectives.
In next paragraphs there is a sum of the results from Delphi’s rounds.
5.2.2 Delphi’s first round
Results from the first round are expected to be the base onto which building consensus
among the experts with judgments expressed in the second round. In the first round, each
expert had to become confident with the research topic and the AHP structure. As said,
all the judgments have been collected by a personal meeting with each expert to whom was
fully explained the research they took part into. Once illustrated the relations among Fac-
tors and Characteristics, each expert gave his judgments in pairwise comparisons among
the Characteristics with respect to the Objectives. For each matrix it was C.R. < 10%.
Judgments composed Saaty matrixes of which main eigenvector was calculated to extract
the Characteristics ranking. According to equation 5.57, a mean matrix has been built
and its main eigenvector is the ranking of the panel.
Data from the first round were gathered in graphs and tables easy to be read in order to
present such data to the experts before the second round. For each panel graphs showing
the distribution of judgments for each Characteristic with respect to the Objectives were
plot.
In the following sections the ranking results of for each Objective and for each panel
are shown. For each table C.R. and W are reported.
To each table is associated a graph showing the mean ranking for the panel in first
Delphi round.
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5.2.2.1 Panel 1: academics
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.44 and Figure 5.17.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC01 66% 25% 9%
AC02 11% 78% 11%
AC03 15% 55% 30%
AC04 10% 74% 16%
AC05 24% 68% 8%
AC06 67% 10% 23%
AC07 12% 65% 23%
AC08 43% 43% 14%
AC09 20% 71% 9%
AC10 16% 74% 10%
Combined 26% 58% 16%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.44: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 1;
C.R. = 0, 01% and W = 0, 4.
Figure 5.17: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean rank-
ing from Panel 1.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.45 and Figure 5.18.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC01 50% 29% 21%
AC02 23% 12% 65%
AC03 15% 30% 55%
AC04 11% 11% 78%
AC05 24% 9% 67%
AC06 24% 13% 63%
AC07 20% 25% 55%
AC08 33% 33% 33%
AC09 24% 9% 67%
AC10 68% 9% 23%
Combined 29% 17% 54%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.45: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 1;
C.R. = 0, 1% and W = 0, 3.
Figure 5.18: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2: mean rank-
ing from Panel 1.
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External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.46 and Figure 5.19.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC01 20% 73% 7%
AC02 46% 47% 7%
AC03 50% 21% 29%
AC04 60% 20% 20%
AC05 7% 61% 32%
AC06 60% 25% 15%
AC07 16% 71% 13%
AC08 46% 47% 7%
AC09 20% 73% 7%
AC10 16% 71% 13%
Combined 33% 53% 14%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.46: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 1;
C.R. = 0, 4% and W = 0, 4.
Figure 5.19: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3: mean rank-
ing from Panel 1.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.47 and Figure 5.20.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC01 17% 57% 26%
AC02 45% 47% 8%
AC03 24% 63% 13%
AC04 65% 23% 12%
AC05 12% 79% 8%
AC06 29% 50% 21%
AC07 13% 77% 10%
AC08 67% 21% 12%
AC09 9% 71% 20%
AC10 77% 13% 10%
Combined 33% 53% 14%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.47: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 1;
C.R. = 0, 5% and W = 0, 5.
Figure 5.20: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 1.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.48 and Figure 5.21.
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Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC01 40% 20% 40%
AC02 74% 10% 16%
AC03 20% 20% 60%
AC04 19% 9% 72%
AC05 20% 7% 73%
AC06 15% 54% 30%
AC07 30% 59% 11%
AC08 47% 43% 10%
AC09 67% 9% 24%
AC10 30% 54% 16%
Combined 41% 24% 35%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.48: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 1;
C.R. = 0, 1% and W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.21: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 1.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.49 and Figure 5.22.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC01 61% 8% 31%
AC02 46% 46% 8%
AC03 25% 8% 67%
AC04 12% 69% 19%
AC05 77% 11% 12%
AC06 60% 15% 25%
AC07 57% 12% 31%
AC08 68% 9% 23%
AC09 50% 25% 25%
AC10 68% 8% 24%
Combined 55% 18% 27%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.49: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 1;
C.R. = 0, 01% and W = 0, 3.
Figure 5.22: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 1.
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5.2.2.2 Panel 2: technicians and practitioners
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.50 and Figure 5.23.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
EC01 66% 25% 9%
EC02 7% 76% 17%
EC03 15% 55% 30%
EC04 43% 43% 14%
EC05 20% 71% 9%
EC06 20% 71% 9%
EC07 16% 74% 10%
EC08 13% 24% 63%
EC09 47% 47% 6%
EC10 26% 59% 15%
Combined 25% 60% 15%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.50: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 2;
C.R. = 0, 4% and W = 0, 4.
Figure 5.23: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean rank-
ing from Panel 2.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.51 and Figure 5.24.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
EC01 50% 29% 21%
EC02 16% 10% 74%
EC03 16% 30% 54%
EC04 33% 33% 34%
EC05 24% 8% 68%
EC06 19% 73% 8%
EC07 68% 9% 23%
EC08 10% 31% 59%
EC09 15% 20% 65%
EC10 29% 26% 45%
Combined 29% 23% 48%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.51: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 2;
C.R. = 0, 3% and W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.24: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2: mean rank-
ing from Panel 2.
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External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.52 and Figure 5.25.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
EC01 20% 73% 7%
EC02 47% 47% 6%
EC03 6% 47% 47%
EC04 47% 47% 6%
EC05 20% 73% 7%
EC06 63% 22% 15%
EC07 16% 71% 13%
EC08 43% 40% 17%
EC09 9% 15% 76%
EC10 31% 49% 20%
Combined 30% 51% 19%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.52: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 2;
C.R. = 1, 2% and W = 0, 4.
Figure 5.25: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3: mean rank-
ing from Panel 2.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.53 and Figure 5.26.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
EC01 17% 57% 26%
EC02 47% 47% 6%
EC03 24% 63% 13%
EC04 67% 21% 12%
EC05 9% 71% 20%
EC06 14% 32% 54%
EC07 77% 13% 10%
EC08 24% 63% 13%
EC09 12% 45% 43%
EC10 23% 64% 13%
Combined 29% 51% 20%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.53: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 2;
C.R. = 1, 2% and W = 0, 3.
Figure 5.26: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 2.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.54 and Figure 5.27.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
EC01 40% 20% 40%
EC02 47% 6% 47%
EC03 20% 20% 60%
EC04 47% 43% 10%
EC05 67% 9% 24%
EC06 13% 30% 57%
EC07 30% 55% 15%
EC08 63% 18% 19%
EC09 12% 45% 43%
EC10 63% 18% 19%
Combined 41% 25% 34%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.54: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 2;
C.R. = 3% and W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.27: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 2.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.55 and Figure 5.28.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
EC01 61% 8% 31%
EC02 68% 10% 22%
EC03 24% 9% 67%
EC04 68% 9% 23%
EC05 50% 25% 25%
EC06 71% 12% 17%
EC07 68% 8% 24%
EC08 73% 11% 16%
EC09 61% 8% 31%
EC10 50% 25% 25%
Combined 61% 11% 28%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.55: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 2;
C.R. = 0, 7% and W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.28: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 2.
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5.2.2.3 Panel 3: fire brigades
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.56 and Figure 5.29.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
VF01 16% 76% 8%
VF02 10% 66% 24%
VF03 69% 19% 12%
VF04 16% 76% 8%
VF05 35% 30% 35%
VF06 16% 13% 71%
VF07 16% 13% 71%
VF08 30% 35% 35%
VF09 14% 43% 43%
VF10 28% 42% 30%
Combined 28% 42% 30%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.56: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 3;
C.R. = 0, 3% and W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.29: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean rank-
ing from Panel 3.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.57 and Figure 5.30.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
VF01 16% 74% 10%
VF02 10% 24% 66%
VF03 20% 10% 70%
VF04 14% 74% 12%
VF05 47% 10% 43%
VF06 10% 31% 59%
VF07 10% 31% 59%
VF08 17% 60% 23%
VF09 65% 15% 20%
VF10 25% 44% 31%
Combined 25% 47% 28%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.57: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 3;
C.R. = 1, 5% and W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.30: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2: mean rank-
ing from Panel 3.
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External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.58 and Figure 5.31.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
VF01 10% 81% 9%
VF02 10% 81% 9%
VF03 14% 14% 72%
VF04 14% 78% 8%
VF05 12% 19% 69%
VF06 8% 60% 32%
VF07 8% 60% 32%
VF08 47% 47% 6%
VF09 20% 20% 60%
VF10 17% 55% 28%
Combined 17% 58% 25%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.58: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 3;
C.R. = 1, 4% and W = 0, 3.
Figure 5.31: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3: mean rank-
ing from Panel 3.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.59 and Figure 5.32.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
VF01 12% 71% 17%
VF02 16% 71% 13%
VF03 10% 45% 45%
VF04 12% 69% 19%
VF05 22% 43% 35%
VF06 45% 15% 40%
VF07 45% 15% 40%
VF08 9% 67% 24%
VF09 12% 45% 43%
VF10 16% 71% 13%
Combined 18% 52% 30%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.59: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 3;
C.R. = 1% and W = 0, 3.
Figure 5.32: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 3.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.60 and Figure 5.33.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
VF01 8% 72% 20%
VF02 16% 71% 13%
VF03 23% 17% 60%
VF04 8% 72% 20%
VF05 60% 17% 23%
VF06 44% 12% 44%
VF07 44% 12% 44%
VF08 72% 20% 8%
VF09 24% 13% 63%
VF10 10% 71% 19%
Combined 30% 35% 35%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.60: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 3;
C.R. = 0, 9% and W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.33: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 3.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.61 and Figure 5.34.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
VF01 11% 11% 78%
VF02 29% 50% 21%
VF03 10% 20% 70%
VF04 13% 12% 75%
VF05 10% 32% 58%
VF06 75% 8% 17%
VF07 75% 8% 17%
VF08 7% 73% 20%
VF09 35% 43% 22%
VF10 10% 10% 80%
Combined 25% 24% 51%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.61: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 3;
C.R. = 0, 4% and W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.34: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean
ranking from Panel 3.
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5.2.2.4 Final ranking round 1
In this paragraph the mean judgments from each panel and the final mean of such values
are shown. Concordance in aggregated mean from each panel is not requested; we don’t
check W coeﬃcient in aggregated mean because Delphi has been performed referring the
feedback to the judgments coming from each panel. Concordance among the panels is not
the aim of the process: it is just requested that each panel gives reliable judgments with
respect to its own experience and cultural background. Each panel can express reliable
judgments because it is composed by experts sharing a common point of view on the topic.
Not necessarily the three panels have to give back the same rankings. In this phase only
C.R. is checked.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.62 and Figure 5.35.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC 26% 58% 16%
EC 25% 60% 15%
VF 28% 42% 30%
Combined 27% 54% 19%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.62: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - ranking after
round 1;
C.R. = 0, 001%.
Figure 5.35: External Characteristics with
respect to Objective 1: rank-
ing average after round 1.
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External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.63 and Figure 5.36.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC 29% 17% 54%
EC 29% 23% 48%
VF 25% 47% 28%
Combined 29% 28% 43%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.63: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - ranking after
round 1;
C.R. = 0, 8%.
Figure 5.36: External Characteristics with
respect to Objective 2: rank-
ing average after round 1.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.64 and Figure 5.37.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC 33% 53% 14%
EC 30% 51% 19%
VF 17% 58% 25%
Combined 27% 54% 19%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.64: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - ranking after
round 1;
C.R. = 3, 2%.
Figure 5.37: External Characteristics
with respect to Objective
3: ranking average after
round 1.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.65 and Figure 5.38.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC 33% 53% 14%
EC 29% 51% 20%
VF 18% 52% 30%
Combined 26% 53% 21%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.65: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - ranking after
round 1;
C.R. = 0, 07%.
Figure 5.38: Internal Characteristics
with respect to Objective
1: ranking average after
round 1.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.66 and Figure 5.39.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC 41% 24% 35%
EC 41% 25% 34%
VF 30% 36% 35%
Combined 36% 23% 41%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.66: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - ranking after
round 1;
C.R. = 2, 3%.
Figure 5.39: Internal Characteristics
with respect to Objective
1: ranking average after
round 1.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.67 and Figure 5.40.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC 55% 18% 27%
EC 61% 11% 28%
VF 25% 24% 51%
Combined 46% 18% 36%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.67: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - ranking after
round 1;
C.R. = 0, 2%.
Figure 5.40: Internal Characteristics
with respect to Objective
1: ranking average after
round 1.
From data shown above, the necessity to perform the second round becomes evident.
According to the stopping criteria that consider concordance, none of the panels has W ≥
0, 7. The worst concordance is registered for the “Panel 3: fire brigade” in judgments
given both to the External Characteristics (EC vs OB1: W=0,1; EC vs OB2: W=0,1;
EC vs OB3: W=0,3) and to the Internal Characteristics (IC vs OB1: W=0,3; IC vs
OB2: W=0,1; IC vs OB3: W=0,1). The other panels demonstrated an higher internal
concordance (0, 3 < W < 0, 7) however lower than the acceptable limit (W=0,7).
In the follow are shown graphs summing up the final judgments from round 1.
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Figure 5.41: External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1: ranking from the three panels.
Figure 5.42: External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2: ranking from the three panels.
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Figure 5.43: External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3: ranking from the three panels.
Figure 5.44: Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1: ranking from the three panels.
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Figure 5.45: Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2: ranking from the three panels.
Figure 5.46: Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3: ranking from the three panels.
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5.2.3 Delphi’s second round
In this round of Delphi, a feedback is provided to the experts and the discussion among
them is solicited in order to confirm the judgments given in the first round. Resuming
tables and graphs referred to their panel were presented to the experts and it was asked
them to think again about the judgments they gave. This time, experts had just to
attribute percentages to each Characteristic with respect to each Objective, setting up a
ranking both of External and Internal Characteristics with respect to each Objective. The
final mean of the judgments was calculated for each panel as the arithmetic mean of the
percentages with respect to each Objective. Since they aren’t given, in this second round,
in pairwise judgments, no Saaty’s matrix has been built and no C.I. has been checked.
For each panel only the two Delphi’s stopping criteria were controlled (W ≥ 0,7 or mean
rankings for two successive rounds not significantly diﬀerent).
For “panel 1: Academics” and “panel 2: Technicians”, in the second round the same
interview methodology used in the first one was used. Feedback was shown by means of
papers and judgments were collected from each one expert at a time.
Since in the “panel 3: Fire brigades” very low values of concordance were reached in the
first round, in the second round a diﬀerent methodology of data collection was adopted.
A meeting with all the ten fire brigades experts was arranged and the feedback from the
first round was presented by means of a public presentation. All the experts were then
solicited to discuss together in order to motivate the answers they give in first round; with
this methodology, misunderstandings in the questions from the first round were solved and
levels of concordance increased sensibly. In the following sections the ranking results for
each Objective and for each panel are shown; for each table W is reported.
A graph showing the mean ranking for the panel in second Delphi round is associated
to each table.
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5.2.3.1 Panel 1: academics
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
In this round academics reviewed their judgments and the two stopping criteria were both
reached: W = 0, 7 and variation in percentages were not significant. Results are shown in
Table 5.68 and Figure 5.47.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC01 27% 60% 13%
AC02 14% 75% 11%
AC03 20% 60% 20%
AC04 70% 15% 15%
AC05 24% 68% 8%
AC06 34% 41% 25%
AC07 19% 55% 26%
AC08 40% 40% 20%
AC09 20% 71% 9%
AC10 25% 60% 15%
Combined 29% 55% 16%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.68: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 1 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.47: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 1 - second round.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
In this round academics reviewed their judgments and the two stopping criteria were both
reached: W = 0, 7 and variation in percentages were not significant. Results are shown in
Table 5.69 and Figure 5.48.
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Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC01 30% 25% 45%
AC02 23% 12% 65%
AC03 15% 30% 55%
AC04 20% 10% 70%
AC05 24% 9% 67%
AC06 24% 13% 63%
AC07 20% 25% 55%
AC08 35% 30% 35%
AC09 20% 18% 62%
AC10 30% 25% 45%
Combined 24% 20% 56%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.69: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 1- sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.48: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2: mean ranking
from Panel 1 - second round.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
In this round academics reviewed their judgments and the two stopping criteria were both
reached: W = 0, 7 and variation in percentages were not significant. Results are shown in
Table 5.70 and Figure 5.49.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC01 30% 60% 10%
AC02 47% 47% 6%
AC03 40% 30% 30%
AC04 20% 70% 10%
AC05 32% 61% 7%
AC06 40% 40% 20%
AC07 15% 66% 19%
AC08 40% 50% 10%
AC09 20% 73% 7%
AC10 30% 50% 20%
Combined 31% 55% 14%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.70: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 1- sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.49: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3: mean ranking
from Panel 1 - second round.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
In this round academics reviewed their judgments and the two stopping criteria were both
reached: W = 0, 7 and variation in percentages were not significant. Results are shown in
Table 5.71 and Figure 5.50.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC01 35% 45% 20%
AC02 45% 47% 8%
AC03 24% 63% 13%
AC04 35% 50% 15%
AC05 11% 65% 24%
AC06 50% 29% 21%
AC07 19% 71% 10%
AC08 25% 50% 25%
AC09 42% 46% 12%
AC10 25% 60% 15%
Combined 31% 53% 16%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.71: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 1- sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.50: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 1 - second round.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
In the second round, despite of the new formulation of percentages from most of the
experts, W concordance didn’t increased. Only the second stopping criteria was reached:
• IC1: 41% in first round, 40% in second round; variation of 1%;
• IC2: 24% in first round, 28% in second round; variation of 4%;
• IC3: 35% in first round, 32% in second round; variation of 3%;
Since there was no significant variation in percentages from first to second round, we
accepted the following results as definitive. Results are shown in Table 5.72 and Figure
5.51.
123
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC01 35% 30% 35%
AC02 65% 15% 20%
AC03 60% 20% 20%
AC04 30% 40% 30%
AC05 26% 29% 45%
AC06 30% 30% 40%
AC07 30% 20% 50%
AC08 45% 30% 25%
AC09 20% 50% 30%
AC10 55% 20% 25%
Combined 40% 28% 32%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.72: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 1- sec-
ond round; W = 0, 1.
Figure 5.51: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 1- second round.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
In second round was reached for these judgments an high degree of concordance: W = 0, 8.
Results are shown in Table 5.73 and Figure 5.52.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC01 55% 20% 25%
AC02 50% 20% 30%
AC03 60% 20% 20%
AC04 50% 20% 30%
AC05 69% 12% 19%
AC06 60% 20% 20%
AC07 57% 12% 31%
AC08 60% 30% 10%
AC09 60% 10% 30%
AC10 50% 25% 25%
Combined 57% 19% 24%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.73: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 1 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 8.
Figure 5.52: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 1 - second round.
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5.2.3.2 Panel 2: technicians and practitioners
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
In this round technicians reviewed their judgments and the two stopping criteria were both
reached: W = 0, 7 and variation in percentages were not significant. Results are shown in
Table 5.74 and Figure 5.53.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
EC01 27% 60% 13%
EC02 30% 50% 20%
EC03 20% 60% 20%
EC04 35% 45% 20%
EC05 20% 71% 9%
EC06 20% 65% 15%
EC07 25% 60% 15%
EC08 20% 30% 50%
EC09 16% 76% 8%
EC10 25% 55% 15%
Combined 24% 57% 19%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.74: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 2 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.53: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 2 - second round.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
In second round was reached for these judgments an high degree of concordance: W = 0, 7.
Results are shown in Table 5.75 and Figure 5.54.
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Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
EC01 30% 25% 45%
EC02 10% 15% 75%
EC03 15% 30% 55%
EC04 30% 35% 35%
EC05 18% 20% 62%
EC06 25% 35% 40%
EC07 30% 25% 45%
EC08 20% 30% 50%
EC09 7% 61% 32%
EC10 20% 18% 62%
Combined 21% 29% 50%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.75: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 2 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.54: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2: mean ranking
from Panel 2 - second round.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
In this round technicians reviewed their judgments and the two stopping criteria were both
reached: W = 0, 7 and variation in percentages were not significant. Results are shown in
Table 5.76 and Figure 5.55.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
EC01 30% 60% 10%
EC02 40% 50% 10%
EC03 40% 35% 25%
EC04 40% 50% 10%
EC05 30% 60% 10%
EC06 63% 22% 15%
EC07 30% 50% 20%
EC08 40% 50% 10%
EC09 7% 47% 46%
EC10 30% 49% 21%
Combined 34% 48% 18%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.76: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 2 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.55: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3: mean ranking
from Panel 2 - second round.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
In this round technicians reviewed their judgments and the two stopping criteria were both
reached: W = 0, 7 and variation in percentages were not significant. Results are shown in
Table 5.77 and Figure 5.56.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
EC01 35% 45% 20%
EC02 30% 45% 25%
EC03 24% 63% 13%
EC04 25% 50% 25%
EC05 42% 46% 12%
EC06 15% 35% 40%
EC07 25% 60% 15%
EC08 30% 60% 10%
EC09 14% 74% 12%
EC10 27% 55% 18%
Combined 27% 53% 20%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.77: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 2 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.56: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 2 - second round.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
In the second round there were only few changes in percentages from the experts, therefore
W concordance didn’t increased. Only the second stopping criteria was reached:
• IC1: 41% in first round, 41% in second round; variation of 0%;
• IC2: 25% in first round, 25% in second round; variation of 0%;
• IC3: 34% in first round, 34% in second round; variation of 0%;
Since there was no variation in percentages from first to second round, we accepted
the following results as definitive. Results are shown in Table 5.54 and Figure 5.27.
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Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
EC01 35% 30% 35%
EC02 47% 6% 47%
EC03 20% 20% 60%
EC04 40% 40% 20%
EC05 20% 50% 30%
EC06 30% 30% 40%
EC07 55% 20% 25%
EC08 50% 30% 20%
EC09 46% 9% 45%
EC10 63% 18% 19%
Combined 41% 25% 34%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.78: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 2 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 2.
Figure 5.57: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 2 - second round.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
In second round was reached for these judgments an high degree of concordance: W = 0, 8.
Results are shown in Table 5.79 and Figure 5.58.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
EC01 61% 8% 31%
EC02 68% 10% 22%
EC03 60% 20% 20%
EC04 60% 30% 10%
EC05 60% 10% 30%
EC06 71% 12% 17%
EC07 50% 25% 25%
EC08 50% 25% 25%
EC09 67% 9% 24%
EC10 50% 25% 25%
Combined 60% 17% 23%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.79: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 2 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 8.
Figure 5.58: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 2 - second round.
128
5.2.3.3 Panel 3: fire brigades
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
In second round was reached for these judgments an high degree of concordance: W = 0, 7.
Results are shown in Table 5.80 and Figure 5.59.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
VF01 8% 82% 10%
VF02 8% 80% 12%
VF03 20% 75% 15%
VF04 20% 73% 7%
VF05 15% 55% 30%
VF06 25% 40% 35%
VF07 25% 35% 40%
VF08 30% 45% 25%
VF09 20% 45% 35%
VF10 20% 50% 30%
Combined 19% 58% 23%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.80: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 3 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 7.
Figure 5.59: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 3 - second round.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
In the second round there were some changes in percentages from the experts, therefore
W concordance didn’t increased till an acceptable level. Only the second stopping criteria
was reached:
• IC1: 25% in first round, 24% in second round; variation of 1%;
• IC2: 47% in first round, 45% in second round; variation of 2%;
• IC3: 28% in first round, 32% in second round; variation of 4%;
Since there was no significant variation in percentages from first to second round, we
accepted the following results as definitive.Results are shown in Table 5.81 and Figure
5.60.
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Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
VF01 10% 80% 10%
VF02 10% 24% 66%
VF03 15% 35% 50%
VF04 18% 72% 10%
VF05 25% 45% 30%
VF06 45% 30% 25%
VF07 10% 45% 45%
VF08 20% 55% 25%
VF09 50% 20% 30%
VF10 35% 40% 25%
Combined 23% 45% 32%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.81: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 3 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 2.
Figure 5.60: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2: mean ranking
from Panel 3 - second round.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
In second round was reached for these judgments an high degree of concordance: W = 0, 8.
Results are shown in Table 5.82 and Figure 5.61.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
VF01 10% 80% 10%
VF02 10% 81% 9%
VF03 20% 60% 20%
VF04 20% 72% 8%
VF05 15% 65% 20%
VF06 30% 50% 20%
VF07 8% 60% 32%
VF08 10% 65% 25%
VF09 15% 70% 15%
VF10 15% 55% 30%
Combined 15% 66% 19%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.82: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 3 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 8.
Figure 5.61: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3: mean ranking
from Panel 3 - second round.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
In second round was reached for these judgments an high degree of concordance: W = 0, 9.
Results are shown in Table 5.83 and Figure 5.62.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
VF01 10% 70% 20%
VF02 15% 70% 15%
VF03 10% 50% 40%
VF04 12% 69% 19%
VF05 22% 43% 35%
VF06 30% 40% 30%
VF07 30% 40% 30%
VF08 5% 70% 25%
VF09 11% 46% 43%
VF10 15% 60% 25%
Combined 16% 56% 28%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.83: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - Panel 3 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 9.
Figure 5.62: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 3 - second round.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
This is the only case in which W decreased from first to second round; however means
of judgments from second round are completely according with means in second round.
Only the second stopping criteria was reached:
• IC1: 30% in first round, 31% in second round; variation of 1%;
• IC2: 36% in first round, 37% in second round; variation of 1%;
• IC3: 35% in first round, 32% in second round; variation of 3%;
Variation in percentages are not significant and the three judgments mean reflect the
total lack of concordance in the panel (the three means are almost 1/3 each one). Results
are shown in Table 5.84 and Figure 5.63.
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Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
VF01 8% 72% 20%
VF02 20% 70% 10%
VF03 50% 30% 20%
VF04 20% 60% 20%
VF05 30% 20% 60%
VF06 30% 30% 40%
VF07 40% 20% 40%
VF08 70% 20% 10%
VF09 40% 20% 40%
VF10 15% 30% 55%
Combined 31% 37% 32%
Rank 3 1 2
Table 5.84: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - Panel 3 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 0.
Figure 5.63: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 3 - second round.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
In second round was reached for these judgments an high degree of concordance: W = 0, 8.
Results are shown in Table 5.85 and Figure 5.64.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
VF01 12% 8% 80%
VF02 30% 20% 50%
VF03 45% 20% 35%
VF04 30% 10% 60%
VF05 10% 30% 60%
VF06 50% 15% 35%
VF07 50% 5% 45%
VF08 30% 20% 50%
VF09 45% 20% 35%
VF10 30% 10% 60%
Combined 33% 16% 51%
Rank 2 3 1
Table 5.85: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - Panel 3 - sec-
ond round; W = 0, 8.
Figure 5.64: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: mean ranking
from Panel 3 - second round.
132
5.2.3.4 Final ranking round 2
In this paragraph the mean judgments from each panel and the final mean of such values
at the end of the Delphi process are shown. Concordance among the panels is not the aim
of the process: it is just a request that each panel gives to reliable judgments with respect
to its own experience and cultural background. The percentages reported in the following
paragraphs are the weights inserted in the AHP.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.86 and Figure 5.65.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC 29% 55% 16%
EC 24% 57% 19%
VF 19% 58% 23%
Combined 24% 57% 19%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.86: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - final ranking.
Figure 5.65: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1: final ranking.
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External Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.87 and Figure 5.66.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC 24% 20% 56%
EC 21% 29% 50%
VF 24% 45% 32%
Combined 23% 31% 46%
Rank 3 2 1
Table 5.87: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - final ranking.
Figure 5.66: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2: final ranking.
External Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.88 and Figure 5.67.
Partecipant EC1 EC2 EC3
height vertical
connec-
tions
context
AC 31% 55% 14%
EC 35% 47% 18%
VF 15% 66% 19%
Combined 27% 56% 17%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.88: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - final ranking.
Figure 5.67: External Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3: final ranking.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 1 (Evacuation).
Results are shown in Table 5.89 and Figure 5.68.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC 31% 53% 16%
EC 27% 53% 19%
VF 16% 56% 28%
Combined 25% 54% 21%
Rank 2 1 3
Table 5.89: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 1 - final ranking.
Figure 5.68: Internal Characteristics with respect
to Objective 1: final ranking.
Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 2 (Fire brigade eﬀectiveness).
Results are shown in Table 5.90 and Figure 5.69.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC 40% 28% 32%
EC 41% 25% 34%
VF 31% 37% 32%
Combined 37% 30% 33%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.90: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 2 - final ranking.
Figure 5.69: Internal Characteristics with respect
to Objective 1: final ranking.
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Internal Characteristics with respect to Objective 3 (Fire and smoke spread).
Results are shown in Table 5.91 and Figure 5.70.
Partecipant IC1 IC2 IC3
technical
installa-
tions
egress
paths
structure
AC 57% 19% 24%
EC 60% 17% 23%
VF 33% 16% 51%
Combined 50% 17% 33%
Rank 1 3 2
Table 5.91: Internal Characteristics with re-
spect to Objective 3 - final ranking.
Figure 5.70: Internal Characteristics with respect
to Objective 1: final ranking.
5.2.4 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is the study of how the variation in the output of a model can be
attributed to diﬀerent variations in the inputs of the model. Sensitivity analysis has been
conducted for:
• each set of Factor with respect to the corresponding Characteristic and each Objec-
tive (sensitivity analysis of level 4 with respect to level 3 of the hierarchical structure);
• each set of Characteristics with respect to each Objective (sensitivity analysis of level
3 with respect to level 2 of the hierarchical structure).
Analysis has been performed by means of spreadsheets, tables and diagrams created by a
Microsoft Excel plug-in.
5.2.4.1 Theoretical outline
Sensitivity analysis is useful to understand how the output depends on specified ranges
for each of the input variables. Range of variation for each parameter has been found out
with the worst case, likely case, and best case for that parameter.
Tornado Diagrams and Spider Charts were plotted for each Factor with respect to the
Characteristics and for each Characteristic with respect to the Objectives.
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Tornado Diagram
For each input variable, all other input values at their “Base case” values are set, it copies
the “One Extreme” input value to the input variable cell, recalculated the worksheet, and
copies the value of the output variable cell to the table. The same steps were repeated
using each “Other Extreme” input value. For each input variable, the software computes
the range of the output variable values (the swing), sorts the table from the largest swing
down to the smallest swing, and prepares a bar chart.
Two Factors Tornado Diagram
Two-factor tornado chart are also produced, where each pair of input variables is consid-
ered. If N is the number of input variables, there are N · (N − 1)/2 pairs to evaluate.
For each pair, the software considers all nine combinations of the “One Extreme”, “Base
Case”, and “Other Extreme” input values for the two variables. For the calculation of
output of each combination, the other input variables are kept at their “Base Case” val-
ues. For each pair, the software summarizes the calculations by showing the combinations
of input values that produce the lowest and highest output value. Finally, the pairs are
sorted by swing, and a tornado chart is created.
Spider Chart
In addition to the tornado chart, spider charts were also created to show how your model’s
output depends on the percentage changes for each of the model’s input variables. Soft-
ware’s Spider uses the same base case and extreme input values as the sensitivity analysis
for the tornado chart. The results are shown with each input value expressed as a percent-
age of the base case input value. If the base case value for an input variable is zero, that
variable is not included in the Spider analysis (because it would not be possible to express
an extreme or intermediate input value as a percentage of the zero base case value). The
chart is an XY chart where the horizontal axis is each input value as a percentage of the
base case input value and the vertical axis is the associated model output value.
5.2.4.2 Results
Sensitivity analysis of level 4 with respect to level 3
It is important to remember that weights for Factors with respect to the Characteristics
are fixed by the method developer; risk indexes, that each factor can assume, are also
fixed (refer to subsection 5.1.6). Sensitivity analysis for the Factors with respect to the
Characteristics has been performed to understand if suggestions coming from the discus-
sion about important Factors had in the Delphi’s first round, were to be considered in the
structure. Such sensitivity analysis was useful to reduce the number of parameters in the
original hierarchy structure to define the definitive structure shown in Figure 5.5. Original
hierarchic structure was composed by 18 Factors instead that 15 in the definitive version.
In the follow, results from the sensitivity analysis performed on a hierarchic structure are
shown. In that structure, in addition to the Factors considered in subsection 5.1.6, three
more factors were considered:
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• EF2.2 Elevators (considered in EC2 Vertical connections);
• EF3.2 Presence of external hydrants (considered in EC3 Context);
• IF1.5 Electricity power system (considered in IC1 Technical installations).
In each one of the following paragraphs three tables (one for each Objective) containing
Factors composing the Characteristic and their percentage coming from the sensitivity
analysis are reported. For each Characteristic there is a graph showing the importance of
Factors for each one of the Objectives. Full results from sensitivity analysis in Appendix B.
Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristic 1: Height
EC1 was composed by EF1.1: Number of Levels and EF1.2: Medium Height.
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
EC1
EF1.1 78,5% EF1.1 89,9% EF1.2 90,8%
EF1.2 21,5% EF1.2 10,1% EF1.1 9,2%
Table 5.92: Percentages of EF1.1 and EF1.2 from sensitivity analysis with respect to the Objec-
tives.
Figure 5.71: Sensitivity analysis of External Factors EF1.1 and EF 1.2 with respect to External
Characteristic 1 for the three Objectives.
Both the two Factors have strong percentage on the Characteristic: none of them have
been neglected after this sensitivity analysis.
Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristic 2: Vertical connections
EC2 was composed by EF2.1: Stairs, EF2.2: Elevators and EF2.3: Double Heights.
From Figure 5.72 and table 5.93 it is quite evident how Factor EF2.2: Elevators have
no influence on the Characteristic. EF2.2 percentage is always lower than 2%; for this
reason this Factor has been neglected in the the definitive hierarchic structure.
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OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
EC2
EF2.1 97,8% EF2.1 74,5% EF2.3 95,4%
EF2.3 1,5% EF2.3 25,1% EF2.1 2,9%
EF2.2 0,7% EF2.2 0,4% EF2.2 1,6%
Table 5.93: Percentages of EF2.1 EF2.2 and EF2.3 from sensitivity analysis with respect to the
Objectives.
Figure 5.72: Sensitivity analysis of External Factors EF2.1, EF 2.2 and EF 2.3 with respect to
External Characteristic 2 for the three Objectives.
Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristic 3: Context
EC3 was composed by EF3.1: Fire Brigade response time, EF3.2: Presence of external
hydrants and EF3.3: Surroundings.
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
EC3
EF3.1 57,7% EF3.1 55,2% EF3.3 47,0%
EF3.3 39,5% EF3.3 43,2% EF3.1 44,8%
EF3.2 2,8% EF3.2 1,6% EF3.2 8,3%
Table 5.94: Percentages of EF3.1 EF3.2 and EF3.3 from sensitivity analysis with respect to the
Objectives.
In Figure 5.73 and table 5.94 we can see that Factor EF3.2: Presence of external
hydrants have percentage always lower than 10%; for this reason this Factor has been
neglected in the the definitive hierarchic structure. Such choice coincides with the opin-
ion collected from the experts in Delphi’s first round: limiting the damages by means of
hydrants can represent a severe problem for the Valuable Contents. Lots of damages to
contents are due not only to the fire but also to the use of water as an extinguisher.
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Figure 5.73: Sensitivity analysis of External Factors EF3.1, EF 3.2 and EF 3.3 with respect to
External Characteristic 3 for the three Objectives.
Sensitivity analysis of Internal Characteristic 1: Technical installations
IC1 was composed by IF1.1: Smoke control system; IF1.2: Detection system; IF1.3:
Suppression system; IF1.4: Alarm system and IF1.5: Electricity power system.
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
IC1
IF1.2 38,7% IF1.2 33,4% IF1.3 44,3%
IF1.4 35,1% IF1.4 27,3% IF1.1 29,8%
IF1.1 11,1% IF1.3 23,0% IF1.2 18,2%
IF1.3 10,6% IF1.1 15,5% IF1.4 5,3%
IF1.5 4,6% IF1.5 0,8% IF1.5 2,4%
Table 5.95: Percentages of IF1.1, IF1.2, IF1.3, IF1.4 and EF1.5 from sensitivity analysis with
respect to the Objectives.
Figure 5.74: Sensitivity analysis of Internal Factors IF1.1, IF1.2, IF1.3, IF1.4 and EF1.5 with
respect to External Characteristic 1 for the three Objectives.
In Figure 5.74 and table 5.95 we can see that Factor IF1.5: Electricity power system
has percentage always lower than 5%; for this reason this Factor has been neglected in
the the definitive hierarchic structure. Such choice coincides with the opinion collected
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from the experts in Delphi’s first round: in event of fire electricity is always absent and
the other technical installations have to be provided with alternative power supply.
Sensitivity analysis of Internal Characteristic 2: Egress paths
IC2 was composed by IF2.1: Type of Evacuation Route; IF2.2: Dimension and Layout
and IF2.3: Linings and Floorings.
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
IC2
IF2.1 75,9% IF2.1 71,5% IF2.2 48,5%
IF2.2 19,8% IF2.2 20,3% IF2.3 37,1%
IF2.3 4,3% IF2.3 8,2% IF2.1 14,3%
Table 5.96: Percentages of IF2.1, IF2.2 and EF2.3 from sensitivity analysis with respect to the
Objectives.
Figure 5.75: Sensitivity analysis of Internal Factors IF2.1, IF2.2 and EF2.3 with respect to Ex-
ternal Characteristic 2 for the three Objectives.
All the three Factors have strong percentages with respect to the Characteristics: none
of them has been neglected after this sensitivity analysis.
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Sensitivity analysis of Internal Characteristic 3: Structure
IC3 was composed by IF3.1: Vertical Structure and IF3.2: Horizontal Structure.
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
IC3
IF3.2 59,0% IF3.2 77,7% IF3.2 91,1%
IF3.1 41,0% IF3.1 22,3% IF3.1 8,9%
Table 5.97: Percentages of IF3.1 and EF3.2 from sensitivity analysis with respect to the Objec-
tives.
Figure 5.76: Sensitivity analysis of Internal Factors IF3.1 and EF3.2 with respect to External
Characteristic 3 for the three Objectives.
The two Factors have strong percentage on the Characteristic: none of them has been
neglected after this sensitivity analysis.
After the full sensitivity analysis on the hierarchic structure, three Factors have been
neglected. Sensitivity analysis was performed another time for EC2: Vertical connections,
EC3: Context and IC1: Technical installations after the cut oﬀ of the three Factors: EF2.2
Elevators, EF3.2 Presence of external hydrants and IF1.5 Electricity power system. In the
following paragraphs the results from the sensitivity analysis on the definitive Factors are
reported.
Sensitivity analysis in the definitive hierarchic structure - External Character-
istic 2: Vertical connections
EC2 is composed, in the definitive hierarchic structure, by only two Factors: EF2.1: Stairs
and EF2.2: Double Heights.
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OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
EC2
EF2.1 96,2% EF2.1 73,2% EF2.2 95,3%
EF2.2 3,8% EF2.2 26,8% EF2.1 4,7%
Table 5.98: Percentages of EF2.1 EF2.2 from sensitivity analysis for definitive hierarchic structure
with respect to the Objectives.
Figure 5.77: Sensitivity analysis in definitive hierarchic structure of External Factors EF2.1 and
EF 2.2 with respect to External Characteristic 2 for the three Objectives.
Sensitivity analysis in the definitive hierarchic structure - External Character-
istic 3: Context
EC3 is composed, in the definitive hierarchic structure, by only two Factors: EF3.1: Fire
Brigade response time and EF3.2: Surroundings.
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
EC3
EF3.1 54,9% EF3.1 54,9% EF3.2 55,7%
EF3.2 45,1% EF3.2 45,1% EF3.1 44,3%
Table 5.99: Percentages of EF3.1 and EF3.2 from sensitivity analysis for definitive hierarchic
structure with respect to the Objectives.
143
Figure 5.78: Sensitivity analysis in definitive hierarchic structure of External Factors EF3.1 and
EF 3.2 with respect to External Characteristic 3 for the three Objectives.
Sensitivity analysis in the definitive hierarchic structure - Internal Character-
istic 1: Technical installations
IC1 is composed, in the definitive hierarchic structure, by only four Factors by IF1.1:
Smoke control system; IF1.2: Detection system; IF1.3: Suppression system and IF1.4:
Alarm system.
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
IC1
IF1.2 39,3% IF1.2 34,1% IF1.3 44,2%
IF1.4 36,8% IF1.4 27,9% IF1.1 31,3%
IF1.1 13,3% IF1.3 22,3% IF1.2 17,9%
IF1.3 10,6% IF1.1 15,8% IF1.4 6,5%
Table 5.100: Percentages of IF1.1, IF1.2, IF1.3 and EF1.4 from sensitivity analysis for definitive
hierarchic structure with respect to the Objectives.
Figure 5.79: Sensitivity analysis in definitive hierarchic structure of Internal Factors IF1.1, IF1.2,
IF1.3 and EF1.4 with respect to External Characteristic 1 for the three Objectives.
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Sensitivity analysis of level 5 with respect to level 4
In this phase a sensitivity analysis was performed in order to check the influence of the
Characteristics with respect to the Objectives. To perform this sensitivity analysis, results
about risk indexes (range of variation of each Characteristic) coming from the sensitivity
between level 4 and 3 and the weights coming from Delphi’s second round were used.
In the following paragraphs tables and graphs (both for External Characteristics and
for Internal Characteristics) containing percentages of each Characteristic with respect to
the Objectives are reported.
Full results from sensitivity analysis in Appendix B.
Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristic with respect to Objectives
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
EC2 81,4% EC1 40,5% EC2 76,0%
EC1 16,0% EC3 31,5% EC1 22,4%
EC3 2,6% EC2 28,1% EC3 1,5%
Table 5.101: Percentages of EC1, EC2 and EC3 from sensitivity analysis with respect to the
Objectives.
Figure 5.80: Sensitivity analysis of EC1, EC2 and EC3 with respect to the three Objectives.
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Sensitivity analysis of Internal Characteristic with respect to Objectives
OB1 OB2 OB3
Evacuation Fire brigade eﬀectiveness Fire and smoke spread
Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage Input Variable Percentage
IC2 81,6% IC3 41,2% IC1 53,8%
IC3 10,8% IC2 34,0% IC3 38,0%
IC1 7,6% IC1 24,8% IC2 8,2%
Table 5.102: Percentages of IC1, IC2 and IC3 from sensitivity analysis with respect to the Ob-
jectives.
Figure 5.81: Sensitivity analysis of IC1, IC2 and IC3 with respect to the three Objectives.
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Chapter 6
Risk Treatment Method
Risk treatment is the phase of the procedure that starts only if the results from Risk
Assessment phase are considered not acceptable from the stakeholder. If the results from
the first phase of the Procedure agree with the acceptance criteria, no action of intervention
is required and risk treatment is not necessary. For this reason, the definition of acceptance
criteria has first priority.
6.1 Acceptance criteria
As widely explained in chapter 4, the final user of the procedure is the manager of his-
torical heritage buildings; it is hence necessary to adopt criteria suitable to his necessity
of manager. Risk Assessment Method produces, for the three Objectives, risk indexes
expressed in the risk scale proposed in Table 5.3. It is important to underline how risk
indexes coming from the procedure have no absolute reference, they are not expressed
calibrating the scale on the base of fire codes. An absolute calibration of the risk scale is
not possible for the buildings we treat and for the Policy (protection of Valuable Contents)
we want to reach. There are not minimum prescriptions or codes referring to protection
against fire of contents in historical buildings in Italy, as referred in 4.2. No relationship
exists therefore between the risk scale definition in Table 5.3 and fire codes application.
This is the reason why, in this Procedure, acceptance criteria are mainly building and
contents dependent.
The manager have to state which is the level of risk he can accept basing such decision
on the importance and on the value both of the building and the contents. An evaluation
of “importance” and “value” of Works of Art and Heritage Buildings is, as referred in
Cost C17 [87, 88, 86], a complex issue that lies outside this text. Only art historians and
conservers have enough competence to state such semi-philosophical concepts; in the follow
some suggestions, in order to take a coherent set of acceptance criteria for the Objectives,
are just proposed, according to the risk scale used in the Procedure.
Acceptance criteria should be based on two limit thresholds, as a lot of best practices
used in risk assessment according to Italian D.Lgs. 81/08 [29]. A lower limit, defined as
the value under which the building and its contents are in a positive situation has to be
identified. Then an upper limit has to be defined, in order to state that over such risk
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value it is compulsory to take mitigation measures for risk reduction. An “action area”,
included between lower and upper limit, is this way created; that is the area within which
it is expected to find the majority of the buildings. With such two limits, it is possible
to reward virtuous managers that have indexes lower than lower limit and to penalize
managers that exceed the upper risk limit. All the managers that have buildings with
risk indexes under the lower limit aren’t obliged to act in risk mitigation; if the building
is in the “action area”, managers can decide to act in order to have advantages in risk
prevention. The area from 0 to the upper limit is defined as the “acceptable area”; if risk
indexes are bigger than upper limit, the building is in the “not acceptable area” and the
mitigation becomes compulsory.
Referring to Table 5.3, index “5: risk condition” is the midpoint of the scale. Around
this midpoint it is suggested to create the “action area” described above. In the follow
and in chapter 7 the following limits have been chosen:
• lower limit = 4;
• upper limit = 5,5.
and consequently:
• Acceptable area: 0 ≤ risk index ≤ 5, 5;
• Not acceptable area: risk index > 5, 5;
• Action area: 4 ≤ risk index ≤ 5, 5.
Between 4 and 5,5 it is necessary to take mitigation measures to reduce risk as much as
possible with the aim to decrease till 4. Over 5,5 limit, it is important to act immediately
in order to reduce risk under 5,5.
It is suggested in the Procedure to fix lower limit at 4, according to the risk scale. Upper
limit is mobile; by increasing and decreasing its value it is possible to create a wider or
smaller “action area” and consequently “acceptable area”, according to the importance of
contents and building.
Risk indexes coming out from the Risk Assessment Method are referred both to the
External Characteristics and to the Internal ones. It is possible to create a diﬀerent
“acceptability area” for External and Internal Characteristics, and diﬀerent limits also
for the various sectors, depending on the relative importance of the contents inside them.
This means that the user can accept diﬀerent levels of risk for the building from a global
viewpoint (External Characteristics) and for the sectors composing the building itself
(Internal Characteristics).
Since historical buildings and Valuable Contents are unique, in order to have a full
scale it is necessary to refer it to the same building and contents. A relative representation
of risk indexes can so be performed running twice the Risk Assessment Method: once for
the actual situation of survey and once inserting data corresponding to the best situation
we can reach in that specific building. Performing Risk Assessment Method twice for the
building and twice for each sector, makes the user able to evaluate how distant actual risk
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indexes are with respect to the best risk indexes one can obtain in that historical building.
A full explanation about this methods of risk communication and outcome representation
is given in paragraph 6.3.2.
In the case studies presented in this dissertation, the same “acceptability area” has
been defined for all the output evaluation. This choice has been made in order to make
easier the comparison among indexes coming out from analysis performed on diﬀerent
buildings.
6.2 Measures of Mitigation
The main goal of the Risk Treatment Method is to provide indications on how to reduce risk
for Valuable Contents. On the base of sensitivity analysis outcomes reported in chapter 5,
it was possible to associate to each Objective the corresponding set of Characteristics that
have more influence on the Objective itself. With the same process, to each Characteristic
the most influencing Factors with respect to the chosen Objective were associated. In the
end it was possible to arrive to the last step of the hierarchic structure, reaching the Sub-
factors. The measures of mitigation are then associated to each Sub-Factors: this way,
once chosen by the stakeholder the Objective to be mitigated, it is possible to descend the
hierarchic structure along links of relative influence, form Characteristics to Sub-Factors,
till arriving to the associated mitigation measures.
In linking levels of the hierarchic structure, basing on the results of sensitivity analysis,
all the elements that had influence percentage lower than 20% were neglected. This way
paths to be followed to mitigate a particular Objective, leading the user from the top of
the structure till the lower level, the level of mitigation measures, were created. Each path
for mitigation starts from an Objective and arrives to a package of measures of mitigation
that are eﬀective to reduce risk. In the follow the sub-hierarchy structures for mitigation
both for the External and for the Internal Characteristics are depicted.
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External Characteristics
Objective 1: Evacuation
Figure 6.1 shows the path from OB1 to the most eﬀective measures of mitigation for
External Characteristics. Intervention on EC2 has priority on intervention on EC1.
Figure 6.1: Sub-hierarchy structure for mitigation of Objective 1 with respect to the External
Characteristics.
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Objective 2: Fire brigade eﬀectiveness
Figure 6.2 shows the path from OB2 to the most eﬀective measures of mitigation for
External Characteristics.
Figure 6.2: Sub-hierarchy structure for mitigation of Objective 2 with respect to the External
Characteristics.
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Objective 3: Fire and smoke spread
Figure 6.3 shows the path from OB3 to the most eﬀective measures of mitigation for
External Characteristics.
Figure 6.3: Sub-hierarchy structure for mitigation of Objective 3 with respect to the External
Characteristics.
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Internal Characteristics
Objective 1: Evacuation
Figure 6.4 shows the path from OB1 to the most eﬀective measures of mitigation for
Internal Characteristics.
Figure 6.4: Sub-hierarchy structure for mitigation of Objective 1 with respect to the Internal
Characteristics.
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Objective 2: Fire brigade eﬀectiveness
Figure 6.5 shows the path from OB2 to the most eﬀective measures of mitigation for
Internal Characteristics.
Figure 6.5: Sub-hierarchy structure for mitigation of Objective 2 with respect to the Internal
Characteristics.
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Objective 3: Fire and smoke spread
Figure 6.6 shows the path from OB3 to the most eﬀective measures of mitigation for
Internal Characteristics.
Figure 6.6: Sub-hierarchy structure for mitigation of Objective 3 with respect to the Internal
Characteristics.
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Mitigation measures are strictly linked, as said, to the Sub-Factors. To give more eﬀec-
tive indications to the user, every mitigation measure belongs to one of the two following
categories, defined on the base of the “cost” of the measure:
• Management Strategies
These measures of mitigation are intended to be at “zero cost” or at least at a
lower cost than the measures in the other category. Management Strategies are
the measures that a manager can adopt without the necessity of an intervention on
the building fabric. This measures are usually to be preferred in risk mitigation
because it is more probable to be able to act on the management, instead of on the
architerctonic configuration of the building.
• Building intervention Strategies
These measures of mitigation are intended to be costly, or at least at an higher cost
than the measures in the other category. In this category all the measures that
necessarily modify the building are comprehended: installations of technical devices,
intervention on the building’s structure, on the facades, on the vertical connections
and so on. Such measures often cannot be avoided to have a good performance in
Valuable Contents protection, but they are very diﬃcult to be fully implemented
because of problems of compatibility and intervention on historical buildings.
In Table 6.1 all the mitigation measures associated to Sub-Factors for External Charac-
teristics are described. In Table 6.2 all the mitigation measures associated to Sub-Factors
for Internal Characteristics are described. If some Sub-Factors are not in the table, it
means that no mitigation measures can be associated to them.
Factor Sub-Factor Mitigation Mesure Category of Miti-
gation Measure
IF1.1 Smoke con-
trol system
IF1.1.1 characteristics
of the smoke control
system
It could be possible to intervene modifying or
installing the smoke control system
Building
intervention
IF1.1.2 maintenance of
the smoke control sys-
tem
It is possible for the building’s manager to fore-
cast regular the maintenance
Management
IF1.2 Detection
system
IF1.2.1 detection sys-
tem distribution
It could be possible to intervene modifying or
installing the detection system
Building
intervention
IF1.2.2 type of detec-
tion system
It could be possible to intervene modifying the
type of the detection system
Building
intervention
IF1.2.3 maintenance of
the detection system
It is possible for the building’s manager to fore-
cast regular the maintenance
Management
IF1.3 Suppression
system
IF1.3.1 type and dis-
tribution of automatic
suppression system
It could be possible to intervene modifying or
installing the automatic suppression system
Building
intervention
IF1.3.2 distribution of
portable suppression
system
It is possible for the building’s manager to
increase the number of portable suppression
equipment and its distribution
Management
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IF1.3.3 reliability of
fire service team
It is possible for the building’s manager to in-
crease the quality of the fire service team act-
ing on the number of components and their
formation (ref. to FSI)
Management
IF1.3.4 maintenance of
the suppression system
It is possible for the building’s manager to fore-
cast regular the maintenance
Management
IF1.4 Alarm sys-
tem
IF1.4.1 type of alarm
system
It could be possible to intervene modifying or
installing the alarm system
Building
intervention
IF1.4.2 location of the
signal
It could be possible to intervene modifying the
location of the signal
Building
intervention
IF1.4.3 maintenance of
the detection system
It is possible for the building’s manager to fore-
cast regular the maintenance
Management
IF2.1 Type of
Evacuation Route
IF2.1.1 external evacu-
ation route
It could be possible to intervene modifying the
external evacuation route system
Building
intervention
IF2.1.2 internal evacu-
ation route
It could be possible to intervene modifying the
internal evacuation route system
Building
intervention
IF2.1.3 evacuation
routes for works of art
It is possible for the building’s manager to
change the Damage Limitation Plans avoiding
dangerous paths for works of art
Management
IF2.2 Dimension
and Layout
IF2.2.1 maximum
travel distance
It could be possible to modify the maximum
travel distance with heavy structural interven-
tion
Building
intervention
IF2.2.2 number of
floors to walk
It could be possible to modify the number of
floors to walk with heavy structural interven-
tion (stairs, protected elevators...)
Building
intervention
IF2.2.3 number of sec-
tors connected to the
escape route
It could be possible to modify the number of
sectors connected with the egress path with
heavy structural intervention (stairs, protected
elevators...). It is further possible to take man-
agement strategies that allow to reduce the
number of sectors linked with that specific
egress path
Management
and Building
intervention
IF2.3 Linings and
Floorings
IF2.3.1 type of lining
and floorings
It could be possible to modify linings and floor-
ings in egress paths
Building
intervention
IF3.1 Vertical
Structure
IF3.1.1 vertical struc-
ture
It could be possible to intervene on the struc-
ture to improve its resistance according to fire
codes
Building
intervention
IF3.2 Horizontal
Structure
IF3.1.1 horizontal
structure
It could be possible to intervene on the struc-
ture to improve its resistance according to fire
codes
Building
intervention
Table 6.2: Measures of mitigation linked with Internal Factors.
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Factor Sub-Factor Mitigation Mesure Category of Miti-
gation Measure
EF1.1 Number of
Levels
EF1.1.3 attic and its
destination of use
It is possible for the building’s manager to
change the destination of use of the attic
Management
EF1.2 Medium
Height
EF1.2.3 opening to the
public
It is possible for the building’s manager to
modify the opening to the public of the in-
terested building’s area
Management
EF2.1 Stairs EF2.1.2 safe egress
stairs
It could be possible to intervene on the stairs
to make them “safe” according to the fire codes
Building
intervention
EF2.1.3 equivalent safe
stairs
It could be possible to intervene on the stairs
to make them useful for the emergency paths
Building
intervention
EF2.2 Double
Heights
EF2.2.2 presence of
flues and chimneys
It could be possible to intervene sealing all the
vertical connections among the levels of the
building
Building
intervention
EF3.1 Fire Brigade
response time
EF3.1.1 fire brigade re-
sponse time
It is possible for the building’s manager to take
special agreements with fire brigades in order
to reduce their intervention time
Management
EF3.2 Surround-
ings
EF3.2.2 facade accessi-
bility
It could be possible to intervene modifying the
openings in the facades in order to make them
easier accessible from the extern
Building
intervention
Table 6.1: Measures of mitigation linked with External Factors.
6.3 Risk communication: how to display results
Risk communication is an interactive process of exchange of information and opinions on
risk among risk assessors, risk managers, and other interested parties. In this dissertation
the most important goal is to communicate risk to the manager of historical buildings,
that is the stakeholder with a low risk-confidence.
As reported in literature [31, 90, 53], risk communication is an integral and ongoing part
of the risk management exercise, and ideally all the stakeholder groups should be involved
from the start. Risk communication makes stakeholders aware of the process at each stage
of the Risk Management. This helps to ensure that the logic, outcomes, significance, and
limitations of the Risk Assessment are clearly understood by all the stakeholders.
The identification of particular interest groups and their representatives should com-
prise a part of an overall risk communication strategy. This risk communication strategy
should be discussed and agreed between risk assessors and managers early in the process,
in order to ensure two-way communication. In this dissertation, the addressees of the risk
communication are the managers of historical buildings, persons that basically also are,
at the same time, risk managers for their buildings. Usually buildings’ managers are not
expert in risk management but they are the persons who have the duty to act in order
to reduce risk for Valuable Contents. The Risk Management Procedure of this disser-
tation have to communicate risk to “not risk-confident” stakeholder that, basing on the
procedure’s suggestion, have to act as risk manager in mitigating risk.
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Decisions on risk communication, including what, whom and how, should be part of an
overall risk communication strategy. Risk communication is most eﬀective if undertaken
in a systematic way, and generally starts with the gathering of information on the risk
issue of concern. Therefore the risk manager and risk assessor must be able to briefly and
clearly summarize what this issue encompasses, at an early stage, in order to elicit interest
and stakeholder input Communication must then continue throughout the entire process.
The fundamental goal of risk communication is to provide meaningful, relevant and
accurate information, in clear and understandable terms targeted to a specific audience.
It may not resolve all the diﬀerences between the parties, but may lead to a better under-
standing of those diﬀerences. It may also lead to more widely understood and accepted
risk management decisions. Eﬀective risk communication should have goals that build
and maintain trust and confidence. It should facilitate a higher degree of consensus and
support by all interested parties for the risk management option(s) being proposed.
From [31], the goals of risk communication are here reported:
1. Promote awareness and understanding of the specific issues under consideration dur-
ing the risk analysis process, by all participants;
2. Promote consistency and transparency in arriving at and implementing risk man-
agement decisions;
3. Provide a sound basis for understanding the risk management decisions proposed or
implemented;
4. Improve the overall eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of the risk analysis process;
5. Contribute to the development and delivery of eﬀective information and education
programmes, when they are selected as risk management options;
6. Strengthen the working relationships and mutual respect among all participants;
7. Promote the appropriate involvement of all interested parties in the risk communi-
cation process;
8. Exchange information on the knowledge, attitudes, values, practices and perceptions
of interested parties concerning risks and related topics.
Basing on this concept, strong importance was assigned to the methodology of repre-
sentation for the risk results from Risk Assessment Method. Risk Indexes, with respect to
the three Objectives, are shown by means of diﬀerent graphs and tables. In the following
paragraphs diﬀerent ways to represent outcomes from Risk Assessment Method are shown.
6.3.1 Absolute representation of risk
This way of representing results is the most intuitive and immediate. Risk indexes are
depicted in histograms and the “action area” is identified by means of two horizontal lines
corresponding to its boundary (red line corresponds to upper limit 5,5 and green line
corresponds to lower limit 4). In Figure 6.7 an example of such representation is given.
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Figure 6.7: Example of absolute representation of the risk indexes for the three Objectives.
6.3.2 Relative representation of risk
Relative representation of risk indexes is referred to the full scale created ad hoc for the
analysed building, as described on page 149. Risk Assessment Method has been run
once for the actual situation of survey and once inserting data corresponding to the best
situation reachable in that specific building. Outcomes of Risk Assessment Method are,
in this case, information as the ones reported in Table 6.4.
Best Index Risk Index Level of Mitigation Measures
OB1 2,09 4,51 46%
OB2 3,05 4,96 62%
OB3 1,10 5,01 82%
Table 6.3: Example of information from Risk Assessment Method useful for relative representa-
tion of risk indexes.
In Table 6.4:
• Best index = BI; first column represents the risk index one can reach in that
building by the full implementation of the mitigation measures suitable for that
specific situation;
• Risk index = RI; second column represents the risk index coming from the evalua-
tion of the actual situation in the building;
• third column represents level of application of the mitigation measures. Such pa-
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rameter is defined as
LMM =
BI
RI
(6.1)
and says “how much” has been done in fire prevention with respect to what is possible
to do in the future. The higher such parameter is, the less it is possible to do in risk
mitigation; this is the case in which RI in quite near to BI.
From above described information, it is possible to represent data in graphs like the
one in Figure 6.8: on the x axis the risk scale according to Table 5.3 is reported and on
y axis LMM parameter is reported; points are identified by coordinates (RI; LMM).
Vertical red line corresponds to the upper risk limit, vertical green line corresponds to the
lower limit of the “action area”, as defined in paragraph 6.1.
Figure 6.8: Example of relative representation of the risk indexes for the three Objectives.
The virtuous situation is when all the points are below than the lower limit and in the
upper part of the graph, that means very low risk and full implementation of measures of
mitigation.
The worst situation is for points with risk indexes higher than upper limit and in the
upper part of the graph. This means that, despite the high risk, there are not mitigation
measures to be taken in order to reduce risk.
The most common situation is to have points that, apart from their risk index, are in
the middle area of y axis; this means that there are enough mitigation measures to be taken.
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The relative representation can be used to choose which is the Objective the manager
wants to mitigate first: Objectives with high risk index and low level of MMT are to be
preferred.
The relative representation can be useful also to depict risk indexes after Risk Treat-
ment phase, to communicate to the manager the eﬃcacy of his actions of mitigation. Fol-
lowing procedure described in section 6.2, from the Procedure are obtained risk indexes
associated to the behaviour of the building after the application of specific mitigation mea-
sures. Parameters used for graphic representation are the same shown above; risk indexes
are now calculated after the application of suitable mitigation measures. While BI doesn’t
change, a decreasing of RI is expected.
6.3.3 Representation of mitigation
In the Risk Management Procedure for Valuable Contents in Historical Heritage Buildings,
a set of instructions to reduce risk are suggested as output of the Risk Treatment phase,
as described in section 6.2. The final user of the procedure must be aware of which miti-
gation measure is most eﬃcacy and why the Procedure suggests him to attempt a specific
mitigation path. In this paragraph three diﬀerent ways of representing risk with respect
to the mitigation are given.
Triangle of mitigation
This is the most simple way to represent and to communicate risk and eﬃcacy of mitiga-
tion. “Triangle representation” consists only in depicting the three risk indexes, one for
each Objective, on a 3 axis graph. Each set of three points depicts a triangle that defines
the status of the situation with respect to which indexes are calculated. The external
triangle represents the risk upper limit and no other point should exceed its boundary.
The inner triangle represents the best situation; all the other sets of indexes are outside
of its perimeter. Between inner and outer triangles, there is the shape representing the
actual situation. Also after mitigation, the situation can be depicted; in this case, the
corresponding triangle is expected to be internal to the one of the actual situation. In
Figure 6.9 and 6.10 examples of “triangle representation” are given.
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Figure 6.9: Example of relative “triangle representation” for the actual situation.
Figure 6.10: Example of relative “triangle representation” for the situation after mitigation.
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Paths of mitigation
By this kind of representation the milestones the user has to reach in order to mitigate
risk in the building he manage are shown. The proposed representation is not referred
to the absolute risk index representation; it is possible this way to choose every suitable
upper risk limit and not to loose sense in output representation. Upper risk limit (RL) is
here considered together with two additional parameters:
∆R = RL−RI (6.2)
that measures the distance between the actual situation and the risk upper limit, and
MMT = 1− LMM (6.3)
that is an estimation of the Mitigation Measure that can be taken with respect to the
ones adopted in the actual situation (LMM). Parameters are calculated as output of the
procedure and are resumed in tables like Table 6.4, here reported as an example.
Actual situation After mitigation Best situation
OB1
∆R 0,99 2,92 3,41
MMT 54% 19% 0%
OB2
∆R 0,54 1,31 2,45
MMT 38% 27% 0%
OB3
∆R 0,49 0,95 1,40
MMT 18% 10% 0%
Table 6.4: Example of parameters useful for mitigation paths representation.
The parameters calculated for the actual situation in the building are in the first
column; these parameters come out from the first application of the Risk Assessment
Method on the building, once collected the starting data.
The parameters calculated for the best situation we can have in that specific building
are in the third column. This is the reason why parameters MMT (Mitigation Measures
to be Taken) are equal to zero; we assume that, in the best situation, we have a full
implementation of mitigation measures.
Indexes calculated after the application of a package of mitigation measures, according
to indications given in section 6.2, are in the second column.
By means of such parameters graphs like Figure 6.11 are depicted. In such kind of
graphs, the level of Mitigation Measure to be Taken decreases while the ∆R parameter,
indicating how far we are from the not acceptable risk limit, increases. User can read which
are the paths he can follow, applying the mitigation packages in section 6.2, to reach the
best situation for the building. Such graphs can be built once chosen the Objective to be
mitigated and it represents also the secondary eﬀect of mitigation we have on the other
two Objectives, not directly interested by actions of mitigation.
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Figure 6.11: Example of mitigation paths representation for the three Objectives.
Area of mitigation
From the representation of “paths of mitigation”, it is evident that mitigation trend is
quite linear. “Area of mitigation” represents just the plot of ∆R over MMT for the
actual situation and for the best situation. By means of this representation, the area of
the triangle under the broken line gives a qualitative impression about the possibility to
mitigate risk in that building. The bigger is the area under the line, the more is possible
to act in order to reduce risk, and that can be done using the paths of mitigation.
The representation with “area of mitigation” is mainly useful to the building’s manager
when he has to manage more than one building. By means of this graphs it is possible
to join, on the same figure, areas representing diﬀerent buildings. This can be done
comparing corresponding Objectives: a comparison of the same Objective with respect to
External Characteristics of the two buildings or a comparison of the same Objective with
respect to Internal Characteristics of sectors of each building with highest risk index. Such
comparison can be done whatever is the chosen upper risk limit, in the representations in
fact only dimentionless parameters are involved.
A manager that has to decide which one of the building he manages needs priority in
intervention and “how much” he can act in risk reduction, has just to decide a comparison
Objective ad to look at “area of mitigation” graphs. In Table 6.5 sample data for two
buildings, useful to depict “area of mitigation” graphs like Figure 6.12 are shown.
Actual situation Best situation
Building 1
∆R 0,99 3,41
MMT 54% 0%
Building 2
∆R 1,74 1,99
MMT 7% 0%
Table 6.5: Example of parameters useful for “area of mitigation” graphs for two buildings with
respect to one fixed Objective.
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Figure 6.12: Example of “area of mitigation” graphs for two buildings with respect to one fixed
Objective.
Figure 6.12 shows in a qualitative way how small the leeway is in acting on building
2 while building 1 allows to take more mitigation measures in order to reduce risk till the
best situation.
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Chapter 7
Case Studies
In this chapter two application examples of the Risk Management Procedure are shown.
Procedure was run applying it to two historical buildings in Tuscany: Opificio delle Pietre
Dure base in Fortezza da Basso in Firenze and Palazzo Chigi Saracini in Siena. The two
buildings have been chosen to test the Procedure in real buildings with known character-
istics with respect to the fire protection. Opificio delle Pietre Dure building in Fortezza
da Basso is the base of one of the most important conservation laboratories for works
of art in Europe. The building that hosts the laboratory is inside Fortezza da Basso in
Firenze, the building has a very simple architectonic configuration despite the complexity
of the activity conducted inside it. In the building the most important masterpieces of
Art History to be conserved are temporary placed (but for long periods of time). Contents
of the building are estimated to be some of the most important masterpieces all over the
world. For this reason in the building technical installations for fire prevention and pro-
tection are suitable, as well as the staﬀ is well trained in contents protection against fire
and evacuation.
Palazzo Chigi Saracini is one of the most important building of Siena historic centre; it
is a complex building with a lot of diﬀerent activities inside it. Despite such architectonic
complexity, almost no permanent fire protection or prevention measure is applied at the
moment. The approval of the fire protection design is in progress at the moment. In the
building valuable contents (works of art and musical instruments) that are precious and
to be preserved are contained.
In table 7.1 a resume of the features characterizing the two buildings is shown.
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Opificio delle Pietre Dure Palazzo Chigi Saracini
Simple architectonic configuration Complex architectonic configuration
Building containing masterpieces of Art
History
Building containing valuable assets
Very good technical installations for
fire protection and prevention
Almost total absence of technical sys-
tems for fire protection and prevention
Table 7.1: Features characterizing the two buildings.
7.1 Opificio delle Pietre Dure
In this chapter the results deriving from the application of the risk management procedure
to an historical building in Florence are presented. The building analysed is the “Opificio
delle Pietre Dure” base inside the Fortezza da Basso in Firenze.
Opificio delle Pietre Dure e Laboratori di Restauro is a public institute of the Italian
Ministry for Cultural Heritage based in Florence. It is a global leader in the field of art
restoration and provides teaching as one of the two Italian state conservation schools (the
other being the Istituto Superiore per la Conservazione ed il Restauro). The institute
maintains also a specialist library and archive of conservation and a museum displaying
historic examples of Pietre Dure inlaid semi-precious stones artefacts. A scientific labo-
ratory conducts research and diagnostics and provides a preventive conservation service
[47].
Being one of the famous artistic workshops of the Italian Renaissance, the Opificio
was established in 1588 at the behest of Ferdinando I de’ Medici to provide the elaborate,
inlaid precious and semi-precious stoneworks. One of the masterpieces of the crafts is the
overall decoration of the Cappella dei Principi in the Basilica di San Lorenzo di Firenze.
The technique, which originated from Byzantine inlay work, was perfected by the Opificio
masters and the artworks they produced became known as ”opere di Commessi Mediceo”
(commesso is the old name of the technique, similar to ancient mosaics) and later as
“Commesso in Pietre Dure” (semi-precious stones mosaic). The artisans performed the
exceptionally skilled and delicate task of inlaying thin veneers of semi-precious stones espe-
cially selected for their colour, opacity, brilliance and grain to create elaborate decorative
and pictorial eﬀects. Items of extraordinary refinement were created in this way, from
furnishings to all manner of artworks. Today, artisans trained at the Opificio assist many
of the world’s museums in their restoration programmes. The Opificio workshops were
originally located in the Casino Mediceo, then in the Uﬃzi and were finally moved to their
present location in Via Alfani in 1796. After the end of the XIX Century the institute’s
activities moved away from the production of works of art and towards its restoration.
At first specialising in hardstone carving, in which the workshops were a world authority,
and then later expanding into other related fields (stone and marble sculptures, bronzes,
168
ceramics).
The second branch of the Institute (Laboratori di Restauro) had a more modern story.
In 1932 Ugo Procacci, the distinghished scholar of Florentine art, in his career as an
oﬃcer of the Italian Ministry for Cultural Heritage, founded a Laboratory of restoration
(original Italian name: Gabinetto di Restauro) at the Florence Soprintendenza. It was the
first modern restoration laboratory in Italy (pre-dating of 7 years the Istituto Superiore
per la Conservazione ed il Restauro in Rome) and one of the very first ones in all the world.
The Gabinetto di Restauro used scientific methods for the preliminary exhamination of
the works of art (as X radiography) and began an outstanding campaign of restoration on
Tuscan Early Masters paintings.
In 1966, the fatal tragedy of the flooding of the River Arno, resulted in many priceless
works of art requiring restoration. It provided a significant impetus for expansion of the
Gabinetto di Restauro’s research and restorative services. More space was needed because
of the sheer number of artworks which required restoration and also, in some cases, the
large size of the pieces themselves, such as the immense Crucifix by Cimabue from the
Basilica di Santa Croce. The expansions provided new laboratories in the Fortezza da
Basso. Thanks to financial aid and an influx of expertise from throughout the world,
the Florentine Laboratory became, in a short time one of the at the vanguard restora-
tion laboratories in the world, combining traditional practices with modern technology.
In 1975, the Cultural Heritage Ministry merged the Opificio laboratories with the Gabi-
netto di Restauro (plus other minor Florentine restoration laboratories) and created a
new Institute, the modern Opificio delle Pietre Dure e Laboratori di Restauro. Today, the
institute is organised in specific departments for the various types of artworks it treats.
The laboratories are in three principal venues: in Via Alfani 78, in the historic centre of
Florence; in the Fortezza da Basso; and in Palazzo Vecchio where restoration treatments
on tapestries and textiles are carried out. There are also several research and services
oﬃces. The Opificio has a board of directors of the departments, under the supervision of
the Soprintendente. It has also a management committee and a scientific committee. The
Departments for conservations are:
• Tapestries and carpets
• Bronzes and ancient weapons
• Wooden Sculptures
• Wall Painting
• Drawings and Prints
• Stoneworks
• Pietre dure mosaics
• Jewelry
• Easel Paintings
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• Terracotta and potteries
• Textiles
The building we studied was the Fortezza da Basso base, in Figure 7.1 the entrance of
the building. This building hosts the departments of Wooden Sculptures, Wall Paintings,
Drawings and Prints, Easel Paintings and Textiles. Inside the building there are also
oﬃces and laboratories.
Figure 7.1: Main entrance of the OPD building in Fortezza da Basso.
The building has rectangular shape and two stores height; the main vertical structure is
composed of mansory and the floors and the roof are wooden-made. There are three main
staircases, one of them fire protected. All the Figures here reported derive from Capone
et al. [38]. In Figure 7.2 the Fortezza da Basso map is shown with a marker indicating
the OPD base. In Figure 7.3 and 7.4 plans and sections of the building are shown.
To estimate the Internal Characteristics, the building has been divided into six sectors:
• Sector 1: it is located at the ground floor and it contains storage rooms and the
photography laboratory;
• Sector 2: it is located at the ground floor and it contains the Easel painting depart-
ment;
• Sector 3: it is located at the ground floor and it contains the Wooden Sculptures
and Wall Painting departments;
• Sector 4: it is located at the ground floor and it contains carpentry and laboratories;
• Sector 5: it is located at the first floor and it contains Textile department and oﬃces;
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Figure 7.2: Map of the Fortezza da Basso with indication of OPD building.
Figure 7.3: Ground floor and first floor of the OPD Building in Fortezza da Basso, [38].
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Figure 7.4: Section of the OPD Building in Fortezza da Basso, [38].
• Sector 6: it is located at the first floor and it contains laboratories and oﬃces.
(refer to the Figure 7.5 to individuate them). The sectors correspond to the fire com-
partments into which the building is divided; the stairs in the center of the building are
protected, while the other two stairs at the extremes of the building are common stairs
made of stone. In the following, tables resuming the results from the procedure are re-
ported for each sector and for the External Characteristics; in these tables there is also a
brief description about the situation in the building. For each set of characteristics there
are two tables, one referred to the actual situation and the other referred to the best
situation.
Figure 7.5: Sectors composing OPD Building in Fortezza da Basso, elaboration from [38].
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7.1.1 FSI
In OPD building we have a number of FS members greater than 1 for each sector. Every
member has “Medium Fire Risk” formation and retraining is done every two years.
FSI1
In Table 7.2 risk indexes for ISi are shown.
Sector Number of members in the sector ISi
Sector 1 > 1 0
Sector 2 > 1 0
Sector 3 > 1 0
Sector 4 > 1 0
Sector 5 > 1 0
Sector 6 > 1 0
Table 7.2: Values for ISi in OPD building.
From the data in Table 7.2 it is possible to calculate
FSI =
￿n
i=1 ISi
n
= 0 (7.1)
FSI2
In Table 7.3 risk indexes for FSI2 are shown.
Level of formation FSI2
B: medium fire risk 3
Table 7.3: Values for FSI2 in OPD building.
FSI3
In Table 7.4 risk indexes for FSI3 are shown.
Periodicity Type of retrainig
Theoretical and practical
every two years 4
Table 7.4: Values for FSI3 in OPD building.
From data in tables above FSI according to equation 5.51 assumes the value of 2,3
and, according to Table 5.28, IF133 is estimated to be 1,2.
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7.1.2 External Characteristics
Table 7.5 shows risk indexes for OPD building in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
EC1
EF 1.1 n◦ of levels 2 levels, no attic, no under-
ground levels
3,00
3,80 3,60 4,60
EF 1.2 medium height HM minor than 10m 5,00
EC2
EF 2.1 stairs missing 1 emergency stair 4,20
4,32 4,48 4,84
EF2.2 double heights one of two levels height 5,00
EC3
EF 3.1 fire brigade response
time
10-15 minutes 6,00
6,04 6,04 6,05EF3.2 surroundings 3 of the four sides with very
good accessibility; 1 side to-
tally not accessible
6,13
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,52 5,00 4,98
Table 7.5: Risk Indexes for External Characteristics in actual situation.
Table 7.6 shows risk indexes for OPD building in best situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
EC1
EF 1.1 n◦ of levels 2 levels, no attic, no under-
ground levels
3,00
3,80 3,60 4,60
EF 1.2 medium height HM minor than 10m 5,00
EC2
EF 2.1 stairs desired number of stairs 0,00
0,75 1,75 4,00
EF2.2 double heights one of two levels height 5,00
EC3
EF 3.1 fire brigade response
time
0-5 minutes 2,00
3,44 3,44 3,65EF3.2 surroundings 3 of the four sides with very
good accessibility; 1 side to-
tally not accessible
6,13
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 1,99 2,95 4,10
Table 7.6: Risk Indexes for External Characteristics in the best situation.
Figure 7.6 shows relative representation of risk indexes for OPD External Character-
istics. The three Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
Since the three points are in the “action area”, no compulsory intervention has to be
done; in order to be virtuous, building’s manager can try to improve the Risk Index for
OB1 − Evacuation since it has the lowest LMM . Referring to the mitigation path for
OB1 with respect to the External Characteristics, represented in Figure 6.1, mitigation
measures have to be taken about Factor EF2.1 − stairs. To improve LMM was chosen
to built the emergency staircase now missing in the building.
In Table 7.7 risk indexes after OB1 mitigation are reported and in Figure 7.7 results
after mitigation are shown. Table 7.8 shows data upon whom to build Figure 7.7.
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Figure 7.6: Relative representation of the risk indexes for the External Characteristics in OPD
building.
Figure 7.7: Relative representation of the risk indexes for the External Characteristics in OPD
building after mitigation of OB1.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
EC1
EF 1.1 n◦ of levels 2 levels, no attic, no under-
ground levels
3,00
3,80 3,60 4,60
EF 1.2 medium height HM minor than 10m 5,00
EC2
EF 2.1 stairs desired number of emer-
gency stairs
0,00
0,75 1,75 4,00
EF2.2 double heights one of two levels height 5,00
EC3
EF 3.1 fire brigade response
time
10-15 minutes 6,00
6,04 6,04 6,05EF3.2 surroundings 3 of the four sides with very
good accessibility; 1 side to-
tally not accessible
6,13
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 2,49 4,15 4,41
Table 7.7: Risk Indexes for External Characteristics after OB1 mitigation.
Actual situation After OB1 mitigation
BI RI LMM RI LMM ∆RI ∆LMM
OB1 1,99 4,52 44% 2,49 80% 2,03 36%
OB2 2,95 5,00 59% 4,15 71% 0,85 12%
OB3 4,10 4,98 82% 4,51 91% 0,47 9%
Table 7.8: Data for relative representation of risk for External Carachteristics after OB1 mitiga-
tion in OPD building.
From the above data it is possible to notice how the direct action on the EF2.1−stairs
factor creates a strong reduction of the RI for that Objective and a significant increase of
the corresponding LMM . At the same time there are also good secondary eﬀects on the
other two Objectives, both in terms of RI and LMM .
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7.1.3 Sector 1
Sector 1 is located at the ground floor of the building and it contains storage rooms and
the photography laboratory. This sector corresponds with a fire compartment. Table 7.9
shows risk indexes for Sector 1 of OPD building in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
4,58 4,66 5,06
IF 1.2 detection system at least one wired smoke de-
tector in every room
4,00
IF 1.3 suppression system gas system in rooms with
valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
4,24
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell with signal sent
manually to all building
3,40
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
3,11 3,03 2,41IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2levels; protected stairs
2,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,96 4,59 4,99
Table 7.9: Risk Indexes for Sector 1 of OPD building in actual situation.
Table 7.10 shows risk indexes for Sector 1 of OPD building in best situation. Figure 7.8
shows relative representation of risk indexes for OPD Sector 1. The three Risk Indicators
for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,85 1,89 1,97
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system bet FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
3,11 3,03 2,41IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2levels; not protected stairs
2,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,27 3,54 3,44
Table 7.10: Risk Indexes for Sector 1 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.8: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Sector 1 in OPD building.
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7.1.4 Sector 2
Sector 2 is located at the ground floor of the building and it contains the Easel painting
department. This sector corresponds with a fire compartment. Table 7.11 shows risk
indexes for Sector 2 of OPD building in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
4,16 4,29 4,79
IF 1.2 detection system more than one wired smoke
detector in every room
2,50
IF 1.3 suppression system gas system in rooms with
valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
4,24
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell with signal sent
manually to all building
3,40
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
3,11 3,03 2,41IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2levels; protected stairs
2,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,85 4,45 4,85
Table 7.11: Risk Indexes for Sector 2 of OPD building in actual situation.
Table 7.12 shows risk indexes for Sector 2 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.9 shows relative representation of risk indexes for OPD Sector 1. The three
Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,85 1,89 1,97
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system bet FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
2,81 2,74 2,01IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2levels; protected stairs
1,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,11 3,45 3,37
Table 7.12: Risk Indexes for Sector 2 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.9: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Sector 2 in OPD building.
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7.1.5 Sector 3
Sector 3 is located at the ground floor of the building and contains the Wooden Sculptures
and Wall Painting departments. This sector corresponds with a fire compartment. Table
7.13 shows risk indexes for Sector 3 of OPD building in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
4,19 4,33 4,85
IF 1.2 detection system more than one wired smoke
detector in every room
2,50
IF 1.3 suppression system gas system in rooms with
valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
4,40
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell with signal sent
manually to all building
3,40
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
2,81 2,74 2,01IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2 levels; protected stairs
1,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,70 4,38 4,81
Table 7.13: Risk Indexes for Sector 3 of OPD building in actual situation.
Table 7.14 shows risk indexes for Sector 3 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.10 shows relative representation of risk indexes for OPD Sector 1. The three
Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,88 1,94 2,04
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system bet FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
2,56
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
2,81 2,74 2,01IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2levels; protected stairs
1,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,12 3,47 3,41
Table 7.14: Risk Indexes for Sector 3 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.10: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Sector 3 in OPD building.
182
7.1.6 Sector 4
Sector 4 is located at the ground floor of the building and it contains carpentry and
laboratories. This sector is a fire compartment. Table 7.15 shows risk indexes for Sector
4 of OPD building in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
4,24 4,39 4,93
IF 1.2 detection system at least one wired smoke de-
tector in every room
2,50
IF 1.3 suppression system gas system in rooms with
valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
4,64
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell with signal sent
manually to all building
3,40
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
3,11 3,03 2,41IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2 levels; not protected stairs
2,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,87 4,49 4,92
Table 7.15: Risk Indexes for Sector 4 of OPD building in actual situation.
Table 7.16 shows risk indexes for Sector 4 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.11 shows relative representation of risk indexes for OPD Sector 4. The three
Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,85 1,89 1,97
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art
4,05
3,11 3,03 2,41IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2levels; not protected stairs
2,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,27 3,54 3,44
Table 7.16: Risk Indexes for Sector 4 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.11: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Sector 4 in OPD building.
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7.1.7 Sector 5
Sector 5 is located at the first floor of the building and it contains Textile department
and oﬃces. In this side of the building a staircase is missing with respect to the desired
number of egress safe stairs. Table 7.17 shows risk indexes for Sector 5 of OPD building
in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
5,10 5,18 5,53
IF 1.2 detection system at least one wired smoke de-
tector in every room
5,5
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system in the
whole sector
4,80
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell with signal sent
manually to all building
3,40
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art and direct escpae to two
escape routes
6,45
4,10 3,94 2,49
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2 levels; protected stairs
1,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,63 5,06 5,23
Table 7.17: Risk Indexes for Sector 5 of OPD building in actual situation.
Table 7.18 shows risk indexes for Sector 5 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.12 shows relative representation of risk indexes for OPD Sector 5. The three
Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,88 1,94 2,04
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
2,56
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art and direct escape to
two escape routes
6,45
4,10 3,94 2,49
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2 levels; protected stairs
1,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,82 3,83 3,49
Table 7.18: Risk Indexes for Sector 5 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.12: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Sector 5 in OPD building.
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7.1.8 Sector 6
Sector 6 is located at the first floor of the building and contains laboratories and oﬃces.
Table 7.19 shows risk indexes for Sector 6 of OPD building in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
5,10 5,18 5,53
IF 1.2 detection system at least one wired smoke de-
tector in every room
5,5
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system in the
whole sector
4,80
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell with signal sent
manually to all building
3,40
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art and direct escape to
two escape routes
6,45
4,10 3,94 2,49
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2 levels; protected stairs
1,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,63 5,06 5,23
Table 7.19: Risk Indexes for Sector 6 of OPD building in actual situation.
Table 7.20 shows risk indexes for Sector 6 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.13 shows relative representation of risk indexes for OPD Sector 6. The three
Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,88 1,94 2,04
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room
2,56
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used
for“first priority” Works of
Art and direct escape to
two escape routes
6,45
4,10 3,94 2,49
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance be-
tween 15 and 30m; less than
2 levels; protected stairs
1,00
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,82 3,83 3,49
Table 7.20: Risk Indexes for Sector 6 of OPD building in best situation.
Figure 7.13: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Sector 6 in OPD building.
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7.1.9 Remarks on OPD case study
The Opificio delle Pietre Dure building in Fortezza da Basso has a very simple architec-
tonical configuration and distribution. Despite this profitable aspect, we have inside the
building some of the most important works of art in Art History.
From the above data it is possible to notice that all the Risk Indicators are inside
the “action area”, so they are acceptable with respect to the stated acceptance criteria.
None of the Sectors needs mitigation measures, an example of mitigation with respect to
the External Characteristics it is just reported in order to give an example of the Risk
Treatment Method application. OPD base is an example of building that could have had
a smaller “acceptable area” with respect to the acceptance criteria. Most of the Risk
Indicators are around 5 and the building’s manager could have choose 5 as upper limit
(instead of 5,5) to increase more and more the performance required to the building in
contents protection.
As said, we chose upper limit of 5,5 to make easier the comparison with the second
case study Palazzo Chigi Saracini.
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7.2 Palazzo Chigi Saracini
In this section the results deriving from the application of the procedure to an historical
building in Siena are presented. The analysed building is “Palazzo Chigi Saracin”, seat of
the “Accademia Chigiana” [65]. Palazzo Chigi Saracini was built on a previous building
from the thirteenth century Marescotti family who had his castle at that place. It was
enlarged in sec. XVI, in the second half of the 700 remodeled and renovated at the
beginning of 900. The building still retains the typical aspect of “Senese” Gothic, stones
and bricks, with three-light windows, battlements and a tower of stone. These main stages
of transformation and growth correspond to the various changes of ownership: each owner
has in fact left his “footprint”.
In table 7.21 from Lusini [78] a resume of the main transformation of the building are
shown.
Figure 7.14 gives a representation of the building while Figures 7.15 and 7.16 show the
building today.
Figure 7.14: A picture of the palace.
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Figure 7.15: Entrance of the palace.
Figure 7.16: An interior.
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Period Facts
1147 The Marescotti submit to the City of Siena, they occupy the space in an old Roman
tower perched at the edge of Galgario way to build their home. Several members
of the family then built the house around the common courtyard on which each
one had a separate entrance. The Palace was the base, for a long time between
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of the Council of Rulers of the Republic of Siena,
before it was permanently transferred to the building “Palazzo Pubblico”. The most
memorable event in the history of the Republic of Siena is related to the ancient
Palace Marescotti: the victory against Florence in Monteaperti. The chronicles tell
that in that fateful day the drummer Ceccolini Cerreto, from the tower of Marescotti,
described the stages of the battle that took place at the Arbia.
Middle
XV cen-
tury
It is buried the lane from East; the level of the Palace courtyard is then raised. The
court is closed with a wall built to the east. Finally, to the west is built the portico
with two-story lodge on top.
1488 The Marescotti family sell the palace to Piccolomini Mandoli family. These extended
or modified the North wing of the palace and then awaited with particular interest
in interior decoration especially in the north wing. The ground floor of the lodge had
an airy fifteenth grotesque decoration, attributed to Giorgio di Giovanni.
1770 The palace passes to the Saracini family and the fac¸ade is extended along the curve
of the via di Citta`.
1787 Galgano Saracini commissions the expansion of the building. The factory covers
both downstream and upstream of the original nucleus. Many windows are moved
to achieve symmetry and, disregarding the remains of battlements Ghibellines, the
battlements are rebuilt Guelphs like those of other buildings in the city.
1806 Thanks to Galgano Saracens the palace is enriched his important collection of works of
art, well over twelve thousand pieces. In the same year was inaugurated the museum,
housed in the Gothic palace and open to the public of art lovers.
1877 Extinction of the Saracini family. Chigi family inherits the palace.
1914-1925 General renovation of the building taking care, especially, of the external facades
of the main courtyard and atrium. Intervenes in the internal stairs to the diﬀerent
distribution plans and reorganization of some of the rooms on the second floor [100].
1932 By the will of Count Guido Chigi, it is established the Music Academy, an interna-
tional centre for advanced musical studies [95].
Present
time
The Chigiana Academy holds in its interior a huge collection of works of art belong-
ing to the greatest artists of Italian painting, especially Siena, including the Sassetta,
Sodoma, Beccafumi, Botticelli, and includes many sculptures, ivory objects, porce-
lain, silver and a collection of ceramics [106]. The Chigiana Academy also has a
library both literary and musical, which includes about 70,000 volumes, rich in rare
editions, autographs, manuscripts of various periods and a fine collection of musical
instruments especially for arco.
Table 7.21: Chronology of the Palazzo Chigi Saracini transformations.
In its present configuration, the building has two underground levels, the ground floor
and four floors above ground. At the basement there are some technical areas (sometimes
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made the recesses of the building) and, above all, some rooms used as storage or archive.
On the second basement level there are many locals dug directly into the “tufo” stone,
which are largely unused. On the upper floors are the local music school and concert hall.
There are also some rooms used as oﬃces, housing for caretakers, the concierge. At the
top floor are other rooms used as storage (or could be used for this purpose). Among
these, the local “picture gallery” in which there are paintings of great value. Figure 7.17
shows the urban location of the building, Figure 7.18 shows the ground floor plan of the
building while Figures 7.19 and 7.19 show two sections.
Figure 7.17: The palace in the city plan.
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Figure 7.18: Ground floor plan.
Figure 7.19: Section 1-1.
Figure 7.20: Section 3-3.
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Activity Place Period n◦ of persons
Oﬃces First and second
floor
All year long 15 persons
Concierge Mezzanine floor All year long 2 persons
Music School Ground and first
floor
Only in July and August less than 100 persons
Concerts Concert hall at first
and second floor
15 days in a year maximum 260
persons
Temporary
exhibitions
Ground floor - -
Museum First floor From April to October, 4
visits 1hour long per day
-
Library Second Floor All year long maximum 5 persons
Archives Underground floors
and third floor
- -
Table 7.22: Synthesis of the diﬀerent destination of use of Palazzo Chigi Saracini.
In Palazzo Chigi Saracini there are a lot of diﬀerent activities. In table 7.22 a resume of
the destination of use of the diﬀerent areas of the building is reported. Sectors considered
in the Internal Characteristics analysis are:
• Sector 1: library;
• Sector 2: storage rooms;
• Sector 3: musical instruments museum;
• Sector 4: main museum;
• Sector 5: quadreria;
• Sector 6: theatre.
In the procedure’s application, only parts of the building containing works of art are
interesting. This is the reason why oﬃces are not considered as a sector. All the others
considered sectors contain valuable contents; a music school is set up in the summer in
the rooms of the main museum. Some sectors overlap each other; theatre’s stalls i.e. is a
part of the main museum path and it is considered both in the “sector 4:main museum”
and in the “sector 6: theatre”.
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7.2.1 FSI
In Palazzo Chigi Saracini we have only one FS member for each sector. Every member
has “Medium Fire Risk” formation and retraining is done every two years.
FSI1
In Table 7.23 risk indexes for ISi are shown.
Sector Number of members in the sector ISi
Sector 1 1 3
Sector 2 1 3
Sector 3 1 3
Sector 4 1 3
Sector 5 1 3
Sector 6 > 1 0
Table 7.23: Values for ISi in Palazzo Chigi Saracini.
From the data in Table 7.23 it is possible to calculate
FSI =
￿n
i=1 ISi
n
= 2, 5 (7.2)
FSI2
In Table 7.24 risk indexes for FSI2 are shown.
Level of formation FSI2
B: medium fire risk 3
Table 7.24: Values for FSI2 in Palazzo Chigi Saracini.
FSI3
In Table 7.25 risk indexes for FSI3 are shown.
Periodicity Type of retrainig
Theoretical and practical
every two years 4
Table 7.25: Values for FSI3 in Palazzo Chigi Saracini.
From data in tables above FSI according to equation 5.51 assumes the value of 3,2
and, according to Table 5.28, IF133 is estimated to be 1,5.
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7.2.2 External Characteristics
Since the building shows such architectonical complexity, Medium Height is considered to
be the one corresponding to the height of the main facade in via di citta`. Tower was not
considered so HM < 22m. Table 7.26 shows risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini in
actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
EC1
EF 1.1 n◦ of levels 4 levels, attic, 2 under-
ground levels
10,56
9,14 9,49 7,71
EF 1.2 medium height HM minor than 22m 7,00
EC2
EF 2.1 stairs number of desired stairs
egual to the existent stairs
0,00
0,75 1,75 5,20EF2.2 double heights one of two levels height,
possible presence of ancient
flues and chimneys
5,00
EC3
EF 3.1 fire brigade response
time
5-10 minutes 4,00
4,68 4,68 4,78
EF3.2 surroundings in historical centre with traf-
fic restrictions, 2 sides with
good accessibility, streets
quite large
5,95
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,51 4,88 5,81
Table 7.26: Risk Indexes for External Characteristics in Palazzo Chigi Saracini actual situation.
Table 7.27 shows risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini in best situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
EC1
EF 1.1 n◦ of levels 4 levels, attic, 2 under-
ground levels
10,56
9,14 9,49 7,71
EF 1.2 medium height HM minor than 22m 7,00
EC2
EF 2.1 stairs number of desired stairs
equal to the existent stairs
0,00
0,75 1,75 4,00EF2.2 double heights one of two levels height, an-
cient flues and chimneys are
sealed
4,00
EC3
EF 3.1 fire brigade response
time
reduced to 0-5 minutes 2,00
3,38 3,38 3,58
EF3.2 surroundings in historical centre with traf-
fic restrictions, 2 sides with
good accessibility, streets
quite large
5,95
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,26 4,28 4,93
Table 7.27: Risk Indexes for External Characteristics in Palazzo Chigi Saracini best situation.
Figure 7.21 shows relative representation of risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini
External Characteristics. Two of the three Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the
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“acceptable area” while OB3 is in the “not acceptable” area.
Figure 7.21: Relative representation of the risk indexes for the External Characteristics in
Palazzo Chigi Saracini.
According to the procedure, an intervention has to be done in order to improve the
Risk Index for OB3 − Fire and smoke spread. Referring to the mitigation path for
OB3 with respect to the External Characteristics, represented in Figure 6.3, mitigation
measures have to be taken about Factor EF2.2−double heights. The specific measure here
proposed is to close all the flues and chimneys in order to reduce the vertical connections
among floors.
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In Table 7.28 risk indexes after OB3 mitigation are reported and in Figure 7.22 results
after mitigation are shown. Table 7.29 shows data upon whom to build Figure 7.22.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
EC1
EF 1.1 n◦ of levels 4 levels, attic, 2 under-
ground levels
10,56
9,14 9,49 7,71
EF 1.2 medium height HM minor than 22m 7,00
EC2
EF 2.1 stairs number of desired stairs
equal to the existent stairs
0,00
0,75 1,75 4,00EF2.2 double heights one of two levels height, an-
cient flues and chimneys
are sealed
4,00
EC3
EF 3.1 fire brigade response
time
5-10 minutes 4,00
4,68 4,68 4,78
EF3.2 surroundings in historical centre with traf-
fic restrictions, 2 sides with
good accessibility, streets
quite large
5,95
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,51 4,88 5,13
Table 7.28: Risk Indexes for External Characteristics after OB3 mitigation in Palazzo Chigi
Saracini.
Actual situation After OB1 mitigation
BI RI LMM RI LMM ∆RI ∆LMM
OB1 3,26 3,51 93% 3,51 93% 0,00 0%
OB2 4,28 4,88 88% 4,88 88% 0,00 0%
OB3 4,93 5,81 85% 5,13 96% 0,67 11%
Table 7.29: Data for relative representation of risk for External Characteristics after OB3 miti-
gation in Palazzo Chigi Saracini.
From the above data it is possible to notice how the direct action on the EF2.2 −
double heights factor create a reduction of the RI only for the considered Objective
and a significant increase of the corresponding LMM . No secondary eﬀect on the other
Objectives is detected.
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Figure 7.22: Relative representation of the risk indexes for the External Characteristics in
Palazzo Chigi Saracini after mitigation of OB3.
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7.2.3 Sector 1: library
The historic library of Palazzo Chigi Saracini, containing ancient manuscripts and books,
is located at second floor of the building. Figure 7.23 shows sector 1 in the building plan.
Figure 7.23: Sector 1 identification.
Table 7.30 shows risk indexes for Sector 1 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
6,75 6,88 7,18
IF 1.2 detection system no detection system 9,0
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire service
at law minimum compliance
7,50
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used for
“third priority” Works of
Art and direct escape to two
escape routes
5,50
4,94 4,77 4,10
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
3 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
3,00 3,00 3,00
IF3.2 horizontal structure stone, bricks 3,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,98 5,03 5,27
Table 7.30: Risk Indexes for Sector 1 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in actual situation.
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Table 7.31 shows risk indexes for Sector 1 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in best situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,58 1,78 1,77
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,0
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish in every
room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used for
“third priority” Works of
Art and direct escape to two
escape routes
5,50
4,94 4,77 4,10
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
3 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
3,00 3,00 3,00
IF3.2 horizontal structure stone, bricks 3,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,69 3,10 2,57
Table 7.31: Risk Indexes for Sector 1 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in best situation.
Figure 7.24 shows relative representation of risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector
1. The three Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
Figure 7.24: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector 1.
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7.2.4 Sector 2: storage rooms
Storage rooms are one of the most tricky weak point in historical buildings in case of
fire. Usually a large amount of precious contents is put inside them but their location in
the building is often critical with respect to the evacuation and fire and smoke spread.
In Palazzo Chigi Saracini storage rooms are located at the underground floor and at the
ground floor. Because of their disadvantageous location, just underground storage rooms
are here analysed.
Figures 7.25 and 7.26 show the location of storage rooms in the building plan.
Figure 7.25: Storage rooms in underground floor.
Table 7.32 shows risk indexes for Sector 2 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in actual situation.
Table 7.33 shows risk indexes for Sector 2 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in best situation.
Figure 7.27 shows relative representation of risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector
2. No one of the three Risk Indicators for the Objectives is in the “acceptable area”.
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Figure 7.26: Storage rooms in ground floor.
Figure 7.27: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector 2.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
7,29 7,63 8,23
IF 1.2 detection system no detection system 9,0
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire service
at law minimum compliance.
No portable equipment in
the other part of the sector
except that in the highest
fire load rooms.
10,50
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Windows and balcony can-
not be used as evacuation
route, evacuation route used
for“third priority” Works of
Art
8,36
6,48 6,20 4,67
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
3,00 3,00 3,00
IF3.2 horizontal structure stone, bricks 3,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 5,95 5,75 5,90
Table 7.32: Risk Indexes for Sector 2 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in actual situation.
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,58 1,78 1,77
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish in every
room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
evacuation route used for
“third priority” Works of
Art
8,36
6,48 6,20 4,67
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings stone 2,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
3,00 3,00 3,00
IF3.2 horizontal structure stone, bricks 3,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,53 3,53 2,67
Table 7.33: Risk Indexes for Sector 2 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in best situation.
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7.2.5 Sector 3: musical instruments museum
Musical instruments museum is located at ground floor of the building and the main
entrance to the museum is from via di citta`. The windows of the museum are instead in
the back side of Palazzo Chigi Saracini, facing via Casato di Sotto; evacuation route leads
to two independent exits. Such observations are considered in Sector 3 analysis. Figures
7.28 shows the location of musical instruments museum in the building plan.
Figure 7.28: Musical instruments museum at ground floor.
Table 7.34 shows risk indexes for Sector 3 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the actual
situation.
Table 7.35 shows risk indexes for Sector 3 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in best situation.
Figure 7.29 shows relative representation of risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector
3. No one of the three Risk Indicators for the Objectives is in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
5,63 5,88 6,46
IF 1.2 detection system wired smoke detectors (one
in every room)
7,50
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire service
at law minimum compliance.
No portable equipment in
the other part of the sector
except that in the highest
fire load rooms.
10,50
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Escape route leading to
two independent staircases,
more than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for“third prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,50
5,50 5,50 5,50
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 5,51 5,80 6,21
Table 7.34: Risk Indexes for Sector 3 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the actual situation.
Figure 7.29: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector 3.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,58 1,78 1,77
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish in every
room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Escape route leading to
two independent staircases,
more than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for “third prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,50
5,50 5,50 5,50
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,50 4,24 3,86
Table 7.35: Risk Indexes for Sector 3 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in best situation.
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7.2.6 Sector 4: main museum
Main museum is located at first floor of the building with respect to the entrance from
via di citta` while the secondary exit leads to via Casato di Sotto, corresponding to the
second underground floor. In the museum there is a lack of portable equipment for fire
suppression. Figures 7.30 shows the location of main museum in the building plan.
Figure 7.30: Main museum at first floor.
Table 7.36 shows risk indexes for Sector 4 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the actual
situation.
Table 7.37 shows risk indexes for Sector 4 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the best situation.
Figure 7.31 shows relative representation of risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector
4. No one of the three Risk Indicators for the Objectives is in the “acceptable area”.
For this sector, since it is the main museum with the most valuable contents in the
building, an example of mitigation is here proposed. The Objective we choose to mitigate
is the OB3 : fire and smoke spread. According to Figure 6.6, to mitigate OB3 it is
necessary to act on IC1. In this example we decided to simulate intervention only on
IF1.3.3. FSI was increased from the “minimum law compliance” level to the “very good”
level. Also IF1.3.4 parameter was increased to “maintenance with fire service audit”. It
is to be noticed how only managerial strategies have been carried out.
In Table 7.38 risk indexes after OB3 mitigation are reported and in Figure 7.32 results
after mitigation are shown. Table 7.39 shows data upon whom to build Figure 7.32.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
5,63 5,88 6,46
IF 1.2 detection system wired smoke detectors (one
in every room)
5,00
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire service
at law minimum compliance.
No portable equipment in
the other part of the sector
except that in the highest
fire load rooms.
7,50
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Direct escape to two in-
dependent staircases, more
than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for“second prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,59
5,55 5,55 5,52
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 5,54 5,81 6,21
Table 7.36: Risk Indexes for Sector 4 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the actual situation.
Figure 7.31: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector 4.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,58 1,78 1,77
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish in every
room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Direct escape to two in-
dependent staircases, more
than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for “third prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,50
5,55 5,55 5,52
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,53 4,25 3,87
Table 7.37: Risk Indexes for Sector 4 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the best situation.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
5,63 5,88 6,46
IF 1.2 detection system wired smoke detectors (one
in every room)
5,00
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire service
very good. Maintenance
by means of internal au-
dit. No portable equipment
in the other part of the sec-
tor except that in the high-
est fire load rooms.
4,80
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Direct escape to two in-
dependent staircases, more
than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for“second prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,59
5,55 5,55 5,52
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 5,23 5,44 5,47
Table 7.38: Risk Indexes for Sector 4 after OB3 mitigation.
Actual situation After OB3 mitigation
BI RI LMM RI LMM ∆RI ∆LMM
OB 1 4,53 5,54 82% 5,23 87% 0,31 5%
OB 2 4,25 5,81 73% 5,44 78% 0,37 5%
OB 3 3,87 6,21 62% 5,47 71% 0,75 8%
Table 7.39: Data for relative representation of risk for Sector 4 after OB3 mitigation Palazzo
Chigi Saracini.
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Figure 7.32: Relative representation of the risk indexes for sector 4 in Palazzo Chigi Saracini
after mitigation of OB3.
From the above data it is possible to notice how the direct action on the IC1 −
Technical installations factor creates a reduction of the RI for Objective 3 and a signifi-
cant increase of the corresponding LMM . At the same time there are also good secondary
eﬀects on the other two Objectives, both in terms of RI and LMM . At the end of the
mitigation on OB3, also the other two Objectives come inside the “acceptable area”.
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7.2.7 Sector 5: quadreria
Quadreria is located at third floor of the building; it is a small museum only seldom open
to the public that contains works of art more important than the ones in the main museum.
Figure 7.33 shows the location of quadreria in the building plan.
Figure 7.33: Quadreria at third floor.
Table 7.40 shows risk indexes for Sector 5 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the actual
situation.
Table 7.41 shows risk indexes for Sector 5 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the best situation.
Figure 7.34 shows relative representation of risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector
5. No one of the three Risk Indicators for the Objectives is in the “acceptable area” and
the level of application of mitigation measures in quite high.
Also for this sector an example of mitigation is here proposed. The Objective we choose
to mitigate is the OB2 : fire brigade effectiveness. According to Figure 6.5, to mitigate
OB2 it is necessary to act firstly on IC3, then on IC2 and in the end on IC1. Intervention
IC2 by means of management strategies. IF1.2.1 was turned in: wired smoke detectors
more than one in every room and in every escape route, while IF1.3.3 was increased by
changing FSI from“minimum law compliance” to “excellent”. Was also increased IF1.3.4
parameter to “maintenance with fire service audit”.
In Table 7.42 risk indexes after OB2 mitigation are reported and in Figure 7.35 results
after mitigation are shown. Table 7.43 shows data upon which Figure 7.35 is built.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
5,63 5,88 6,46
IF 1.2 detection system wired smoke detectors (one
in every room)
5,00
IF 1.3 suppression system nno automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire service
at law minimum comliance.
No portable equipment in
the other part of the sector
except that in the highest
fire load rooms.
7,50
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
One staircase may be used
as an evacuation route, more
than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for “first prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,59
7,71 7,55 6,32
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
9,60
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 6,71 6,41 6,35
Table 7.40: Risk Indexes for Sector 5 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in actual situation.
Figure 7.34: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector 5.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,58 1,78 1,77
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish in every
room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
One staircase may be used
as an evacuation route, more
than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for “first prior-
ity” Works of Art
9,60
7,47 7,24 5,72
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Stone 4,00
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 5,56 4,76 3,90
Table 7.41: Risk Indexes for Sector 5 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the best situation.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
3,52 3,93 4,04
IF 1.2 detection system wired smoke detectors
more than one in every
room and in every es-
cape route
2,50
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire ser-
vice excellent and in-
ternal audit for mainte-
nance. No portable equip-
ment in the other part of
the sector except that in the
highest fire load rooms.
3,20
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
One staircase may be used
as an evacuation route, more
than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for “first prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,59
7,71 7,55 6,32
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
9,60
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 6,18 5,67 5,14
Table 7.42: Risk Indexes for Sector 5 after OB2 mitigation.
Actual situation After OB2 mitigation
BI RI LMM RI LMM ∆RI ∆LMM
OB 1 5,50 6,71 82% 6,18 89% 0,53 7%
OB 2 4,76 6,41 74% 5,67 84% 0,74 10%
OB 3 3,90 6,35 61% 5,14 76% 1,21 14%
Table 7.43: Data for relative representation of risk for Sector 5 after OB2 mitigation in Palazzo
Chigi Saracini.
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Figure 7.35: Relative representation of the risk indexes for sector 5 in Palazzo Chigi Saracini
after mitigation of OB2.
From the above data it is possible to notice how the direct action on the IC1 −
Technical installations factor create a reduction of the RI for Objective 3 and a significant
increase of the corresponding LMM . At the same time there are no good secondary
eﬀects on the other two Objectives. At the end of the mitigation on OB2, the other two
Objectives don’t come inside the “acceptable area”. It is possible in this case to start
again a mitigation path in order to reduce OB2 an OB1 RI, according to Figures 6.5 and
6.4.
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7.2.8 Sector 6: theatre
Theatre is located on two diﬀerent levels: stalls occupy a part of the first floor while
gallery is at the second floor of the building. When the theatre is open, no other activity
is carried on inside the building and we make the assumption that Fire Service team
works exclusively for the theatre. In the theatre there are valuable contents as pictures
and furniture linked with the history of the building.
Figures 7.36 and 7.37 show the location of the theatre in the building plan.
Figure 7.36: Theatre at first floor.
Figure 7.37: Theatre at second floor.
Table 7.44 shows risk indexes for Sector 6 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the actual
situation.
219
Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system no smoke control system 7,00
4,80 5,00 5,57
IF 1.2 detection system More than one wired smoke
detector in every room
3,00
IF 1.3 suppression system no automatic system and
portable extinguish eq. not
in every room, Fire ser-
vice higher than minimum
compliance (because of the
public event). No portable
equipment in the other part
of the sector except that in
the highest fire load rooms.
6,00
IF 1.4 alarm system alarm bell in the sector 4,00
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Escape route leading to
two independent staircases,
more than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for“third prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,00
5,23 5,25 5,40
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
3,00 3,00 3,00
IF3.2 horizontal structure stone, bricks 3,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 4,65 4,47 4,69
Table 7.44: Risk Indexes for Sector 6 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the actual situation.
Table 7.45 shows risk indexes for Sector 6 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the best situation.
Figure 7.38 shows relative representation of risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector
6. All the three Risk Indicators for the Objectives are in the “acceptable area”.
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Characteristic Factor Description OB1 OB2 OB3
IC1
IF 1.1 smoke control system performant smoke control
system
2,00
1,58 1,78 1,77
IF 1.2 detection system Laser detection System or
Air sampling detection sys-
tem everywhere
1,00
IF 1.3 suppression system best FSI, audit for mainte-
nance, gas system in rooms
with valuable contents and
portable extinguish in every
room
2,37
IF 1.4 alarm system spoken signal sent manually
to all building
2,20
IC2
IF 2.1 type of evacuation
route
Escape route leading to
two independent staircases,
more than 1 window can be
used to evacuate, evacuation
route used for “third prior-
ity” Works of Art
5,00
5,23 5,25 5,40
IF 2.2 dimensions and layout max. travel distance >30m;
2 levels to walk; not pro-
tected stairs
5,50
IF 2.3 linings and floorings Textile wall cover 5,50
IC3
IF 3.1 vertical structure stone, bricks 3,00
5,40 5,80 6,20
IF3.2 horizontal structure wood 7,00
OB1 OB2 OB3
RI 3,85 3,24 2,79
Table 7.45: Risk Indexes for Sector 6 of Palazzo Chigi Saracini in the best situation.
Figure 7.38: Relative representation of the risk indexes for Palazzo Chigi Saracini Sector 6.
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7.2.9 Remarks on Palazzo Chigi Saracini case study
Palazzo Chigi Saracini has a very complex architectonical configuration and distribution;
such feature is a contemporary source of advantages and disadvantages. In terms of Ex-
ternal Characteristics, complexity in vertical connections makes the number of stairs for
evacuation and fire brigade eﬀectiveness suﬃcient , while such complexity creates a high
risk index in fire and smoke spread. At the same time, the almost total lack of technical
installations creates high risk indexes in most sectors, with respect to the Internal Char-
acteristics. Another important remark is related with Fire Service Team: there is the
necessity to increase the number of components of the team and their level of formation.
7.3 OPD and Palazzo Chigi Saracini: a comparison
After the procedure application to the two case studies, two diﬀerent remarks have to be
done: one in order to compare results from the procedure with the real expectations, and
one in order to compare results from the two diﬀerent building.
Table 7.46 shows a resume of the results from case studies.
Opificio delle Pietre Dure (OPD) Palazzo Chigi Saracini
External Characteristics It is a “simple building” with very
precious contents
It is a very complex building, not
wholly suitable to host all the dif-
ferent activities it hosts
Expectations We expect to have no problems
from the External Characteristics
evaluation
We expect to have problems
from the External Characteristics
evaluation
Results All the indicators are acceptable One indicator is not acceptable
Concordance between re-
sults and expectations
YES YES
Internal Characteristics Building has a good system of
egress paths, fire compartments and
a very good technical system for
fire prevention and protection. Fire
Service team is well prepared
Building has a lot of diﬀerent desti-
nations of use and most of the sec-
tors share the same egress paths.
Almost total absence of technical
systems for fire prevention and pro-
tection. Fire service team is not
well prepared.
Expectations We expect to have no problems
from the Internal Characteristics
evaluation
We expect, in some Sectors, to have
problems from the External Char-
acteristics evaluation
Results All the indicators are acceptable Only few indicators in each Sector
are acceptable
Concordance between re-
sults and expectations
YES YES
Table 7.46: Resume of the results from case studies.
Fire protection plan of Palazzo Chigi Saracini is now in progress, technicians and fire
brigades are still working on a suitable design for this particular building in order to join
222
prescriptions from fire codes with fire safety engineering models. The Risk Management
Procedure was applied on Palazzo Chigi Saracini taking into account only the actual
situation and expecting to find out about the same suggestion in mitigation that is included
in the fire protection project. Even if FRMP and oﬃcial fire design have diﬀerent goals
(protection of contents vs protection of human life) a good concordance between them
was realized. Both the procedure and the preliminary results from design suggest that the
number of stairs for evacuation is enough, since the low number of occupants. Then there is
concordance also in the decision to improve technical installations, with a specific attention
to the fire suppression installations both mobile and fixed. FRMP further suggests to
improve the reliability level of the Fire Service Team (increasing the number and level of
formations of the members) in order to assure a smart intervention both in life safety and
contents protection.
From technicians and fire brigades, OPD base in Fortezza da Basso is considered to
be a virtuous example of ancient building with an high degree of fire protection mea-
sure’s implementation. OPD base respects most of the prescriptions of Italian fire codes;
moreover, thanks to a good management, OPD workers have an high sensibility in fire
protection both for human life and for contents. FRMP confirms such theory with output
Risk Indexes totally acceptable both for the External Characteristics and for the Internal
ones.
We can then make the hypothesis of a manager that has to administrate both the
buildings, in this situation (not corresponding to reality) the manager could be interested
in a direct comparison between the risk indicators of the two buildings. Let’s compare
External Characteristics of the two buildings with respect to OB1- Evacuation: using
representations in section 6.3.3, it is possible to depict the situation as shown in Figure
7.39 basing on data from Table 7.47. According to the meaning of such representation, we
can realize how much more room for improvement there is in OPD building with respect
to Palazzo Chigi Saracini. Even if OPD has lower risk indexes, it is the building that can
be made safer because of its simple architectonical features; Palazzo Chigi Saracini has,
from the procedure, higher risk indexes but also lower possibilities to be improved in terms
of contents protection with respect to OB1.
Actual situation Best situation
Opificio delle Pietre Dure
∆R 0,99 3,41
MMT 54% 0%
Palazzo Chigi Saracini
∆R 1,74 1,99
MMT 7% 0%
Table 7.47: Data for comparison among the buildings with respect to Objective 1.
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Figure 7.39: Comparison of the two buildings: External Characteristics with respect to OB1-
Evacuation.
Now let’s compare External Characteristics of the two buildings with respect to OB3-
Fire and smoke spread using the above representation. From Figure 7.40 based on data
from Table 7.48, it is possible to perceive the almost equivalent surface of the two areas.
Figure 7.40: Comparison of the two buildings: External Characteristics with respect to OB3-
Fire and smoke spread.
In such case, the manager has to act in order to eliminate negative ∆R, that represents
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Actual situation Best situation
Opificio delle Pietre Dure
∆R 0,49 4,10
MMT 18% 0%
Palazzo Chigi Saracini
∆R -0,30 4,92
MMT 15% 0%
Table 7.48: Data for comparison among the buildings with respect to Objective 3.
a not acceptable risk index for the actual situation. In case of ∆R < 0, the first action to
be taken is to mitigate the corresponding RI for that Objective, moving the area in the
positive quadrant.
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Chapter 8
Summary, Contributions and
Recommendations
The main body of the thesis ends in this chapter with a summary of key results, contri-
butions to research and recommendations for future works.
8.1 Summary of Key Results and Contributions
The findings and contributions to research of this thesis are summarised below:
• Fire Risk Management Procedure for Valuable Contents. The Risk Manage-
ment Procedure described in this dissertation is based on a semi-quantitative method
of risk assessment associated to a risk treatment method that proposes packages of
measure to mitigate risk. The main goal of the procedure is to protect Valuable
Contents but important secondary eﬀects are beneficial also for the historical build-
ing with respect to fire risk. The reliability of the procedure is enclosed in the set of
parameters chosen for the AHP and in the judgments of relative importance given
to the parameters. To start up the procedure, such reliability has been assured by
means of Delphi method: experts have been involved in the hierarchical structure’s
architecture and in the formulation of judgments. Because of the origin of the experts
panels, the proposed procedure assumes its maximum reliability and eﬀectiveness if
applied to the Italian situation, especially in the Tuscany region (area that is marked
by homogeneous historical building’s features and similar management strategies).
• Validation of the Procedure. Fire Risk Management Procedure is built up on
a structure that is fed by expert’s judgments; such procedure has been tested on
two buildings and the validity of the results was this way confirmed. The building
we chose to test the Procedure represents two opposite examples both in terms
of architectonical features, and technical installations and valuable contents hosted
inside them. We tried this way to take into account two limit cases representing the
extremes of a wide gamma of buildings in Tuscany.
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• An easy-to-use management instrument. Historical Building’s manager is the
first addressee of the Procedure and choice of a simple method, graphically user
friendly, makes it an easy-to-use instrument. Great attention was put in risk com-
munication by means of diﬀerent output representation useful to depict diﬀerent
aspects of the same output on the base of the decision that has to be taken from the
manager. “Annex A” gives a practical guideline to use the Procedure.
8.2 Recommendations for Future Works
The research objectives outlined for this thesis end in this chapter. However, several
questions still remain to be answered in future works:
• Improve reliability of the Procedure and further calibration. To improve
reliability of the Procedure implies to calibrate again weights and risk indexes in
the AHP structure on the base of the evidence coming out from the application.
The structure of the Procedure (both of Risk Analysis Method and Risk Treatment
Method) is “open”; connections among parameters are established but weights for
their combination can be constantly updated. It is then possible, if future devel-
opment requests it, to add further parameters to the Hierarchic Structure in order
to perform a more accurate analysis. It is to remember that, as an intrinsic char-
acteristic of the semi-quantitative method is here used, increasing the number of
parameters means to reduce importance of each one of the other parameters. Risk
indexes coming out from the Procedure are not a measure of the absolute fire safety
level, but a rough indicator of whether the building is safer than other buildings or
not. The Procedure also very well illustrates diﬀerent ways of enhancing the fire
safety level and can be used to compare diﬀerent options. Receiving a risk index
lower than the acceptable risk level, obviously is not a guarantee that the building
fulfills the current building regulations. The hierarchic structure can therefore be
fed in future by more accurate judgments calibrated again on the basis of further
results that could be non in concordance with the real situation.
• Applicability in other geographical contexts. As widely said, Procedure de-
scribed in this dissertation has a well known boundary: the geographical context onto
which Procedure has been calibrated. A first limit can be pointed out in the choice
of the AHP parameters: diﬀerent building traditions can determine a diﬀerent set of
parameters to be considered in fire protection for contents inside historical buildings.
As example of such assertion we can adduct the “fire wall”: it is an architectonical
feature widely present in other countries (i.e. Germany or England) while it is almost
impossible to find in Italy. If we want to apply the Procedure in diﬀerent countries,
such peculiar parameters have to be taken into account. Delphi’s panel used in this
dissertation is another limit for the applicability tout court of the Procedure in other
countries. All the experts have been identified in the Tuscan context with the aim
to increase reliability of the Procedure in that defined context. This choice implies a
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lack of reliability for all the application outside the original boundary of validation.
Calibration of the Procedure for diﬀerent geographical contexts needs to foresee:
1. definition of a specific set of parameters for the hierarchic structure;
2. attribution of weights by means of a Delphi method performed in that context;
3. validation trough the Procedure application to chosen case studies significant
for the context.
• Insurance application. Important relationships can be established between risk
indexes coming from the Procedure and the insurance premium to be payed for
contents. It is important for insurance companies to find criteria to count risk, apart
from the correspondence between the measurement and the real situation. The risk
scale proposed in the Procedure, used as a relative risk scale, can be useful for this
aim. Representation of the risk by means of “mitigation path”, as referred on page
164, can be used to individuate future milestones in contents protection, linking the
premium amount to the achievement of such targets. The manager can cope with
the insurance companies in order to make the premium proportional to the Risk
Index of a specific Sector (or of the whole building), with respect to the possible
mitigation measures he can take. The more a manger can demonstrate to invest
in contents protection tending to reach milestones in mitigation paths, the more
insurance premium can be reduced.
Building’s manager can measure the risk and can have a path to follow in order to
reduce it; insurance companies can reward virtuous managers allowing reduction of
premiums or obliging managers to act in order to reduce risk for contents.
Future development of the Procedure can be done making a direct connection be-
tween output in terms or Risk Indexes, Measure of Mitigation to be taken and the
amount of insurance premium.
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Appendix A
GUIDELINES
This annex provides guidelines that describe how to make practical use of the Fire Risk
Management Procedure for Valuable Contents in Historical Heritage Buildings. Guidelines
turn their attention to the building managers and take into account which are the data to
be collected before running the procedure and how to input them into the spreadsheets in
order to have results. As starting point it is necessary to became familiar with the building
knowing its history and architectonical evolution trough centuries. Before starting to apply
procedure, manager has to be able to individuate in the building the suitable number of
Sectors to be analysed. A Sector has to be identified as:
• part of the building with the same destination of use;
• part of the building that is a single architectonical unit (a building’s level, a single
special room - a theatre, an hall, a double height salon- , a series of rooms with
common features);
• part of the building that is a fire compartment (with respect to the regulation defi-
nition).
Data useful to the procedure can be collected by means of check-lists that are composed
by two parts:
• Part 1: External Characteristics. This part has to be completed once for the building
with respect to the External Characteristics;
• Part 2: Internal Characteristics. This check list has to be completed many times as
are the Sectors.
In the follow fac-simile of data collection check-lists are reported.
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A.1 CHECK LIST PART 1: EXTERNAL CHARACTER-
ISTICS
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A.2 CHECK LIST PART 2: INTERNAL CHARACTER-
ISTICS
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A.3 SPREADSHEETS INSTRUCTIONS
In this section, captions from Procedure’s spreadsheets are reported. For each one of the
Factors, tables are shown in order to explain to Procedure’s user how to employ data from
check-lists.
In columns marked with “Assigned”, the user has to write down the risk index corre-
sponding to the collected data, according to risk value listed in tables. Data have to be
inserted only in boxes with gray background.
In boxes with red text, the user has to insert values coming from data collection as
required from the table.
In boxes with light blu background, the user can find the output risk index for that
factor that procedure will use to calculate risk indexes with respect to the Objectives.
EF1.1 Number of levels
The Factor that considers the number of building’s levels is defined as follow:
EF1.1 = EF1.1.1× EF1.1.2× EF1.1.3 (A.1)
where:
• EF1.1.1 is the Sub-Factor dealing with the number of levels out of ground;
• EF1.1.2 is the Sub-Factor considering the number of underground levels;
• EF1.1.3 is the Sub-Factor considering the presence of an attic and its destination of
use.
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EF1.2 Medium Height
The Factor that considers the building’s height is defined on the basis of the following
parameter:
HM =
￿n
i=1 αpiAiHi￿n
i=1Ai
(A.2)
where:
• Ai = EF1.2.1 is the Sub-Factor dealing with the partial surface of the building’s
area with Hi height;
• Hi = EF1.2.2 is the Sub-Factor considering the partial height of the building’s area
with Ai surface;
• αpi = EF1.2.3 is the Sub-Factor considering if the i area with Hi height and Ai
surface is opened to the public;
• n is the number of areas with Hi height and Ai surface individuated in the building.
Height Hi is always calculated under the eaves. By means of the intermediate parameter
HM , height of the diﬀerent parts of the building is weighted with the surface of that area.
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EF2.1 Stairs
The Factor that consider the presence and the number of stairs in the building is defined
as follow:
EF2.1 = 3 + λ∆S + (1− λ)SR (A.3)
where:
SR =
Ds
Ets
(A.4)
∆S = Ds − Ets (A.5)
and
λ = 0, 6 is the importance of the parameter ∆S respect to the parameter SR.
We further define:
• Ds = EF2.1.1 is the Sub-Factor dealing with the desired number of stairs according
to the codes. It represents the code’s prescription, it is the number of stairs that the
building needs if the fire code is applied with no law dispensation.;
• Ets = Ess + Ees is the Sub-Factor considering the total number of egress stairs
present in the building;
• Ess = EF2.1.2 is the parameter considering the total number of “safe” egress stairs
present in the building. A stair is considered “safe” when has the characteristics
that the fire code requests;
• Ees = EF2.1.3 is the Sub-Factor considering the total number of “equivalent safe”
egress stairs present in the building. A stair is considered “equivalent safe” when it
has not the characteristics that the fire code requests but it can be used as egress
stairs because of the special situation in the historical building;
• Etot = Ets + Eus is the parameter considering the total number of stairs present in
the building, both unsafe, safe and used as egress stairs;
• Eus is the number of unsafe stairs present in the building. A stair is considered
“unsafe” when it is not possible at all to use it as an egress stair.
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EF2.2 Vertical Connections
This Factor considers the presence of vertical connections among the floors, due to architec-
tonical features. The presence of salons, theatres, halls can create obstacles in evacuation
both of people and Valuable Contents and it is a critical point in fire spread. This Factor
is composed by two Sub-Factors:
• EF2.2.1 is a Sub-Factor that considers the possible presence of double heights in the
building;
• EF2.2.2 is a Sub-Factor that considers the possible presence spread flues and chim-
neys in the building.
EF2.2.1 acts in all the Objectives (ref. paragraph 5.1.4) while EF2.2.2 has to be consid-
ered only with respect to the Objective 3: Fire and smoke spread.
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EF3.1 Fire brigade response time
In this Factor the fire brigade response time is considered. In some special case, we
have on site fireman inside Historical Heritage Buildings (these cases have to be discussed
on the base of the regulations; i.e. public shows inside historical building). The time
required for a suitably equipped fire brigade team to reach the site of the fire is essential
in terms of limiting the extent of fire and the damage. Response time is strictly linked
to the distance between fire station and building and probability of traﬃc jam has to be
included in the evaluation. It is assumed that fire brigade equipment is adapted to the
task they may have to fulfill.
The permanent presence of trained staﬀ facilitates and accelerates the first intervention
on a starting fire and can this way limit the extent of damage. If from the calculation
comes a FireServiceIndex ≤ 2 it is possible to take a step up with respect to the real
situation in the upper table. Building’s manager can take special agreements with the fire
brigades to reduce their intervention time.
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EF3.2 Surroundings
Surroundings of the analysed building are here checked. EF3.2 factor is defined as
follow:
EF3.2 = EF3.2.3× ID (A.6)
where:
• EF3.2.3 is a Sub-Factor considering the position of the building with respect to the
urban configuration of the city;
• ID is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor EF3.2.1 and EF3.2.2.
ID is defined as follow:
ID =
￿n
i=1(λGi + (1− λ)Ai)
n
(A.7)
where:
• n is the number of building’s sides;
• λ=0,5 is the importance of the parameter Gi with respect to the parameter Ai;
• Gi = EF3.2.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the distance between the
analysed side and opposite buildings;
• Ai = EF3.2.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the accessibility of the
analysed side.
EF3.2.1 and EF3.2.2 are attributed for each side of the building.
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IF1.1 Smoke control system
In cultural heritage buildings, smoke control:
• contributes to the safe evacuation of people between substantial times;
• limits the smoke damage to cultural heritage content.
The grade of implementation has to be evaluated regarding the eﬃciency of prohibiting
smoke to spread beyond the room of origin of the fire during its expected duration. The
eﬃciency of smoke control systems depends upon the activation of the smoke control
system (manual versus automatic) and the type of system:
• natural ventilation through openings;
• mechanical ventilation;
• pressurisation and ventilation (natural, mechanical or mixed) for smoke.
IF1.1 factor is defined as follow:
IF1.1 = IF1.1.1× IF1.1.2 (A.8)
where:
• IF1.1.1 is a Sub-Factor considering the characteristics of the smoke control system;
• IF1.1.2 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the smoke control system.
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IF1.2 Detection system
This Factor is evaluated on the basis of the distribution and the type of detectors.
IF1.2 factor is defined as follow:
IF1.2 = IF1.2.3× IDET (A.9)
where:
• IF1.2.3 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the detection system;
• IDET is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF1.2.1 and IF1.2.2.
IDET is defined as follow:
IDET = λDDs + (1− λ)TDs (A.10)
where:
• λ=0,5 is the importance of the parameter DDs with respect to the parameter TDs;
• DDs = IF1.2.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the distribution of the
system in the sector;
• TDs = IF1.2.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of system.
If in the sector there are Laser Detection System or Air Sampling Detection System, risk
index for IF1.2 is 1.
If there is no detection system nor in the rooms or in the escape routes, risk index for
IF1.2 is 9.
253
IF1.3 Suppression system
Both automatic and portable fire suppression means are covered by this Factor. Ulti-
mately the eﬃciency of both aspects has to be evaluated on the basis of their capacity to
extinguish a starting fire. For automatic fire suppression systems the type and the location
of heads are important.
The eﬃciency of portable extinguishers depends entirely on the presence of trained
people; one of the duties of the building’s manager is to make the staﬀ trained.
IF1.3 factor is defined as follow:
IF1.3 = IF1.3.4× ISUPP (A.11)
where:
• IF1.3.4 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the suppression system;
• ISUPP is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF1.3.1, IF1.3.2 and IF1.3.3.
ISUPP is defined as follow:
ISUPP = λAs + αT (1− λ)Peq (A.12)
where:
• λ is the importance of the parameter As respect to the parameter Peq and it depends
on the type and location of the system;
• As = IF1.3.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type and the location of
the automatic system in the sector;
• Peq = IF1.3.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the portable equipment for
fire suppression present in the sector.
• αT = IF1.3.3 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the reliability of Fire Service
Team.
Among the assigned indexes in the table, the maximum grade is chosen to be assigned
to the sector.
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IF1.4 Alarm system
Emergency and alarm signs start the evacuation of occupants and in this way intervene
mainly for the safety of people. They also contribute to more immediate salvage inter-
vention of contents. Their eﬃciency is a function of the type, number and location of the
signals. If the detection signal is directly (automatically) sent to a central dispatching
centre (e.g. fire brigade or other), the rescue process can start earlier. Duty of the build-
ing’s manager is to organize the rescue team taking agreement with fire brigade or private
surveillance company. IF1.4 factor is defined as follow:
IF1.4 = IF1.4.3× IAL (A.13)
where:
• IF1.4.3 is a Sub-Factor considering the maintenance of the alarm system;
• IAL is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF1.4.1 and IF1.4.2.
IAL is defined as follow:
IAL = λTal + (1− λ)Lal (A.14)
where:
• λ =0,4 is the importance of the parameter Tal with respect to the parameter Lal;
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• Tal = IF1.4.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of the alarm system
in the sector;
• Lal = IF1.4.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the location of the alarm
system.
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IF2.1 Type of evacuation routes
Stairs, windows and balcony can be considered as evacuation routes. Since stairs lead
people through internal evacuation routes and windows and balcony lead mainly contents
to fire brigade rescue, two diﬀerent categories are created: (i) internal connections and
(ii) external evacuation routes. IF2.1 factor is defined as follow:
IF2.1 = IF2.1.3× ITY (A.15)
where:
• IF2.1.3 is a Sub-Factor considering if the escape route functions as an escape route
for Valuable Contents;
• ITY is a parameter composed by Sub-Factor IF2.1.1 and IF2.1.2.
ITY is defined as follow:
ITY = λEext + (1− λ)Eint (A.16)
where:
• λ =0,3 is the importance of the parameter Tal respect to the parameter Lal;
• Eext = IF2.1.1 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of external evac-
uation routes in the sector;
• Eint = IF2.1.2 is the Sub-Factor that takes into account the type of internal evacu-
ation routes in the sector.
If more than a combination of the Sub-Factors is suitable to the sector, the worst grade is
assigned.
257
IF2.2 Dimensions and layout
In this Factor the following parameters are considered:
• D = IF2.2.1 that is the maximum travel distance to reach a safe place according to
italian law DM 10/03/1998;
• NF = IF2.2.2 that is the number of floors to walk;
• NS = IF2.2.3 that is the number of sectors connected to the escape route.
Limits for walking distance are chosen according to italian law DM 10/03/1998 [9]; max-
imum number of floors to walk (up or down) is chosen according to Table 5.10. If the
vertical connection is protected, it could be an advantage to have a big number of sector
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connected. On the contrary, if the vertical connection is not protected the more are the
connected sectors the worst is the situation.
IF2.3 Linings and floorings
Reaction to fire is evaluated against the probability that flash-over may occur in critical
spaces as escape routes. The grade for this Sub-Factor can be attributed on basis of the
reaction to fire class of large surfaces, i.e. walls and ceiling linings. The worst class
product occupying over 20% of the walls, or 20% of the ceiling is considered dominant
for the attribution of the grade. The grade is linked with the potential contribution
of the product to flash-over in an escape route and it is linked to product’s Euroclass
classification.
259
IF3.1 Vertical Structure
Vertical Structure is the structure composing the walls or columns of the analysed sector.
The grade is linked with the resistance capacity that materials can assure. The worst type
of structure occupying over 20% of the total is considered dominant for the attribution of
the grade.
IF3.2 Horizontal Structure
Horizontal Structure is the structure composing the floors you walk on in the sector. The
grade, as for Factor IF3.1, is linked with the resistance capacity that materials can assure.
The worst type of structure occupying over 20% of the total surface is considered dominant
for the attribution of the grade.
260
Appendix B
Sensitivity Analysis
This annex provides full results from sensitivity analysis performed on the definitive AHP
structure. Sensitivity analysis has been conducted for:
• each set of Factors with respect to the corresponding Characteristic and each Objec-
tive (sensitivity analysis of level 4 with respect to level 3 of the hierarchical structure);
• each set of Characteristics with respect to each Objective (sensitivity analysis of level
3 with respect to level 2 of the hierarchical structure).
For each set of parameters Tornado Diagrams and Spider Charts are here plotted
together with the corresponding data coming out from the spreadsheets.
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B.1 Sensitivity analysis of level 4 with respect to level 3 -
Factors vs Characteristics
B.1.1 External Analysis
B.1.1.1 EC1 vs OB1
Figures B.1 and B.2 show sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB1.
Figure B.1: Sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB1: tornado diagram.
Figure B.2: Sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB1: spider chart.
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B.1.1.2 EC1 vs OB2
Figures B.3 and B.4 show sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB2.
Figure B.3: Sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB2: tornado diagram.
Figure B.4: Sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB2: spider chart.
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B.1.1.3 EC1 vs OB3
Figures B.5 and B.6 show sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB3.
Figure B.5: Sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB3: tornado diagram.
Figure B.6: Sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB3: spider chart.
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B.1.1.4 EC2 vs OB1
Figures B.7 and B.8 show sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB1.
Figure B.7: Sensitivity analysis of EC1 with respect to OB1: tornado diagram.
Figure B.8: Sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB1: spider chart.
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B.1.1.5 EC2 vs OB2
Figures B.9 and B.10 show sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB2.
Figure B.9: Sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB2: tornado diagram.
Figure B.10: Sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB2: spider chart.
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B.1.1.6 EC2 vs OB3
Figures B.11 and B.12 show sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB3.
Figure B.11: Sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB3: tornado diagram.
Figure B.12: Sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB3: spider chart.
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B.1.1.7 EC3 vs OB1
Figures B.13 and B.14 show sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB1.
Figure B.13: Sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB1: tornado diagram.
Figure B.14: Sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB1: spider chart.
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B.1.1.8 EC3 vs OB2
Figures B.15 and B.16 show sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB2.
Figure B.15: Sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB2: tornado diagram.
Figure B.16: Sensitivity analysis of EC2 with respect to OB2: spider chart.
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B.1.1.9 EC3 vs OB3
Figures B.17 and B.18 show sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB3.
Figure B.17: Sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB3: tornado diagram.
Figure B.18: Sensitivity analysis of EC3 with respect to OB3: spider chart.
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B.1.2 Internal Analysis
B.1.2.1 IC1 vs OB1
Figures B.19, B.20 and B.21 show sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB1.
Figure B.19: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB1: tornado diagram.
Figure B.20: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB1: two factors tornado diagram.
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Figure B.21: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB1: spider chart.
B.1.2.2 IC1 vs OB2
Figures B.22, B.23 and B.24 show sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB2.
Figure B.22: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB2: tornado diagram.
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Figure B.23: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB2: two factors tornado diagram.
Figure B.24: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB2: spider chart.
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B.1.2.3 IC1 vs OB3
Figures B.25, B.26 and B.27 show sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB3.
Figure B.25: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB3: tornado diagram.
Figure B.26: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB3: two factors tornado diagram.
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Figure B.27: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB3: spider chart.
B.1.2.4 IC2 vs OB1
Figures B.28, B.29 and B.30 show sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB1.
Figure B.28: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB1: tornado diagram.
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Figure B.29: Sensitivity analysis of IC1 with respect to OB1: two factors tornado diagram.
Figure B.30: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB1: spider chart.
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B.1.2.5 IC2 vs OB2
Figures B.31, B.32 and B.33 show sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB2.
Figure B.31: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB2: tornado diagram.
Figure B.32: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB2: two factors tornado diagram.
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Figure B.33: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB2: spider chart.
B.1.2.6 IC2 vs OB3
Figures B.34, B.35 and B.36 show sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB3.
Figure B.34: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB3: tornado diagram.
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Figure B.35: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB3: two factors tornado diagram.
Figure B.36: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB3: spider chart.
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B.1.2.7 IC3 vs OB1
Figures B.37 and B.38 show sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB1.
Figure B.37: Sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB1: tornado diagram.
Figure B.38: Sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB1: spider chart.
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B.1.2.8 IC3 vs OB2
Figures B.39 and B.40 show sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB2.
Figure B.39: Sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB2: tornado diagram.
Figure B.40: Sensitivity analysis of IC2 with respect to OB2: spider chart.
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B.1.2.9 IC3 vs OB3
Figures B.41 and B.42 show sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB3.
Figure B.41: Sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB3: tornado diagram.
Figure B.42: Sensitivity analysis of IC3 with respect to OB3: spider chart.
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B.2 Sensitivity analysis of level 3 with respect to level 2 -
Characteristics vs Objectives
B.2.1 External Analysis
B.2.1.1 EC vs OB1
Figures B.43, B.44 and B.45 show sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with
respect to OB1.
Figure B.43: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB1: tornado dia-
gram.
Figure B.44: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB1: two factors
tornado diagram.
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Figure B.45: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB1: spider chart.
B.2.1.2 EC vs OB2
Figures B.46, B.47 and B.48 show sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with
respect to OB2.
Figure B.46: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB2: tornado dia-
gram.
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Figure B.47: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB2: two factors
tornado diagram.
Figure B.48: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB2: spider chart.
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B.2.1.3 EC vs OB3
Figures B.49, B.50 and B.51 show sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with
respect to OB3.
Figure B.49: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB3: tornado dia-
gram.
Figure B.50: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB3: two factors
tornado diagram.
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Figure B.51: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB3: spider chart.
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B.2.2 Internal Analysis
B.2.2.1 IC vs OB1
Figures B.52, B.53 and B.54 show sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with
respect to OB1.
Figure B.52: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB1: tornado dia-
gram.
Figure B.53: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB1: two factors
tornado diagram.
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Figure B.54: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB1: spider chart.
B.2.2.2 IC vs OB2
Figures B.55, B.56 and B.57 show sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with
respect to OB2.
Figure B.55: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB2: tornado dia-
gram.
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Figure B.56: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB2: two factors
tornado diagram.
Figure B.57: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB2: spider chart.
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B.2.2.3 IC vs OB3
Figures B.58, B.59 and B.60 show sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with
respect to OB3.
Figure B.58: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB3: tornado dia-
gram.
Figure B.59: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB3: two factors
tornado diagram.
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Figure B.60: Sensitivity analysis of External Characteristics with respect to OB3: spider chart.
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